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CHAPTER I.  Introduction 
During the late Nineteenth Century and most of the Twentieth Century, 
indeterminate sentencing was the most common form of sentencing in the United States.
Judges imposed wide sentencing ranges with little guidance from the legislature, and 
correctional and parole officials subsequently determined the date of release from 
incarceration. Beginning in the 1970s, there was a sentencing reform movement where 
nearly every state and the federal system enacted laws requiring that the length of 
sentence be known at the time of sentencing and limiting the discretion of judges, 
corrections officials, and parole boards. One of the most common methods for controlling 
judicial discretion was through the creation of sentencing guidelines, which generally 
combined offense and offender characteristics in a structured format to determin  the 
type and severity of punishment to be imposed.  
The primary purpose of sentencing guidelines systems was to increase 
consistency and fairness in sentencing. While numerous studies have found that 
sentencing guidelines systems have been successful in reducing sentencing disparity, 
critics argue that guidelines may have simply displaced discretion and disparity from the 
judge at the sentencing phase to the prosecutor at the pre-conviction stage. This argument 
is often referred to as the “hydraulic displacement of discretion” thesis. Few studies have 
empirically examined whether prosecutorial practices such as charging nd charge 
bargaining have changed as a result of sentencing guidelines reforms. This gap in the 
literature is due primarily to the lack of available data on prosecutorial decisions.  
This study tests whether there was a displacement of discretion and disparity from 
the judge to the prosecutor after the implementation of the District of Columbia 
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Sentencing Guidelines in June 2004. Chapter Two reviews the history of sentencing 
guidelines reforms and the studies evaluating whether guidelines have reduced disparity. 
It then summarizes the background and purposes of the District of Columbia Sentencing 
Guidelines and discusses preliminary evaluations by the District of Columbia Sentencing 
Commission finding that its guidelines have been successful in achieving high judicial 
compliance and reducing disparity.  
Chapter Two then provides an overview of the hydraulic displacement of 
discretion thesis and reviews the empirical tests, which have found little evid nce of a 
change in the level of discretion or disparities in prosecutorial practices after sentencing 
guidelines. Next, Chapter Two summarizes prior research on prosecutorial charging and 
charge bargaining, not necessarily in guidelines systems, but in general. While not 
directly relevant to the effect of sentencing guidelines on prosecutors, this literature is 
important for its substantive conclusions about the determinants of prosecutorial 
decisions and its methodological approaches for measuring prosecutorial outcomes. This 
chapter then reviews the dominant theoretical perspectives used to predict and explin 
prosecutorial decision-making. Finally, it discusses the specific resea ch questions that 
will be addressed in this study.  
Chapter Three describes the data, measures, and analytic methods. This study 
examines two random samples of felony convictions from before and after the Disrict of 
Columbia Sentencing Guidelines went into effect in 2004. Because the samples originally 
included only information on the conviction and sentence, it was necessary to manually 
collect information on prosecutorial charging and other missing information such as 
criminal history for each individual case. Chapter Four presents the results of the 
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descriptive statistics analyses, which revealed that the pre-Guidelines and post-Guidelines 
samples were remarkably similar in virtually all offender characte istics. Chapter Five 
presents the results of the multivariate analyses of charge bargaining before and after the 
District of Columbia Sentencing Guidelines. Finally, Chapter Six discusses the important 





CHAPTER II:  Literature Review 
History of Sentencing Guidelines Reforms 
In the late 1800s, indeterminate sentencing was the most common system of 
criminal sentencing in the United States. By 1942, every state and the federal system had 
indeterminate sentencing structures (Petersilia, 1999). Under this system, the legislature 
prescribed broad sentencing ranges without meaningful legal guidance for the trial judge 
(Demleitner, 2004). The judge imposed a minimum and maximum sentence, and 
correctional and parole officials subsequently determined the date of release from prison 
(Tonry, 1996). The judge had significant freedom to fashion penalties tailored to the 
unique circumstances of individual offenders, prison officials had substantial decision 
making authority over the amount of good conduct time an inmate could earn to 
accelerate the discharge date, and parole boards had wide latitude to determine when an 
offender would be released on parole supervision (Tonry, 1996; Ostrom et al., 2008). 
Discretion, in short, was the “cornerstone” of indeterminate sentencing (Walker, 1993).  
Decisions by judges, corrections officials, and parole boards were intended to 
achieve utilitarian goals of punishment such as rehabilitation and incapacitation. Cr minal 
justice officials were assumed to have special expertise to make decisions about 
continued incarceration and predictions about future criminal behavior (Tonry, 1999). As 
the United States Supreme Court explained, “reformation and rehabilitation of offenders 
[were] important goals of criminal jurisprudence,” and the “prevalent modern philosophy 
was that the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime.”1 Offenders 
were viewed as “ill” and in need of “treatment” (Rothman, 1980). In its 1967 report, The 
                                                
1 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). 
 
5 
Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement 
and Administration of Justice discussed the “reform model” that existed in which the 
offender was a “patient” and the “treatment” was intended to fit the individual. Optimism 
about indeterminate sentencing and the potential for rehabilitation reached its p ak in the 
1960s (Ostrom, et al., 2008). Indeterminate sentencing was at that time a “distinctively 
American approach” (Tonry, 1999).  
In the 1970s and early 1980s, however, there was a “ferment that significantly 
affected sentencing practice” (Blumstein, 1983: xi) and led to an unprecedented 
“sentencing reform movement” (Reitz, 1998: 222). Critics of indeterminate sentencing 
argued that sentences should be “softer, tougher, fairer, more consistent, more efficient, 
more economical, more transparent, or more effective at preventing crime” (Tonry, 2005: 
38). With regard to sentencing severity, reformers argued that indeterminate se tencing 
resulted in lenient sentences and failed to control crime (Wilson, 1975). Their views were 
supported by research that many interpreted as finding that rehabilitative programs did 
not reduce recidivism (Martinson, 1974; Lipton, Martinson, Wilks, 1975; Sechrest, 
1979). Others questioned the premise of the rehabilitative ideal--that crime is a product of 
individual pathology or illness and that rehabilitation can be achieved within a prison 
system. They also criticized the assumption that criminal justice officials had sufficient 
knowledge to impose treatment or to accurately predict recidivism to justify the r 
sentencing power (AFSC, 1971; Monahan, 1981; Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1996: 7).  
In 1972, United States District Judge Marvin Frankel wrote Criminal Sentences: 
Law without Order, which has been described as “the best indictment of traditional, 
indeterminate sentencing practices in the literature” (Reitz, 1993). Judge Frankel 
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highlighted the “gross evils and defaults” (p. vii) in the sentencing system, particularly 
the absence of standards, rules, or procedures to guide judicial sentences.2 With uch a 
wide range of statutory choices and a lack of legal guidance for sentencing judges, he 
believed that disparity among similar cases would result.3 While it is important that 
judges make individualized sentencing decisions, it is important that they be made 
according to legal rules.4 
Complicating matters further, the disparity that may result from individual 
sentencing decisions was difficult to understand because judges did not provide 
sentencing rationales. This “wall of silence” was troubling because ther was no way of 
knowing if a judge’s sentencing decision was based on inappropriate considerations.5 In 
                                                
2 Noting that the imposition of sentence is “probably the most critical point” (p. vii) in the criminal justice 
system due in part to the high rate of guilty pleas, Franked argued that it is “tragically incongruous” that the 
most elaborate procedures to safeguard defendant rights are for the trial phase but we “treat as a casual 
anticlimax the perfunctory process” of sentencing (p. vii). 
3 Judge Frankel explained: 
[T]rial judges, answerable only to their varieties of consciences, may and do send people 
to prison for terms that may vary in any given case from none at all up to five, ten, thirty, 
or more years. This means that in the great majority f federal criminal cases that a 
defendant who comes up for sentencing has no way of knowing or reliably predicting 
whether he will walk out of the courtroom on probation, or be locked up for a term of 
years that may consume the rest of his life, or something in between…The result…is a 
wild array of sentencing judgments without any semblance of the consistency demanded 
by the ideal of equal justice. And it could not be otherwise under our non-system of so-
called laws prescribing penalties. The broad statutory ranges might approach a degree of 
ordered rationality if there were prescribed any standards for locating a particular case 
within any range. But neither our federal law nor that of any state I know contains 
meaningful criteria for this purpose (p. 7). 
4 Judge Frankel wrote: 
There is dignity and security in the assurance that each of us—plain or beautiful, rich or 
poor, black, white, tall, curly, whatever—is promised treatment as bland, fungible 
“equal” before the law. Is “individualized” sentenci g consistent with that promise? 
Certainly not under the broad grants of subjective discretion we give to our judges…The 
ideal of individualized justice is by no means an unmitigated evil, but it must be an ideal 
of justice according to law. This means that we must reject individual distinctions—
discrimination, that is—unless they can be justified by relevant tests capable of 
formulation and application with sufficient objectivi y to ensure that the results will be 
more than the idiosyncratic ukases of particular officials, judges, or others (p. 11). 
5 Judge Frankel elaborated:  
Criminal sentences, as our judges commonly pronounce them, are…tyrannical. Largely 
unfettered by limiting standards, and thus having neither occasion nor meaningful terms 
for explaining, the judge usually supplies nothing i  the way of a coherent and rational 
 
7 
short, the main “evils” assailed by Frankel were “the absence of decent legal ordering,” 
“the absurdly broad statutes,” “the gross inequalities,” “the unchecked discretion of 
judges,” “the absence of reasoned explanations,” and “the haste and the general 
arbitrariness” (p. 58). The problem was “too little law, not too much” (p. 58). He also 
criticized the rehabilitative underpinning of indeterminate sentencing, arguing that 
rehabilitation was “absent” in our prisons and that there was powerful evidence that the 
majority of prisoners “become poorer risks and lesser people” rather than improve in 
prison (p. 93). Parole boards, he argued, made decisions without orderly and uniform 
criteria and were often moved by political pressures and public opinion (p. 94). The 
inmate experience was “cruel and degrading,” and there was “command that he remain in 
custody for some uncertain period, while his keepers study him, grade him in secret, and 
decide if and when he may be let go” (p. 96). The “basic problem” was “the unruliness, 
the absence of rational ordering, the unbridled power of the sentencers to be arbitrary and 
discriminatory” (p. 49). Because there was evidence that rehabilitation was often 
ineffective or coercive, Frankel argued that the presumption should be in favor of a fixed
rather than indeterminate sentence.6 
                                                                                                                                                 
judgment when he informs the defendant of his fate…The judge thus loosed may be one 
of the world’s most virtuous people. Or he may not. In either event, he is not encouraged 
or even invited to proceed according to law. He may be propelled toward a stern sentence 
by high moral values or by private quirks of a less legant nature or by a perceived 
affront to his dignity in the courtroom. Whatever accounts for his judgment, he need not 
say, and he normally does not say. It is certain beyond question that a power this wild 
will spawn at least some results that are bizarre and would be promptly condemned as 
unlawful if the unspoken grounds of decision were known. If this certainly requires 
proof, every criminal lawyer knows cases in which sentencing judges have done crazy 
and horrible things (p. 41).   
6 As Frankel explained:  
It is not my claim that rehabilitation is always and everywhere impossible. Nor do I argue 
that an indeterminate sentence could never be wide an  fair. The great evil in current 
thinking is the pair of false assumptions that (1) rehabilitation is always possible and (2) 
indeterminate sentences are lways desirable. I urge that the shoe belongs on the othr 
foot. Most importantly, my contention is that the pr sumption ought always to be in favor 
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Judge Frankel offered, not only criticisms of indeterminate sentencing, but 
proposals for change. He recommended the creation of a specialized administrative 
agency called a sentencing commission that would be responsible for (1) the study of 
sentencing, corrections, and parole; (2) the formulation of laws and rules; and (3) the 
enactment of rules, subject to traditional checks by the legislative and judicial branches 
(p. 119). Frankel also advocated appellate review of sentences, which he thought would 
foster a measure of consistency and fairness (p. 115). Finally, he proposed a general 
outline of how rules or guidelines might incorporate sentencing factors in an orderly and 
measurable way.7 
Beginning in the 1970s, there was a “remarkable burst of reform” of criminal 
sentencing systems in the United States (Walker, 1993: 112). Nearly every stat  and the 
federal system developed mechanisms to eliminate or limit the discretion of judges, 
corrections officials, and parole boards (Walker, 1993: 113). Many states introduced 
sentencing schemes based on theories of deterrence and incapacitation such as 
                                                                                                                                                 
of a definite sentence, known and justified on the day of sentencing…There should be a 
burden of justifying an indeterminate sentence in any particular case—a burden to be 
satisfied only by concrete reasons and concrete program for the defendant in that case. 
The justifications, I tentatively suggest…would consist of identified needs and resources 
for effective rehabilitation or for incapacitation f a dangerous offender, or both (p. 98).  
7 Frankel wrote: 
Beyond codifying the numerous factors affecting the length and severity of sentences, an 
acceptable code of penal law should, in my judgment, prescribe guidelines for the 
application and assessment of these factors. While it may seem dry, technical, 
unromantic, and “mechanical,” I have in mind the cration of a detailed chart or calculus 
to be used (1) by the sentencing judge in weighing the many elements that go into the 
sentence; (2) by lawyers, probation officers, and others undertaking to persuade or 
enlighten the judge; and (3) by appellate courts in reviewing what the judge has 
done…The partial remedy I propose is a kind of detailed profile or checklist of factors 
that would include, wherever possible, some form of numerical or other objective 
grading…The overall result might be a score—or, possibly, an individual profile of 
sentencing elements—that would make it feasible to foll w the sentencer’s estimates, 
criticize them, and compare the sentence in the givn case with others  (p. 112-114). 
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determinate or “flat time” sentencing,8 mandatory minimum penalties,9 and habitual 
offender laws10 (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1996: 1; Spohn, 2002: 220). In 1976, for 
example, California introduced the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Law, which was the 
first major high-profile reconstitution of a state sentencing system. This law was 
supported by liberals and conservatives, prisoners’ rights advocates and police unions, 
and judges and corrections officials (Tonry, 2005: 38). 
Other jurisdictions opted for sentencing guidelines, which  brought together 
characteristics of the offense and the offender in a structured format that de ermines the 
type and severity of punishment the judges should impose (Ostrom, et al., 2008: i). 
Sentencing guidelines proponents such as von Hirsh (1976) argued that punishment 
schemes should be based on a non-utilitarian “just deserts” or “commensurate deserts”
paradigm.11 In most sentencing guidelines systems, punishments are scaled along a two-
dimensional grid measuring the seriousness of the crime and the offender’s prior criminal 
record, and judges are required or encouraged to impose the sentence indicated by the 
intersection of these two factors. By restricting judicial discretion to i dividualize 
sentences and requiring that sentences be based primarily on legal characteristics of the 
                                                
8 Determinate sentencing is defined as sentences of incarceration in which parole is abolished and an 
offender is given a fixed term by a judge that may be reduced by good time or earned time (Bureau of 
Justice Assistance, 1996: xii).  
9 A mandatory minimum penalty is defined as: “A minimum sentence that is specified by statute and that 
may be applied for all convictions of a particular crime or a crime with special circumstances (e.g., robbery 
with a firearm or selling drugs to a minor within 1,000 feet of a school)” (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 
1996: xii). 
10 Habitual offender laws (such as “three-strikes-andyou’re-out”) mandated long prison sentences for 
repeat offenders (Spohn, 2002: 220). 
11 Morris (1974) recommended a “modified just deserts” approach, where upper and lower limits are set 
based on just deserts to prevent undeserved penalties, but judges could otherwise account for other factors 
to achieve utilitarian aims.  
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offense and prior record, sentencing guidelines seek to increase uniformity and eliminate 
disparity in sentencing (Savelsberg, 1992; Spohn, 2002: 222).12 
The first stage in the sentencing guidelines movement was the development of 
voluntary or non-binding guidelines for sentencing judges. They were typically 
descriptive rather than prescriptive in that they were based on the past sentencing 
practices of judges and not on normative notions of what the sentence ought to be. The 
idea was to document the sentences that judges historically imposed for different types of 
offense/offender combinations (Blumstein, et al., 1983: 135; Bureau of Justice 
Assistance, 1996: xii; Spohn, 2002: 224). Advocates hoped that identifying historical 
penalties would encourage judges at the two ends of the sentencing continuum to move 
closer to the middle. In the late 1970s, presumptive sentencing guidelines replaced 
voluntary guidelines as the dominant approach (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1996: 17; 
Spohn, 2002: 229). In presumptive systems, judges are expected to sentence within the 
range dictated by the guidelines or provide written justification for a departure. 
Furthermore, there is generally some form of appellate review of lower court departure 
decisions (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1996: xii).  
Implicit in one’s preference for more presumptive or voluntary guidelines is a 
judgment on the degree to which judicial discretion must be constrained to best achieve 
consistency and fairness (Ostrom, et al., 2008: 5). Though guidelines systems are often 
referred to as either voluntary or presumptive, the distinctions between them are blurred 
in reality, and most systems are located somewhere on a continuum between the two 
                                                
12 Most sentencing guidelines systems attempt to achieve additional sentencing goals such as rehabilitation 
and incapacitation, for example through specific departure grounds, by providing for wide sentencing 
ranges, or by recommending incarceration or non-incarceration. The primary goal of the sentencing 




extremes (Ostrom, et al., 2008: 25). By the early 1980s, a consensus of opinion began to 
emerge that the best method of controlling discretion was through sentencing guidelines, 
which “indicated a presumptive sentence but left the judge some limited discretion” 
(Walker, 1993: 122).  
To be sure, sentencing reform has been a “patchwork affair” (Walker, 1993: 141). 
Roughly one half of the states still retain indeterminate sentencing system , though they 
have introduced some determinate elements such as mandatory minimum and habitual 
offender statutes. At least 20 states, the District of Columbia, and the federal system use 
some form of sentencing guidelines (Ostrom, et al., 2008). Today, American jurisdictions 
continue to consider whether to adopt new sentencing reforms to increase fairness and 
consistency in sentencing.13 Though many states still retain indeterminate sentencing 
structures, the sentencing reform movement that began in the 1970s “arguably produced 
the most fundamental changes to be found in any area of criminal justice. In no other area 
has there been such a broad-ranging debate over the first principles and such sweeping 
changes in operating assumptions and practices” (Walker, 1993: 141).  
 
Prior Research on the Impact of Sentencing Guidelines on Disparity 
There is a substantial body of research examining whether sentencing guidelines 
have achieved their primary aim of reducing disparity. The literature includes numerous 
                                                
13 Sentencing reforms such as sentencing guidelines are also intended to achieve other goals such as tying
sentences to correctional resources and making sentenci g decisions more transparent (Tonry, 2005). One
factor that may affect whether more jurisdictions adopt sentencing guidelines systems is a recent line of 
decisions by the United States Supreme Court holding that certain presumptive sentencing guidelines 
systems violate a defendant’s right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution (See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 
(2004); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)). The states and the federal system have responded to 
these decisions by making their sentencing guidelines voluntary or by introducing new procedural 
requirements to safeguard the right to a jury trial(Frase, 2005; Wool, 2005).  
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complex issues beginning with how to define and measure disparity. Noting that early 
research on sentencing confused discussions of discretion, disparity, and discrimination, 
Hagan and Bumiller (1983) defined discretion as “the latitude of decision provided by 
law to someone in imposing a sentence,” discrimination as “a pattern of sentencing 
regarded as unfair, disadvantaging, and prejudicial in origin,” and disparity as “a form of 
unequal treatment that is often of unexplained cause and is at least incongruous, if not 
unfair and disadvantaging, in consequence” (p. 9). More recently, disparity has been 
defined as “different sentencing of ‘similarly situated’ offenders and the similar 
sentencing of dissimilar offenders” (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1996: 32). The 
meaning of “similarly situated” or “dissimilar” can vary, however, based on how one 
values sentencing factors or goals (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1996: 32).14 
Ostrom, et al. (2008) identified three organizing concepts of disparity: (1) 
consistency (like cases are treated alike); (2) proportionality (more seriou  offenders are 
punished more severely); and (3) discrimination (extra-legal factors such as age, gender 
and race are insignificant in who goes to prison and for how long). Spohn’s (2002) 
review of the sentencing literature provided the following definitions of disparity as 
distinguished from discrimination: 
Disparity refers to a difference in treatment or outcome, but one that does 
not necessarily involve discrimination.  As the Panel on Sentencing 
Research noted, “Disparity exists when ‘like cases’ with respect to case 
attributes—regardless of their legitimacy—are sentenced differently” 
                                                
14 Frase (2005) explained:  
In order to decide that two offenders are similarly situated and thus 
should receive similar sentences (or that they are dissimilar and should 
receive different sentences) we must first define the relevant sentencing 
factors (the offense and offender characteristics that judges should 
consider in determining appropriate sentences) and the weight to be 
given to each of these factors. The choice and weightin  of sentencing 
factors depends, in turn, on the punishment purposes which the 
sentence is supposed to serve (p. 67). 
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(Blumstein et al., 1983, 72). Discrimination, on the other hand, is a 
difference that results from differential treatment based on illegit mate 
criteria, such as race, gender, social class, or sexual orientation.  With 
respect to sentencing, discrimination “exists when some case attribute that 
is objectionable (typically on moral or legal grounds) can be shown to be 
associated with sentence outcomes after all other relevant variables are 
adequately controlled” (Blumstein et al, 1983, 72) (p. 432).  
 
While the definition of sentencing disparity is “inescapably normative,” Alschuler 
(2005) argued, dispassionate social scientists can usefully study it by assessing the 
influence of clearly inappropriate factors such as the offender’s race, ethnicity, and 
gender (p. 95).15 Miethe and Moore (1985) and Souryal and Wellford (1997) followed 
Alshuler’s approach by examining the effect of clearly inappropriate facors. A final 
method measures sentencing disparity as total sentencing variation unexplained by 
legally mandated sentencing factors. Supporters of this approach have argued that it 
diminishes error arising from inadequate measures of extralegal variables and omitted 
variables (Stolzenberg and D’Alessio, 1994).  
Regardless of how one defines sentencing disparity, it is clear that the sentencing 
reform movement has produced a “substantial reduction in the sum total of [judicial] 
discretion in criminal sentencing” (Walker, 1993: 141). Sentencing guidelines hav  been 
successful in that they have changed judges’ sentencing practices (Tonry, 1996). As to 
whether they have reduced disparity, however, Frase (1999) lamented that nobody can 
                                                
15 Alschuler (2005) further argued that researchers should not accept the sentencing guidelines’ own 
standards (e.g., offense severity and prior record) as a baseline for examining disparity:  
Equality requires the consistent application of a comprehensible normative principle or 
mix of principles to different cases. For this reason, evidence that offenders who have 
committed the same crime receive more uniform sentences under a guidelines system 
than they would have without them does not establish that the guidelines have reduced 
disparity. Judges in the pre-guidelines period might not have sought to treat everyone 
who committed the same crime alike. They might have tried to treat offenders of equal 
moral culpability alike or offenders of equal dangerousness alike or offenders with equal 
rehabilitative prospects alike. If these judges consistently applied a coherent principle or 
mix of principles to their cases, researchers could not fairly conclude that the guidelines 
had reduced disparity. They could conclude only that t e guidelines had applied a new set 
of sentencing principles (p. 88). 
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answer this with certainty because the majority of the research has been in a handful of 
jurisdictions. The studies that do exist have generally concluded that state sentencing 
guidelines, particularly presumptive guidelines, have reduced (though not eliminated) 
disparities.16 Several studies of Minnesota’s guidelines concluded that they have 
increased uniformity and reduced disparity across similar cases (Minnesota Sentencing 
Guidelines Commission, 1984; Miethe and Moore, 1985; Moore and Miethe, 1986; 
Stolzenberg and D’Alessio, 1994). Stolzenberg and D’Alessio, for instance, found an 18 
percent reduction in disparity for the decision to incarcerate and a 60 percent reduction in 
disparity for the length of sentence decision (p. 106). They did warn, however, that the 
proportion of sentence variation explained by offense and prior record decreased 18 
months after the Guidelines were implemented, raising the possibility that Sentencing 
Guidelines may only have short term effects on disparity.  
The Washington State Sentencing Guidelines Commission concluded that its 
guidelines reduced variability in sentencing among counties and among judges and led to 
more sentences that were gender and ethnicity neutral (Washington State Sentencing 
                                                
16 The evidence on whether the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have reduced disparity is mixed and harder 
to interpret. Because the federal guidelines are far more rigid, complex, and severe than state systems, and 
because they are based on a unique system of “real off nse conduct” where conduct not part of the 
conviction offense(s) affects sentencing, many dispositions, critics argue,  have been forced “under 
ground,” possibly making federal data more unreliable (Tonry 1993). State sentencing guidelines system 
are frequently viewed by scholars as qualitatively distinct from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The
federal guidelines have been frequently criticized.  They have been described as a “disaster” (Tonry, 1996) 
and a “highly detailed and mechanical set of guidelines without a clear rationale” (Ostrom, et al., 2008: 25). 
Unlike most state guidelines systems that were developed to reduce disparity and increase uniformity, the 
federal guidelines were developed and implemented aft r the heyday of the sentencing reform movement 
during the crime control era of the 1980s. Though reducing disparity is one of the stated goals of the 
guidelines, critics argue they were also developed as a result of a politicized process to increase sentences. 
Contrary to state guidelines, which generally rely on a small number of legal factors and relatively wide 
sentencing ranges, the federal guidelines include a long list of adjustments, offense characteristics, and 
other factors, and very narrow sentencing ranges. All of this makes the Federal guidelines more difficult to 
evaluate. Piehl and Bushway (2007) summed up the evid nce: “The message with respect to the Federal 
guidelines is less clear. A self review by the Federal Sentencing Commission has found increased 




Guidelines Commission, 1992). Oregon’s Criminal Justice Council found that its 
guidelines increased uniformity, with dispositional (whether or not to sentence someone 
to prison) variability for similar offenders being reduced by 45 percent (Ashford and 
Mosbaek, 1991). The Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing (1984) and Kramer and 
Lubitz (1985) concluded that sentences were more uniform throughout Pennsylvania 
following the introduction of sentencing guidelines. Gorton and Boies (1999) analyzed 
pre- and post-sentencing guidelines felony sentences in Pennsylvania and found that 
racial disparity was reduced. 
Thus, as Tonry (1996) wrote, “there is substantial evidence that the presumptive 
sentencing guidelines adopted in Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Oregon 
have made sentencing more consistent and uniform. In all four states, sentencing 
disparity has declined in the post-reform period” (p. 42). Though extra-legal disp rities 
based on characteristics such as race, sex, age, and employment status have not been 
eliminated, most studies of state sentencing guidelines conclude sentences b came more 
uniform and less disparate and are more tightly linked to the guideline factors such as the 
seriousness of the offense and the offender’s prior criminal record (Spohn, 2002: 299).  
The early research was less encouraging for voluntary sentencing guidelines. 
There was evidence that they were less successful in achieving disparity reduction than 
their presumptive counterparts (Cohen and Tonry, 1983). As the Bureau of Justice 
Assistance (1996) wrote, “a review of all the major studies conducted on 
voluntary/advisory guidelines reveals low compliance by judges and, hence, little impact 
on reducing disparity” (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1996: 11). Recent studies of 
voluntary guidelines systems have reached more positive results. Frase (2000) stated, 
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“Although much more research is needed on this point, it may be that voluntary judicial 
guidelines can still be effective to reduce disparity, at least if certain o her factors are 
present” (p. 436). Hunt and Connelly (2005) argued that voluntary guidelines systems 
have produced results comparable to those of presumptive sentencing systems. Hartley, et 
al. (2006) found that judges in the Arkansas voluntary guidelines system based their 
decisions predominantly on legally relevant guideline variables. Pfaff (2007) concluded 
that, while voluntary guidelines do not reduce disparity to the same extent as presumptive 
schemes, they have had some success. As discussed in the next section, several 
preliminary evaluations by the District of Columbia Sentencing Commission have also 
concluded that the voluntary sentencing guidelines have been successful in achieving a 
high level of judicial compliance and reducing disparity. 
 
Background of the District of Columbia Sentencing Guidelines 
Prior to August 2000, the District of Columbia had an indeterminate sentencing 
structure, where judges and parole officials had broad discretion to fashion crimial 
sentences. The judge was required by law to impose a maximum term and a minimum 
term, which could not exceed one-third of the maximum term. The legislature set th  
penalty structure within very broad ranges,17 and the paroling authority had discretion to 
release the offender any time after service of the minimum term (less good time credits) 
(District of Columbia Advisory Commission on Sentencing Annual Report, 2002: 7).  
In 1997, the United States Congress enacted the National Capital Revitalization 
and Self-Government Improvement Act of 1997 (the “Revitalization Act”), which 
                                                




abolished parole for all major felonies in the District of Columbia and mandated a shift to 
determinate sentencing for those felonies. The Revitalization Act also established the 
District of Columbia Truth in Sentencing Commission (“the TIS Commission”) and 
directed it to make recommendations to the Council of the District of Columbia (“the 
Council”) for amendments to the District of Columbia Code with respect to sentencs 
imposed for felonies committed on or after August 5, 2000 (District of Columbia Truth in 
Sentencing Commission Annual Report, 1999: 1). In 1998, the TIS Commission 
recommended to the Council that it create an advisory body to make recommendations to 
enhance the fairness and effectiveness of sentencing policies. That year, the Council 
established the District of Columbia Advisory Commission on Sentencing (“the Advisory 
Commission”) (District of Columbia Advisory Commission on Sentencing Annual 
Report, 1999: 4).  
In 2000, the Advisory Commission recommended to the Council that it abolish 
parole and adopt a determinate sentencing system for all felonies. It further 
recommended that the Council consider the adoption of a structured sentencing system 
given the expanded judicial discretion under the new determinate sentencing system.18 
The Advisory Commission also noted that careful study was required before any 
structured sentencing system was adopted for two reasons. First, “sentencing guidelines 
by design limit the discretion and power of judges, and many believe that in doing so, 
guidelines transfer some of that discretion and power to prosecutors – giving them too 
much power” (District of Columbia Advisory Commission on Sentencing Annual Report, 
                                                
18 The new determinate sentencing system retained a pn lty structure with very broad limits, and judicial 
discretion was expanded by the abolition of parole. Under the new determinate system, a prison sentence 
consisted of a single term of imprisonment up to the maximum authorized sentence, and the offender was 




2000: 76). Second, “most believe that sentencing guidelines must be carefully drafted to 
allow judges some flexibility, but doing so too broadly can defeat the whole purpose of 
controlling discretion, and doing so too narrowly can turn the guidelines into a 
complicated or mechanistic process” (District of Columbia Advisory Commission on 
Sentencing Annual Report, 2000: 76). The Council adopted the recommendation to 
abolish parole for all felonies and directed the Commission to survey the structured 
sentencing systems around the country and to make recommendations as to the type of 
system, if any, that would best serve the needs of the citizens of the District of Columbia 
(District of Columbia Sentencing Commission Annual Report, 2006: 1).  
In 2003, after three years of study, the Advisory Commission recommended the 
adoption of voluntary sentencing guidelines. The Advisory Commission explained: 
The Commission’s primary rationale for proposing structured sentencing 
rests on a concern for basic fairness in sentencing. Substantial unexplained 
variability in sentencing exists. The judges and practitioners on the 
Commission all report variability in sentencing, some of which could be 
explained by legitimate sentencing factors relating to the crime or the 
background of the offender. The Commission’s analysis of sentencing data 
from 1996-2003 also showed variability in sentencing across all crime 
categories. To the extent that variability may be attributable solely to 
differences in judicial philosophy, it is a cause for concern. Basic fairness 
requires that similarly situated offenders should receive similar sentencs 
for similar crimes (District of Columbia Advisory Commission on 
Sentencing Annual Report, 2003: v). 
 
The proposed sentencing guidelines set sentence length ranges for each 
combination of crime and criminal history and established standards for departing from 
those ranges in extraordinary cases. The goal was to “move more sentences toward the 
historical center, without creating a guidelines system that results in more – or less – time 
served for the average offender in the average case” (District of Columbia Advisory 
Commission on Sentencing Annual Report, 2003: vi). Although the ranges in the 
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recommended guidelines were relatively broad, they narrowed discretion for the 
imposition of prison sentences to capture approximately the middle 50 percent of 
historical sentences. They also permitted a sentence to probation if at least 25 percent of 
offenders who fell within a given offense/criminal history combination were sntenced to 
probation in the past (District of Columbia Advisory Commission on Sentencing Annual 
Report, 2003: vi). As the Advisory Commission explained: 
[T]he Commission consciously attempted to capture the middle 50 percent 
of prison sentences in each category, based on the assumption that some 
percentage of sentences in the top and bottom 25 percent were outliers that 
should be brought into the middle range and some smaller percentage in 
each category were truly extraordinary cases that had – and would still 
have – valid reasons to depart from the norm. Similarly, with respect to 
the in/out decision, the Commission has recommended that probation be 
an available alternative to a prison sentence where at least 25 percent of 
the cases in the past received probation, and that a short split sentence, but 
not probation, be an available alternative to a straight prison sentence 
where at least 25 percent of the cases in the past received either probation 
or a short split sentence…The overall goal of this design is to “cabin 
discretion” and draw a good number of outlying sentences into the 
“corral” or mainstream of sentencing practice in the District of Columbia 
(District of Columbia Advisory Commission on Sentencing Annual 
Report, 2003:19).19  
 
The Advisory Commission recommended that the sentencing guidelines be 
voluntary rather than presumptive for three primary reasons. First, experience in other 
states showed that voluntary guidelines could “achieve high compliance while avo ding 
undesirable litigation, which can strain resources and affect the court’s abilityto manage 
its workload” (District of Columbia Advisory Commission on Sentencing Annual Report, 
2003: vi). Second, voluntary guidelines were viewed as “less rigid than mandatory 
                                                
19 Other jurisdictions have sentencing ranges that also wide, if not wider, than in the District of Columbia. 
In Ohio, for instance, First-degree felons can face nywhere from three to ten years in prison, second-
degree felons can face from two to eight years, third-degree felons between one to five years, fourth-degree 






systems and allow judges more room to structure a sentence to fit the varying 
circumstances of each individual case” (District of Columbia Advisory Commission on 
Sentencing Annual Report, 2003: vi). Finally, voluntary guidelines “will make it eas er 
for the Commission to adjust sentencing ranges in the future and, if necessary, account 
for important sentencing factors that may have been missed, and address any 
unanticipated consequences of such a major shift in sentencing practice” (District of 
Columbia Advisory Commission on Sentencing Annual Report, 2003: vi). The Advisory 
Commission, also noted that, given a single courthouse in the District and substantial 
judicial support, it expected the Superior Court to achieve a high degree of judicial 
compliance: 
The Commission believes that in a jurisdiction like the District of 
Columbia, with a single courthouse and judges in frequent contact with 
each other, most judges will want to operate within the mainstream of 
Superior Court practice, and will disdain unwarranted disparity…The 
Commission anticipates that Superior Court judges, understanding that the 
recommendations are derived from an analysis of historical sentencing 
practice in Superior Court, will generally tend to accept the 
recommendations for the typical case (District of Columbia Advisory 
Commission on Sentencing Annual Report, 2003: 18).20 
 
With regard to the potential criticism that a sentencing guidelines system with 
such wide sentencing ranges can not reduce disparity,21 the Advisory Commission 
emphasized that the sentencing ranges exclude 25% of the highest historical prison 
sentences and 25% of the lowest historical prison sentences. Ev n if the sentences that 
                                                
20 Coincidentally, on the first day that the D.C. Sentencing Guidelines went into effect, the United States 
Supreme Court ruled that the presumptive sentencing guidelines system in Washington was 
unconstitutional. This ruling was widely interpreted to mean that presumptive guidelines in other 
jurisdictions were also unconstitutional unless certain new procedural protections were implemented. Se 
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S 296 (2004).  
21 As Wooldredge (2009) wrote, “Some states have purposely developed flexible guidelines to avoid 
problems associated with rigid determinate sentencing schemes. A question, however, is whether flexibl 
schemes can achieve reductions in sentencing disparit es based on extralegal characteristics while 




will be imposed in typical cases span the entire width of the resulting middle 50% range, 
it argued, disparity in prison sentences should be reduced. Moreover, probation would 
still be an option in the proposed system in those offense/criminal history combinations 
where probation was historically given in 25% or more of the cases (District of Columbia 
Advisory Commission on Sentencing Annual Report, 2003: 18). The Advisory 
Commission also noted that, while reducing disparity is an important goal, another aspect
of sentencing fairness is “promoting warranted disparity, that is, treating different 
offenses and offenders differently” (District of Columbia Advisory Commission on 
Sentencing Annual Report, 2003: 21).  
The Advisory Commission further recommended that the new guidelines system 
be implemented initially as a pilot program to allow for a period of evaluation and public
comment. Following this period, if the structured sentencing system achieved its goal, it 
could be implemented on a more permanent basis. In 2004, the Council adopted the 
Commission’s recommendations and directed it to submit a report to the Council by 
December 1, 2006, describing the experience under the pilot program and recommending 
the appropriate sentencing system (District of Columbia Sentencing Commission Annual 
Report, 2006: 1). The Council also renamed the Advisory Commission the District of 
Columbia Sentencing Commission (“the Commission”).  
 The Commission completed drafting of the District of Columbia Sentencing 
Guidelines in early 2004, and they went into effect for all felony convictions on or after 
June 14, 2004. The Sentencing Guidelines have separate matrices for drug offenses (“the 
Drug Grid”) and non-drug offenses (“the Master Grid”).22 The Drug and Master Grids 
                                                
22 The Master Grid and Drug Grid are included in Appendix A and B. The most common Master Grid 
offenses in each severity group are also listed in Appendix C.  
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were designed with a recommended sentencing range for each of sixty boxes 
corresponding to a particular offense severity level and criminal history score. The 
Advisory Commission explained why it separated drug crimes from non-drug crimes: 
Drug cases charged as felonies in Superior Court generally involve small 
quantities of drugs sold on the street. Superior Court rarely sees drug 
dealers who are high up in a criminal organization. Many sellers 
themselves use drugs, and some participate in the sale solely as an aider 
and abettor to the primary dealer to obtain a “tip” in the form of drugs or 
money they can use to purchase their own drugs. Historical sentencing 
patterns demonstrate that these offenders often receive a short split 
sentence or probation with drug treatment, even when their criminal 
history might suggest otherwise. Philosophically, many believe that 
treatment and rehabilitation are important sentencing goals for low-level 
drug dealers selling to support their own substance abuse. This is not to 
suggest that there is unanimity of views on how to sentence repeat low 
level drug dealers. All things considered, however, the Commission 
decided that placing drug felonies on a separate grid was the best way to 
address both the “just deserts” and “rehabilitation” issues posed by these 
crimes and this mixed population of offenders (District of Columbia 
Advisory Commission on Sentencing Annual Report, 2003: 38). 
 
The Advisory Commission ranked more than 150 felony offenses for the Master 
Grid and Drug Grid by severity of the crime. The Advisory Commission explicitly 
followed the principle of proportionality, which requires that more serious crimes receive 
more serious punishment. It ranked felony crimes in severity relative to each other, and 
then grouped comparable crimes to form nine severity levels for crimes other than drug 
offenses (Master Groups 1 through 9 with Master Group 1 being the most severe) and 
three severity levels for drug offenses (Drug Groups 1 through 3 with Drug Group 1 
being the most severe) (District of Columbia Advisory Commission on Sentencing 
Annual Report, 2003: 37). In ranking offenses, the Advisory Commission was guided by 
available historical data on sentences imposed, the view of the “heartland case” for each 
crime, the harm to crime victims and the community commonly associated with the 
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commission of the crime, the legislative ranking of felony offenses as reflected by the 
statutory penalties prescribed, and each Commissioner’s intuitive sense of the relative 
severity of the offense (District of Columbia Advisory Commission on Sentencing 
Annual Report, 2003: 37).23  
With regard to the “heartland” case for each offense, the Advisory Commission 
formulated its rankings based on a hypothetical “ordinary” offender who has committed 
the offense in an “ordinary” way, where “ordinary” refers to factual scenarios that come 
before courts often and would be recognized by court actors as typical rather than 
extreme examples of the crime being ranked (District of Columbia Advisory C mmission 
on Sentencing Annual Report, 2002: xi).24 Though the Commission members considered 
statutory maximum penalties as one factor, it noted that these penalties are deign  to 
accommodate both the ordinary and the extreme cases and thus cover a very wide 
range.25  
In some boxes where the offense severity level and criminal history score 
intersect on the Master Grid and Drug Grid, a prison sentence is the only option 
                                                
23 The Commission warned that this ranking classification scheme did not take into account the many 
factors relevant at time of sentencing: 
[J]udges typically base sentencing decision on the severity of the crime, but also take into 
account other considerations such as the rehabilitation potential of the offender, the need 
to restrain or incapacitate high-risk offenders, and the actual harm done to victims. These 
considerations include a long list of risk factors, such as a defendant’s prior record of 
violent conduct, and protective factors, such as the defendant’s perceived amenability to 
rehabilitation. Lower risk defendants who demonstrate treatable symptoms, such as drug 
addiction, and amenability to treatment, could be se n as good candidates for alternatives 
to incarceration. In other words, the offense classification would be one consideration in 
sentencing defendants, but not the only consideration or, in all cases, the most important 
consideration (District of Columbia Advisory Commission on Sentencing Annual Report, 
2002: 130). 
24 For example, drug distribution cases sentenced in Superior Court usually involve low-level dealers, often 
selling to support a drug habit, rather than predatory drug kingpins (District of Columbia Advisory 
Commission on Sentencing Annual Report, 2002: xi).  
25 For example, the penalty for distribution of illegal drugs ranges from probation up to 30 years in prison 
(District of Columbia Advisory Commission on Sentencing Annual Report, 2002: 110).  
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consistent with the Guidelines recommendation. In some boxes, either a prison sentence 
or a short split sentence is an option.26 In the remaining boxes, a prison sentence, a short 
split sentence, or probation are all options permitted by the Guidelines recommndation 
(District of Columbia Sentencing Commission Annual Report, 2006: 11). Statutory 
enhancements (for example, enhancements for committing a crime against a specific type 
of vulnerable victim or for being a repeat offender) are accommodated by raising the 
upper limit of the recommended guidelines range. The Guidelines contain a non-
exclusive list of aggravating and mitigating factors or departures, which permit 
sentencing above or below the prison range in a given box or the imposition of probation 
or a split sentence in a prison only box. In order to rely on an aggravating or mitigating 
factor, the judge must state on the record the aggravating or mitigating factor(s) on which 
he or she relied. A judge may also opt not to follow the voluntary guidelines system, but 
when this occurs the judge is encouraged to explain his or her reasons to the Commission 
(District of Columbia Sentencing Commission Annual Report, 2006: 11). 
In order to be considered “compliant” with the Guidelines, a sentence must be 
consistent with the applicable Guidelines recommendations in all respects. Thus, in 
making the in/out decision, a sentence to probation complies with the Guidelines only if 
(1) the sentence falls within a box for which probation is one of the recommended 
options and the suspended prison sentence also falls within the range or (2) the judge 
expressly relies on one of the mitigating factors to depart. Similarly, a prison sentence is 
compliant only if it is within the prison range set forth in the applicable box or the judge 
expressly relies on one of the mitigating or aggravating factors to depart. For a split 
                                                
26 A short split sentence is a sentence in which the def ndant serves a sentence of six months of 
imprisonment or less and is then released to a period of probation. 
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sentence to be guideline compliant absent a mitigating factor, the length of the imposed 
prison term before any time is suspended must fall within the guideline range and the 
portion to be served must either be within the prison range or be six months or less in a 
box providing the option of a short split sentence (District of Columbia Sentencing 
Commission Annual Report, 2006: 12). 
In December 2006, the Commission released its evaluation of the Sentencing 
Guidelines pilot program. Though its analysis was “necessarily preliminary” because it 
had less than two years of sentences under the Guidelines in its datafile, and “not nearly 
enough sentences in the more serious and complex felony cases that are likely to pr sent 
the most difficult sentencing decisions for the judge,”27 the Commission concluded: 
[T]he preliminary evidence is compelling. In virtually every category with 
enough cases for analysis, we are able to measure dramatic reduction in 
the degree of unexplained variation in sentences, which was the primary 
goal of the guidelines system. At the same time the guidelines do not 
appear to be causing any unintended consequences, and in particular they 
appear to be neutral with respect to the rate of disposition by guilty plea 
and by trial, the use of prison and alternatives to prison, and the average 
length of prison sentences imposed (District of Columbia Sentencing 
Commission Annual Report, 2006: 2). 
 
More specifically, the Commission concluded that 87.9% all sentences imposed 
were “within the box,” while the remaining 12.1% were “outside the box.”28 When 
                                                
27 The Commission drew its data from the Superior Court Information System (CIS). The CIS system is a 
comprehensive database containing all felony sentences occurring during the study period before and after 
guidelines. The CIS system does not allow the Commission to disaggregate the data by criminal history 
score, because out-of-state convictions are not recrd d in the CIS database. This produces a distorted 
picture of true criminal history. Therefore, the analysis assumes that criminal history and other factors not 
in the database remained relatively constant during the three-year period from 2003 through 2005 and that,
therefore, any changes in sentencing disparity are att ibutable to the guidelines and not these other factors. 
The Guidelines applied to guilty pleas and verdicts entered on or after June 14, 2004, but most of these 
cases were not sentenced and did not begin to appear in the database until August of 2004, at the earli st 
(District of Columbia Sentencing Commission Annual Report, 2006: 32). 
28 The Master and Drug Grids were designed with a recommended sentencing range for each of sixty boxes 
corresponding to a particular offense severity level and criminal history score. In some boxes, a prison 
sentence is the only option consistent with the guideline recommendation. In some boxes, either a prison 
sentence or a short split sentence -- defined as a sentence in which the defendant serves a sentence of six 
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compliant “outside the box” sentences were included, i.e., those where the judge has 
articulated aggravating or mitigating reasons for departing, the overall compliance rate 
increases to 88.8% (District of Columbia Sentencing Commission Annual Report, 2006: 
14). 
As to whether the Guidelines reduced sentencing variation or disparity, the 
Commission’s methodology was to compare the distance between actual sentences that 
were imposed in a given offense severity group and the mean sentence for that group. If 
the average distance between the actual sentences and the group mean declined in the 
Guidelines period, the Commission wrote, then it could be presumed that the Guidelines 
reduced unexplained sentence variation (District of Columbia Sentencing Commission 
Annual Report, 2006: 32). Because the Guidelines were introduced in 2004, 2003 was a 
pre-Guidelines year, 2005 was a Guidelines year, and 2004 was a hybrid year. The data 
revealed that the average distance from the mean decreased between 2003 and 2005 for 
both Drug Grid sentences and Master Grid sentences. The average distance from the 
mean for Drug Grid sentences dropped from 12.3 months in 2003 to 7.3 months in 2004 
and to 6.5 months in 2005, while average distance from the mean for Master Grid 
sentences dropped from 14.1 months in 2003 to 9.3 months in 2004 and to 8.5 months in 
2005 (District of Columbia Sentencing Commission Annual Report, 2006: 35).29
                                                                                                                                                 
months or less and is then released to a period of probation -- is an option. In the remaining boxes, a prison 
sentence, a short split sentence or probation are all options permitted by the guideline recommendation. 
Sentences to one of these options are considered “within the box.” Sentences departing above or below the 
prison range in a given box or the imposition of probation or a split sentence in a prison only box are 
considered “outside the box.” (District of Columbia Sentencing Commission Annual Report, 2006: 11). 
29 Probation sentences were excluded from this calculation, as the distance from the average sentence could
not be computed on the same metric with prison sentences. However, when probation sentences were 
treated as a sentence of zero months and included in the analysis, the “conclusion that guidelines appe r to 




The Commission presented the same data broken down by specific offense 
severity groups on both grids. In five of the 12 offense severity groups, sentence variation 
between 2003 and 2005 decreased. In one group (Drug Group 3), there was no change. 
Of the remaining groups, Master Groups 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7 and Drug Group 1 had too few 
cases for analysis.30 In the other groups, the average distance from the mean for sentences 
in Master Groups 5 and 9 and Drug Group 2 fell dramatically: from 9 months in 2003 to 
3 months in 2005 (67%) in Master Group 9; from 83 months in 2003 to 30 months in 
2005 (64%) in Master Group 5; and from 17 months in 2003 to 7 months in 2005 (59%) 
in Drug Group 2. The reduction in the distance from the mean in Master Groups 6 and 8  
was not as dramatic but still was significant: from 11 months in 2003 to 7 months in 2005 
(37%) for Master Group 8; and from 22 months to 15 months (32%) in Master Group 6 
(District of Columbia Sentencing Commission Annual Report, 2006: 34). Taken together, 
the Commission concluded, these findings were “the strongest evidence to date that 
sentence variation that cannot be explained by the current offense or the offender’s prior 
criminal record has been reduced since the advent of guidelines, fulfilling the major 
stated purpose of the pilot guideline program” (District of Columbia Sentencing 
Commission Annual Report, 2006: 34). The Commission concluded: 
In sum, because of the short time the guidelines have been in effect and 
the relatively small sample of guideline cases available for analysis, 
particularly in the more serious and complex cases, it is too soon to know 
for sure whether the implementation of the pilot sentencing guidelines 
system in June 2004 has affected the overall trends in sentencing. What 
can be said is that guidelines appear to have reduced disparity without 
altering significantly historical sentencing patterns for the in/out decision 
                                                
30 As a general rule of thumb, the Commission considere  any group with fewer than 50 cases to be too 
small for reliable analysis. Under this standard, Drug Group 1 and Master Groups 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7 weretoo 
small. Drug Group 1 was omitted from the analysis because it had only two reported cases in 2003 and 




or for average sentence length. This preliminary result is consistent with 
the stated principle that the guideline sentences should reflect historical 
sentencing practices as closely as possible (District of Columbia 
Sentencing Commission Annual Report, 2006: 36). 
 
The Commission also found evidence of reduced disparity in focus groups with 
judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys. Many participants in the judicial focus group 
praised the Guidelines’ apparent success in narrowing judicial sentencing discretion 
(thereby reducing inter-judge disparity), while still allowing flexibility to fashion 
appropriate individualized sentences (District of Columbia Sentencing Commission 
Annual Report, 2005: 14).31 In the focus groups of prosecutors and defense attorneys, 
lawyers on both sides praised the sentencing guidelines for reducing inter-judge disparity. 
They specifically noted that the sentencing guidelines have done a good job of capturing 
the midrange of historical sentences for most crimes, effectively eliminat ng the pre-
Guidelines extremes between judges sentencing in similar cases (District of Columbia 
Sentencing Commission Annual Report, 2006: 27). 
 As to whether the Sentencing Guidelines impacted plea rates, the Commission 
anticipated that increased uniformity and predictability in sentencing underthe 
Guidelines might bring with it a change in the process by which the parties decide to 
dispose of a case by guilty plea or by trial. There was some anecdotal evidenc  from 
focus groups with defense attorneys and prosecutors that guilty pleas were easi  to 
negotiate under guidelines, at least for some crimes, because both the prosecution and he 
defense had a clearer picture of the likely sentencing range in typical cases, particularly 
for offenses with extremely wide statutory sentencing ranges. However, the Commission 
                                                
31 Examples of the comments from judges included the following: “guidelines provide an appropriate 
anchor for individual sentences;” and “because theyhave wide ranges, the guideline recommendations are 
not unduly restrictive” (2005 Report: 14). 
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found that, “apart from any salutary effect on the negotiation of plea agreements, to date
the Guidelines [did] not appear to have had any measurable impact on the percentage of 
cases resolved by guilty plea and by trial…the pilot Guideline program appears to be 
neutral with regard to this important aspect of case processing (District of Columbia 
Sentencing Commission Annual Report, 2006: 32). 
In 2007, the Council made the Guidelines a permanent feature of sentencing in the 
District of Columbia Superior Court.32 In its 2008 Annual Report, which covered 
sentences from July 1, 2006 to December 31, 2007, the Commission found an increased 
rate of judicial compliance with the Guidelines (District of Columbia Sentencing 
Commission Annual Report, 2008: 3). The Commission concluded: 
Overall, compliance has generally increased from the last report. The 
percentage of sentences within the box grew from 87.9% in the previous 
period to 89.5%...92.5% of prison sentences were within the box in the 
current period, compared to 89.7% in the previous period. However, the 
percentage of probation sentences that were within the box decreased 
slightly from 91% in the previous period to 89.3% in the current period, 
and the percentage of short split sentences within the box also decreased 
slightly from 98.6% to 97.1% (District of Columbia Sentencing 
Commission Annual Report, 2008: 13).  
 
 In its 2009 Annual Report, which covered sentences from January 1, 2008 
through December 31, 2008, the Commission found that 89.8% of all sentences were 
“within the box,” while the remaining 10.2% were “outside the box.” The overall 
compliance rate increased to 90.3%. (District of Columbia Sentencing Commission 
Annual Report, 2009: 5). The Commission concluded: 
Compliance has remained exceptionally high, although there were slight 
variations from what we reported in 2008. The overall percentage of 
sentences within the box remained relatively constant: 89.8% in the 
current period compared to 89.5% in the 2008 report. Among prison 
                                                




sentences, the percentage within the box dropped from 92.5% to 90.3%. 
The percentage of probation sentences that were within the box decreased 
slightly from 89.3% in the 2008 report to 87.1% in the current period, and 
the percentage of split sentences within the box also fell from 97.1% to 
94% (District of Columbia Sentencing Commission Annual Report, 2009: 
12). 
 
The Hydraulic Displacement of Discretion Argument 
Findings by researchers and sentencing commissions that sentencing guidelines 
have reduced disparity should be interpreted with caution. The ideal research design for 
studying disparity reduction consists of a simple pre- and posttest comparison of two 
samples of offenders.33 Although this design appears straightforward, there are several 
methodological problems (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1996: 81). One challenge is to 
separate out the effect of the sentencing guidelines from the effects of other changes that 
occurred during the time period from which the cases are drawn (Spohn, 2002: 287). 
These changes may include the introduction of mandatory minimum statutes or other 
legal changes at about the same time as the implementation of sentencing guidelines 
(Spohn, 2002: 288).34  
A second challenge, which was discussed briefly above, is to decide how to 
define and measure disparity (Spohn, 2002: 287). Although some researchers use 
                                                
33 The first sample would be those offenders sentenced under the preguideline sentencing structure with the 
second sample being similarly situated offenders who ere sentenced under the guidelines. Statistical 
comparisons between the two samples would be made on comparable offense categories and other relevant 
factors to ensure that both samples are statistically equivalent. Analyses would then be made to determine 
whether the imposition of sentences has become morestandardized for the guideline cases than was the 
case for preguideline samples (i.e., less variance in ase disposition and sentence length) (Bureau of J stice 
Assistance, 1996: 83). 
34 The Bureau of Justice Assistance (1996) further explained:  
[B]ecause it is not possible to use an experimental design in which a pool of offenders is 
randomly assigned to either a guideline or a nonguideline system, reductions in disparity 
that would have occurred independently of the passage of guidelines cannot be controlled 
for. This is especially likely with the growing popularity of numerous legislative actions 
such as mandatory terms that require offenders convi ted of specific crimes to be 
imprisoned and spend a specific amount of time incarcer ted. A great deal of determinacy 
may already have been achieved before the guidelines were adopted (p. 83). 
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sophisticated statistical techniques to model sentencing in preguideline and postguideline 
eras, others simply compare the degree to which sentences in the pre-and post-reform 
eras reflect the relationship between crime seriousness and prior record express d in the 
guidelines (Spohn, 2002: 287). Use of this latter approach fails to consider factors such as 
age or employment history that may have been legitimate determinants of sentencing in 
the pre-reform era but are deemed irrelevant in the post-reform era. This approach 
virtually guarantees that guideline sentences will appear more uniform than preguideline 
sentences (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1996: 83; Spohn, 2002: 287).35  
Finally, critics of the conclusion that sentencing guidelines have reduced disparity 
argue that they may have simply displaced discretion (and possibly disparity) from the 
judge at the sentencing phase to the prosecutor at the charging and plea bargaining stages 
(Alschuler, 1978; Lagoy et al., 1979; Coffee and Tonry, 1983). This argument, McCoy 
(1984) wrote, is frequently referred to as the “hydraulic displacement of discretion” 
thesis: 
An often-invoked simile likens the discretion-ridden criminal justice 
system to a set of hydraulic brakes. If you push down on one point, the 
displaced volume of fluid will exert pressure and “bulge out,” reappearing 
elsewhere in the mechanism. Similarly, discretion in the criminal justice 
system can never be extinguished; it is simply dislodged and shifted to 
other system parts. The metaphor illustrates the point that concentrating on 
one particular component of the justice system when attempting to control 
abuses of discretion is probably a fruitless strategy (p. 256). 
 
As Engen and Steen (2000) put it, “Sentencing guidelines disregard a basic 
sociological fact of modern organizations…The intervention in sentencing decisions as 
one element of the criminal justice system results in possibly neutralizing reactions in 
                                                
35 As Tonry (1996) explained, the use of the sentencing guidelines’ offense severity and criminal history 
classifications as the basis of comparisons rather than comprehensive statistical models “inevitably 




other parts of that system” (p. 1372). If there is a hydraulic displacement of discretion to 
prosecutors in sentencing guidelines systems, gains in sentencing fairness may be eroded 
by greater disparities at the charging and plea bargaining stages (Miethe, 1987). The 
displacement of discretion to prosecutors “could ultimately serve to undermine the goal 
of uniformity in sentences, and so disparities based on extra-legal attributes of defendants 
might persist even in determinate sentencing states” (Wooldredge and Griffin, 2005: 
302).36  
In a recent critique of Judge Marvin Frankel’s arguments in favor of sentencing 
guidelines, United States District Judge Lynn Adelman, expressed concern about the 
transfer of power to prosecutors in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines context:  
When Congress enacted the [Sentencing Reform Act] and the [United 
States Sentencing] Commission promulgated the guidelines, Frankel 
realized his goal of reducing judicial sentencing discretion. Unsurprisingly 
and, as he should have anticipated, one result was to increase the power of 
prosecutors over sentences. Judges could no longer serve as a bulwark 
against the consequences of prosecutors’ charging decisions, even when 
they found those consequences objectionable. Under the guidelines, 
prosecutors, who are advocates, largely controlled the severity of 
sentences through charging decisions and plea offers, and judges, who are 
neutrals, often had to impose sentences that they believed were unfair 
(Adelman and Deitrich, 2008: 254). 
 
The displacement of discretion to prosecutors is not inevitable in sentencing 
guidelines systems, however. While McCoy (1984) used the hydraulic brakes metaphor 
to illustrate that discretion is not extinguished but is “simply dislodged or shifted to other 
                                                
36 A finding of hydraulic displacement of discretion to prosecutors would be important, not just because it 
would call into question conclusions that determinate reforms have reduced disparity, but because such a 
dislodging of discretion may be undesirable on other grounds. Alschuler (1978) argued that prosecutors are 
advocates, are often at an early stage of their careers, their decisions are made behind closed doors and are 
neither explained nor on the record nor subject to review. Judges, on the other hand, are generally neutral to 
case outcomes, are selected for high levels of professional attainment, are required to work in open court 
and explain their decisions on the record, and can be second-guessed by appellate courts (see Reitz, 1998). 
The goals of a sentencing system, therefore, are “best furthered by visible, professional, and accountable 
actors who have primary responsibility to further systemic goals as opposed to the interests of particular 
parties” (Reitz, 1998: 403). 
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[criminal justice] system parts” (p. 256), she included an optimistic corollary: Progress 
“toward a professional, responsive justice system” can be made “if discretion is carefully 
controlled in all system parts (and, of course, this means that each component still r tains 
some measure of discretionary power, though it is carefully bounded)” (p. 256). Walker 
(1993) similarly opined that discretion is not always displaced to other criminal justice 
actors, and that when displacement does occur, it is relatively minor and does not 
necessarily subvert the intent of reforms such as sentencing guidelines (p. 150).  
Forst (2002) wrote that, while judges surely have less discretionary authority 
under sentencing guidelines, it is not evident that prosecutors have more discretion 
because, unlike judges, prosecutors reported to senior level attorneys both before and 
after sentencing guidelines (Forst, 2002: 514). According to Miethe (1987), social c ntrol 
mechanisms in the form of informal charging and plea bargaining policies may li it 
abuses of prosecutorial discretion. Moreover, as Miethe (1987) wrote, “prosecutors may 
perceive the development of regulations on judicial discretion as an initial step in 
restructuring the entire criminal justice system,” and they may limit the r use of greater 
discretion due to “perceptions of subsequent control over their discretionary power” by 
legislatures, sentencing commissions, or other bodies (p. 174). Finally, Frase (1999) 
wrote that the lack of effective prosecutorial regulation may be a positive feature of a 
carefully and rationally devised sentencing guidelines system:  
I believe that most state guidelines systems are valuable reforms even if
prosecutorial decisions remain substantially unregulated. I have two 
reasons for this belief. First, the absence of widespread complaints about 
prosecutorial dominance in state guidelines systems is an important sign, 
suggesting that closer regulation may not be needed. Specifically, I am 
suggesting that, in a properly balanced guidelines system—that is, one 
with reasonable sentence severity levels and few mandatory minimum 
statutes, in which courts retain substantial sentencing discretion for any 
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given offense (due to broad guidelines ranges, limited appellate scrutiny, 
and/or flexible departure powers)—it is rare that prosecutorial decisions 
will produce sentences which judges strongly disapprove, yet are 
powerless to prevent (as often seems to occur in federal courts). Second, 
prosecutorial charging and plea bargaining are valuable sources of 
flexibility and moderation in sentencing. These discretionary powers 
permit systems to consider individual offense and offender factors which 
may not fit squarely within formal statutory and guidelines rules.  
 
Many scholars predict that systems with greater restriction of judicial iscretion 
will have a greater hydraulic effect. As discussed earlier, curtailment of judicial 
discretion is most commonly achieved by making the guidelines presumptive and 
prescriptive. Restriction of discretion is also achieved by creating narrower ranges 
prescribing the sentences judges may select. Guidelines systems with less legal force 
(voluntary systems), wider sentencing ranges, and a descriptive approach should result in 
less shifting of discretion to prosecutors. Miethe (1987) wrote: 
Because there is no legal mandate to ensure compliance with voluntary 
guidelines and because descriptive guidelines are typically based on 
average sentences in the past, one would expect few changes over 
previous practices and little impetus for the deflection of judicial 
discretion to prosecutors. Furthermore, even under most presumptive 
guidelines, judges still retain enormous discretion because the range of 
sentence durations is extremely wide…major changes in charging and plea 
bargaining decisions may not typify post-guideline practices (157). 
 
Lagoy, et al. (1979) developed a typology suggesting that the power of the 
prosecutor over sentencing outcomes will be greatest in sentencing structures with tight 
control over judicial discretion (“share”) and severe sentences (“stake”):  
[P]rosecutorial impact on sentencing will be greatest under sentencing 
structures typified by drastic curtailment of judicial discretion and severe 
sentences (e.g., high mandatory sentences). Conversely, the prosecutorial 
impact will be least under structures marked by wide judicial discretion 
and lenient sentences…Between these two extremes, prosecutorial power 
 
35 
will vary according to the degree to which these to factors are present in 
the sentencing structure within which the prosecutor functions (p. 217).37  
 
In short, while numerous studies have found that sentencing guidelines reduce 
disparity, the majority of them have not examined whether prosecutorial charging or 
bargaining practices also changed as a result of determinate sentencing r forms. If 
prosecutorial practices do vary according to the degree of determinacy in a sentencing 
system, it is possible that disparity is not reduced by the sentencing scheme but rather is 
displaced from judges to prosecutors. The vast majority of studies finding that sentencing 
guidelines reduce disparity are problematic because they use only conviction data (Piehl 
and Bushway, 2007). This type of data can not detect whether a hydraulic displacement 
of discretion has occurred:  
Unfortunately, information about conviction offense will not reveal the 
existence or extent of charge or fact bargaining. Research that does not 
consider what takes place prior to conviction systematically misses any 
change in the operation of bargaining associated with the change in 
sentencing system. Therefore, while studies using conviction data 
generally find less variation in sentencing outcomes following 
introduction of guidelines, the methodology cannot discern whether 
discretion is merely displaced to the charging stage of the process (Pi hl 
and Bushway, 2007: 109). 
 
The problem of unanalyzed prosecutorial discretion is widely recognized by 
scholars, but it does not stop them from concluding that guidelines (particularly 
presumptive sentencing guidelines) have reduced overall discretion and disparity 
(Bushway and Piehl, 2007: 465). Indeed, virtually every article that studies disparity in 
sentencing guidelines using guidelines data contains a disclaimer that the study can not 
                                                
37 Lagoy, et al. (1979) recognized that this typology is an oversimplification of the dynamics of criminal 
prosecution and sentencing and that many influential factors have not been included in their analysis. 
Nevertheless, they suggested that the typology is a useful starting point for analysis of the relationship 





account for prosecutorial disparity that may result from prosecutorial discretion 
(Bushway and Piehl, 2007). The next section provides an overview of the limited number 
of studies that specifically test the hydraulic displacement of discretion thesis. 
 
Empirical Research on the Hydraulic Displacement of Discretion Thesis 
In 1996, the Bureau of Justice Assistance wrote that “[l]ittle evidence exists to 
document how much of a shifting of discretion to prosecutors has occurred in sentencing 
guidelines systems” (p. xv). This statement is still true today. While the hydraulic effect 
influences contemporary research to some extent, “little research has even attempted to 
test its central hypothesis” (Engen and Steen, 2000: 1358). This is due largely to th  
scarcity of available data prior to the prosecutorial phase (Wooldredge and Griffin, 2005: 
301). Prosecutors in most jurisdictions do not report information about the numbers and 
types of arrests received from the police and their charging decisions in the same way 
that police report on the number and types of arrests (Forst, 2002: 520).  
The studies that do exist have found very limited evidence of displacement of 
discretion to the prosecutor. Miethe and Moore (1985) examined charging and plea 
bargaining practices before and after Minnesota implemented presumptive guidelines in 
1980. They took samples of felons convicted in the fiscal year 1978 and the first 18 
months after the new law was enacted in May, 1980.38 With respect to whether the 
guidelines reduced disparity in judicial decision making, Miethe and Moore (1985) found 
that the most important predictors of the likelihood of incarceration were guideline 
variables (e.g., offense severity, criminal history, weapon use), whereas the direct impact 
                                                
38 Cases resulting in acquittals or dismissals on all felony counts and those involving misdemeanor 
convictions were not included in the sample. 
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of several socioeconomic attributes (e.g., race and employment status) was substantially 
reduced. They observed a similar trend for pre- and postguideline determinants of le gth 
of imprisonment (Miethe and Moore, 1985: 358).  
The three prosecutorial decisions examined were whether the defendant received 
any charge reductions,39 whether the defendant negotiated a reduced sentence,40 and 
whether jail time was a condition of a stayed sentence (Miethe and Moore, 1985: 347). 
Miethe and Moore found that prosecutorial practices did not change dramatically after the 
introduction of the sentencing guidelines and that the changes that did occur were relat d 
to changes in case attributes41rather than offender characteristics. They concluded: 
The impact of the felon’s socioeconomic profile on the likelihood of 
charge bargaining either stayed constant or, in some cases, diminished in 
importance after the implementation of the law…Circumvention of the 
integrity of the guidelines through prosecutorial discretion in plea 
bargaining did not materialize nor were social biases enhanced or 
displaced through sentencing decisions not covered by the guidelines (p. 
360). 
 
Noting that Miethe and Moore’s (1985) study was problematic because it 
analyzed practices in only the first year after the guidelines were implemented, Miethe 
(1987) used samples of felons convicted in Minnesota for the fiscal year 1978 (two years 
before the guidelines), the first 18 months under the guidelines (May 1, 1980 to October 
1, 1981) and for an additional 12-month period (October, 1981 to September, 1982) (p. 
161). Miethe (1987) examined whether there was a hydraulic effect following the 
guidelines in Minnesota in 1980 and, if so, whether that displacement of discretion 
                                                
39 A charge reduction was noted if either charges were r duced to a lesser offense or dropped as a result of 
a plea agreement for any of the three most serious charges. 
40 A sentence negotiation was recorded if the terms of a plea agreement for any of the three most serious 
charges involved a limited or capped jail sentence, a stay of imposition of the sentence, a concurrent 
sentence, or the prosecutor standing silent at sentenci g. 
41 Case attributes included the alleged severity, whether there was a personal crime, whether there were
multiple alleged offenses, and whether it was an urban jurisdiction. 
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altered the nature and determinants of prosecutorial practices. Miethe hypothesized that, 
if the hydraulic effect is a logical consequence of determinate sentencing systems, overall 
rates of charge bargaining and sentence negotiations should be higher in post-guideline 
periods because prosecutors would use greater power to entice defendants into guilty 
pleas. Second, if the hydraulic effect undermines the goals of sentencing neutrality  and 
uniformity through greater differentiation in the type of person who receives plea 
concessions, measures of the felon’s social profile should more accurately predict
charging and plea bargaining practices in the post-guidelines period (Miethe, 1987: 160).  
Miethe first examined pre-/post-guideline differences in the average severity of 
initial charges, the rate of charge dismissals, the rate of charge reductions, sentence 
negotiations, and overall plea bargains (Miethe, 1987: 160). The major charging variable 
examined by Miethe was the severity of the most serious alleged charge initially filed by 
the prosecutor (Miethe 1987: 162).42 Charge bargaining was operationalized in terms of 
whether any of the three most serious charges were either dismissed or reduced as part of 
the plea agreement. An overall measure of plea bargaining composed of both charge 
bargaining and sentence negotiations was also included (Miethe 1987: 162).  The 
exogenous variables included offense, case processing and offender attributes such as the 
severity of the most serious alleged offense, whether a dangerous weapon was used, 
whether the crime involved multiple offenders, the total number of incidents, and whether 
the case bordered the in/out dispositional line, and the offender’s criminal history score, 
race, sex, marital status, and employment status (p. 164-165). A composite measure of 
the offender’s demographic profile was also constructed, which compared individuals 
                                                
42 This variable was measured on a 10-point scale ranging from 1 (e.g., possession of marijuana) to 10 (2nd 
degree murder). The ranking of crimes on this scale is identical to the index developed by the Minnesota 
Sentencing Guidelines Commission to measure the sevrity of the convicted offense (Miethe, 1987: 162). 
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whose demographic profile fit the stereotypical image of a “high risk” or “dangerous” 
offender (e.g., male, non-white, single and unemployed) with other profiles (p. 165).  
Miethe (1987) found little to no evidence of significant pre-/post-guideline 
differences in the rate of charge reductions, the rate of charge dismissals, or the average 
severity of the initial charge (p. 165). He argued, however, that the rate of charge 
reductions and dismissals may not be the best indication of displacement of discretion 
and its effect on sentencing guideline goals (Miethe, 1987: 160).43 Rather, Miethe (1987) 
wrote, the focus should be on whether greater socio-economic differentiation has 
occurred in plea bargaining practices over time.44 Miethe found little evidence that extra-
legal attributes became more important predictors of dispositions (severity of initial 
charges, charge dismissals, charge reductions, sentence negotiations, and overall plea 
bargains) after the guidelines were implemented. Regardless of the time period, offenders 
who were male, used dangerous weapons and allegedly participated in multiple 
behavioral incidents were initially charged with more serious offenses than their 
counterparts (Miethe, 1987: 168). While pre-guideline models of charge dismissals, 
charge reductions and sentence concessions were significantly different than their 
                                                
43 Miethe reasoned, first, that increases in plea bargaining rates, rather than being due to displacement p r 
se, may be attributable to a general rise in the crime ate in post-guideline periods which may require 
greater use of plea-bargaining for relieving case pressure (Miethe, 1987: 160). On the other hand, even if 
the overall rates of plea bargaining did not increase over post-guideline periods, the “hydraulic effect” may 
still be operative if prosecutors are more likely to enter plea agreements for certain types of crimes, but less 
likely to enter them for others (p. 160). 
44 Miethe wrote: 
[T]he critical question examined here is whether prosecutors are using their greater 
discretionary power in a manner which enhances socio-e onomic biases in plea 
bargaining and, in turn, undermines the explicit goals of the sentencing guidelines…If the 
hydraulic effect is a logical consequence of determinate sentencing systems…, major 
differences in the determinants of prosecutorial prctices should be observed over pre- 
and post-guideline time periods. If the hydraulic effect undermines the goals of 
sentencing neutrality and uniformity through greater differentiation in the type of person 
who receives plea concessions, measures of the felon’s s cial profile (e.g., sex, race, 
unemployment status, marital status) should more accur tely predict charging and plea 
bargaining practices in post-guideline periods (p. 160).  
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postguideline counterparts, these time-specific models were “primarily due to the 
differential importance given to case processing and offense attributes, ra her than 
offender characteristics” (Miethe, 1987: 168). Miethe concluded: 
[T]he results of this study suggest that the hydraulic displacement of 
discretion is not inevitable and does not necessarily dampen the success 
attributed to the primary reform effort…Initial charging and plea 
bargaining practices did change after sentencing guidelines were 
implemented, but greater socio-economic disparities in non-regulated 
prosecutorial decisions did not circumvent the goals of sentencing 
neutrality and uniformity (p. 175). 
 
In 2005, Wooldredge and Griffin examined whether Ohio’s implementation of 
sentencing guidelines in 1996 resulted in significant changes in prosecutorial decisions 
related to charging severity, dropped charges, charge reductions, and overall plea 
bargains. They noted that Ohio’s guidelines were “considerably more flexible”45 than 
Minnesota’s and, thus, “one might expect very similar findings to those of Miethe’s 
(1987) study” (p. 303). They also noted that at the time there was no published research 
on the applicability of the hydraulic displacement thesis in states with less restrictive 
guidelines such as Ohio (p. 303).46  
                                                
45 Members of the Ohio Commission did not want to adopt the matrix-style grid used in other states and in 
the federal system. Rather, they preferred a “more flexible scheme based on presumptions, judicial 
discretion, and truth in sentencing.” The preference for greater flexibility reflected members’ concerns with 
the drawback associated with more rigid schemes such as the inability to individualize sentences 
(Wooldredge and Griffin, 2005: 303).  
46 Wooldredge and Griffin offered a specific illustration of how Ohio’s guidelines differed from those in 
Minnesota: 
The new [guidelines] scheme…still permits a wider range of discretion compared to other 
states with more structured sentencing. For example, a Minnesota judge selects from a 
range of 44 to 52 months for a first-degree felon whereas an Ohio judge selects from 36 
to 120 months. Although it is presumed that a first-time offender would receive no more 
than 36 months imprisonment in Ohio (a shorter term than the presumed 48 months in 
Minnesota), judges have much more latitude when determining the length of 
imprisonment for repeat offenders who have previously served prison time. This range of 
84 months in Ohio (versus 9 months in Minnesota) allows judges more discretion in 
crafting a sentence to the particulars of a case. While the greater flexibility of Ohio’s 
scheme may reduce the impact of the new guidelines o  other aspects of case processing 
(such as charge reductions), it permits broader disc epancies in the length of 
imprisonment compared to other states (p. 303). 
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Woolredge and Griffin (2005) drew two cross-sections of indicted suspects 
reflecting pre- and post-guideline populations to permit the estimation of the multivariate 
models for each time period (p. 304). The Ohio Sentencing Guidelines became effective 
on July 1, 1996. The pre-guideline sample included persons indicted between July 1, 
1995 and June 30, 1996. None of these cases disposed after July 1, 1996 was subject to 
the new guidelines. The post-guideline sample included persons indicted between 
January 1 and December 31, 1997. Woolredge and Griffin selected indictments beginning 
six months after implementation of the guidelines to avoid cases where court participants 
were still learning the nuances of the new scheme. They selected over 6,000 suspects 
from twenty-four counties in Ohio. Woolredge and Griffin (2005) collected data from 
prosecutors’ and probation offices. Prosecutors’ files included data on general and 
specific case characteristics (e.g., types of offenses, felony levels indicted on, the use of 
weapons, types and amounts of drugs, victim injury) as well as the sex, race, and birth 
date of suspects. Probation files provided data on other characteristics of defendants 
including criminal histories, marital status, employment status, and history of substance 
abuse (p. 304). 
The first stage of the analysis focused on whether the guidelines corresponded 
with significantly lower odds of being indicted on first and second-degree felonies. This 
stage also tested whether the guidelines coincided with significant increases in the odds 
of (1) all charges being dropped after indictment (among all indicted suspects), (2) guilty 
pleas with agreements from prosecutors (also among all indicted suspects), (3) some 
charges being dropped between indictment and guilty plea (among those who pled guilty 
via agreements with prosecutors), and (4) reductions to lesser charges (also among those 
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who pled guilty via agreements) (Wooldredge and Griffin, 2005: 304). These main 
effects of sentencing guidelines were examined by estimating period-specific models of 
each outcome and then comparing them (Wooldredge and Griffin, 2005: 304). 
Wooldredge and Griffin’s findings provided modest evidence that the guidelines 
corresponded with significant differences in charging and plea bargaining practices. 
While the shift to guidelines did not coincide with significant changes in likelihoods of 
indictment on a first or second-degree felony, all charges being dropped after indictment, 
pleading guilty with prosecutorial agreement, and some (but not all) dropped charges, 
they did coincide with a significant increase in rates of charge reductions among 
defendants who pled guilty. Thus, if a hydraulic displacement did occur, it translated into 
noticeable differences in one out of the five outcomes (Wooldredge and Griffin, 2005: 
313). 
The second stage of their analysis looked at changes in the specific effects of case
and defendant characteristics on case dispositions (Wooldredge and Griffin, 2005: 301). 
Similar to Miethe’s (1987) approach, this procedure involved testing whether the 
magnitude of a regression coefficient (for a certain predictor) differed significantly 
between the two periods (Wooldredge and Griffin, 2005: 307). They found that some 
changes occurred in the specific effects of various defendant characteristics on some of 
the outcomes examined, but that these changes did not uniformly result in harsher 
dispositions for defendants facing greater social and economic disadvantage. I 
particular, the models of charge reductions revealed “absolutely no significant differences 
in the effects of defendants’ extra-legal characteristics,” and the few significant 
differences in extra-legal effects that were uncovered in the other model comparisons did 
 
43 
“not establish a theme that defendants facing greater social and economic disadvantages 
were consistently treated more severely by prosecutors after the implementation of 
sentencing guidelines” (Wooldredge and Griffin, 2005: 314). Similar to Miethe’s 
findings, any increase in levels of prosecutorial discretion that might have occurred did 
not result in substantive extra-legal disparities in case dispositions (Wooldredge and 
Griffin, 2005: 301).47 Still, Woolredge and Griffin (2005) wrote, the fact that there was 
any evidence at all of a hydraulic effect was substantively significat given Ohio’s 
guidelines structure:  
Miethe (1987) observed that implementation of more flexible determinate 
sentencing schemes might be less likely to produce significant changes in 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion because such schemes still permit a 
fair amount of judicial discretion…Ohio’s reform represented a more 
flexible scheme compared to similar guidelines implemented in other 
states (particularly Minnesota). Development of the scheme was also 
guided heavily by “average” or “going rate” sentences that, according to 
Miethe, should reduce likelihoods of displaced discretion because judges 
were not (really) changing their sentencing practices. The finding that 
charge bargaining actually increased under Ohio’s more flexible scheme 
therefore raises the possibility that even modest shifts in sentencing 
practices might generate noticeable differences in processing at other 
decision points within the system (p. 315). 
 
                                                
47 Wooldgredge and Griffin (2005) noted an important qualification to their conclusions: 
[T]hese conclusions were generalizations across the twenty-four 
counties examined. Results indicated some very strong jurisdiction 
differences in disposition rates, including differenc s in rates of 
dropped charges, guilty pleas with agreements, and charge reductions. 
More specific county-by-county analyses would ultimately reveal the 
magnitude of [the guidelines’] effect on these dispositions for each 
specific jurisdiction in the sample. Models specified by jurisdiction 
would necessarily be more parsimonious than those presented due to 
the more restricted numbers of cases within each county, although zero-
order correlations for the relationships of interest might provide a feel 
for these aggregate level differences….A full understanding of how to 
effectively reduce discretion at one point in the justice system without 
affecting other decision points may necessarily requir  an 
understanding of the contextual differences in case processing between 




Piehl and Bushway (2007) suggested a different methodology for testing the 
hydraulic displacement thesis and applied it in an inter-jurisdictional study. While Miethe 
(1987) and Wooldredge and Griffin (2005) focused on changes in the rate of plea 
bargains (“the existence of the bargain”) after sentencing guidelines, Pi hl and Bushway 
(2007) developed an estimate of the difference in the sentencing outcome that can be 
attributed to charge bargaining (“the value of the bargain”). Their method measures the 
difference in sentencing outcomes caused by plea bargain and emphasizes the amount in 
months that the sentence length is reduced. Piehl and Bushway (2007) argued that “in a 
world in which 90% of the convictions end as a result of a plea bargain,…the substantive 
value of interest is the difference between what the person would have received if he had 
not pled and what they received as the result of the plea bargain” (p. 107). They argued 
that measuring the distance (in moths of prison time) moved during a charge bargain may 
provide a very different estimate of the discretion than is given by the rate of bargaining 
and that the correlates of these two outcomes may differ (Piehl and Bushway, 2007:105).  
What is needed methodologically, Piehl and Bushway (2007) argued, is a way to 
measure the consequences of the decision to charge bargain (p. 107). In order to measure 
the value of the sentence length reduction as a result of the bargain, it is neces ary to 
know what would have happened to the person if they did not plea bargain. Though this 
is unobservable, Piehl and Bushway noted that we have data on what other people who 
are convicted of these offenses receive at sentencing, and to the extent to which these 
defendants are similar to the person who plea bargains, we can use this information to 
create an estimate of the desired counterfactual (Piehl and Bushway, p. 108). Piehl and 
Bushway (2007) proposed that:  
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researchers first estimate a model for the expected sentence length at plea 
using all available information about the case and the criminal history, 
including the charge at conviction. Then, using these coefficient estimates, 
we advocate creation of a predicted sentence for these same individuals, 
where the only change is that the prediction is made with the charge at 
arraignment versus the charge at conviction. If there has been no charge 
bargain, the predicted and actual values will be the same on average. 
However, if there has been charge bargaining, we expect that the predicted 
values using the charges at arraignment will be higher than the actual 
values, on average. The difference for each individual will be an estimate 
of the value of the charge bargain in terms of the sentence avoided by 
pleading guilty. Or alternatively, the difference will be an estimate of he 
size of the discretion exercised by the prosecutor in assigning the charge 
(p. 108). 
 
To build their empirical model, Piehl and Bushway began with the traditional 
model for explaining sentence length using only the factors usually considered to b  
legitimate factors involved in sentencing, namely case characteristics and criminal history 
(Piehl and Bushway, 2007: 111).48 Piehl and Bushway’s estimating equation involved 
several modifications to this approach. First, they logged sentence length to help take into 
account non-linearities across the sentencing range (p. 111). Second, because the 
truncation of non-incarcerated offenders can lead to substantial bias in the coefficient 
estimates in the sentence length regression, they specified a model that includes those 
who receive terms of incarceration as well as those who do not. They addressed 
truncation by modeling the sentence length as censored at zero, using a Tobit regression. 
They also estimated a probit model to test whether their results were driven by the Tobit 
approach’s parametric assumptions about censored variation (p. 112).  
Piehl and Bushway’s equation included five crime types—person, property, drug, 
public order, and other—as dummy variables which they interacted with a misdemeanor 
                                                
48 They did not include the presumptive sentence as a regressor because their paper studies prosecutor 
decision making rather than judicial decision making. As they stated, “[t]he presumptive sentence is the 
outcome of prosecutor decision making, not the starting point” (Piehl and Bushway, 2007: 111). 
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dummy to account for the difference between felonies and misdemeanors. The 
categorization was based on the most serious charge at conviction (p. 112). Criminal 
history was represented using four variables measuring active criminal justice status at 
the time of current offense and numbers of past felony arrests, prison terms and jail terms 
(p. 112). They also included sex, race and age. Although they state these factors were not 
legitimate sentencing factors, they may be correlated with unobserved factors that are 
legitimate. Failure to control for these factors, therefore, could be particul ly 
problematic because the jurisdictions they studied had different case mixes. The results 
were not sensitive to whether or not these demographic variables were included (p. 112). 
 Instead of comparing the proportion of charge bargains across each jurisdiction as 
in Miethe (1987), Piehl and Bushway estimated how much difference in sentence length 
could be attributed to the charge bargain. Using the estimated coefficients from the 
equation above, they formed a predicted sentence length (p. 112). This predicted value 
represented the systematic component of sentencing. They used the most serious crime 
type for which the person was charged at arraignment to create a second predicted value 
for each individual (p. 112). They then calculated the difference between each person’s 
expected sentence at arraignment and the predicted actual sentence. The difference 
represented the effect of charge bargaining (p. 112).49  
They applied their approach in a comparison of two different types of guideline 
systems—Maryland (a voluntary guidelines jurisdiction) and Washington (a presumptive 
                                                
49 This estimate, they argued, would be unbiased as long as the relevant predictors have been included in 
the models. If there were omitted case factors that made the conditional sentences of those with charge 
bargains systematically different from those without charge bargains, then the estimate would be biased. 
Testing this assumption would require richer data than is generally available in either single-jurisdiction 
studies or cross-jurisdiction studies (p. 112). 
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guidelines jurisdiction).50 They used the Bureau of Justice Statistics funded State Court 
Processing Statistics (SCPS) dataset, which had information on charges erlier than the 
conviction phase in two counties in Maryland and one county in Washington. While they 
conceded this dataset is not perfect,51 Piehl and Bushway argued it had enough 
information to allow them to at least demonstrate the utility of their approach (Piehl and 
Bushway, 2007: 122). They found that, although the rate of charge bargaining (in this 
case, the rate at which people plea down from a felony charge to a misdemeanor 
conviction) was higher in Maryland, its impact on sentences was greater in Washington 
(Piehl and Bushway, 2007: 122). 
Piehl and Bushway’s (2007) estimates were consistent with the hypothesis that 
strict guidelines lead to substantial displacement of discretion to the prosecutor (p. 107). 
The finding of differential charge bargaining in these two jurisdictions, Piehl and 
Bushway (2007) argued, should provide caution when comparing the results of studies of 
disparity in sentencing across jurisdiction types, as the conviction informatin in more 
structured systems such as Washington may represent systematic movement fro  the 
arraignment charge (p. 122).  Piehl and Bushway (2007) concluded:  
In addition to identifying the possible hydraulic displacement of discretion 
to prosecutors, we have also developed a way to quantify the magnitude of 
these shifts in practice. By measuring the average change in expected 
sentence due to charge bargaining, we reveal the relevance of 
prosecutorial practice, not merely its existence (p. 119).  
 
                                                
50 Though they focus only on charge bargaining and not o  other forms of prosecutorial discretion such as 
charging decisions or bargaining over the criminal history or facts that will be considered by the judge, 
Piehl and Bushway (2007) argued that this only means they can not draw conclusions about the total 
amount of prosecutorial discretion in Maryland and Washington. These limitations, however, “will not 
affect a comparison of the relative amount of prosecutorial discretion in the two systems” (Piehl and 
Bushway, 2007: 111).  
51 Piehl and Busway (2007) state that the ultimate ability of this exercise to determine causality is limited 
because of parsimonious descriptions of crime severity and criminal history in the SCPS data and the us  of 
only three counties in two states (p. 121). 
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Prior Research on Prosecutor Decision Making  
Former United States Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson famously observed 
that “the prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other 
person in America” (Jackson, 1940). In one of the best known works on the history and 
functions of the prosecutor, Jacoby (1980) wrote that the American prosecutor “enjoys 
independence and discretionary privileges unmatched in the world” (p. 3). Yet, the 
amount of research on the prosecutor is far less than on other actors of the criminal 
justice system (McDonald, 1979: 9). Worrall, et al. (2006) noted that prosecutors “have 
been almost completely ignored in criminal justice and criminology” and that “much 
more attention needs to be given to prosecutors” (p. 497). The lack of attention to the 
prosecutor is especially evident in research focusing on sentencing. Lagoy, et al. (1979) 
commented, “In contrast to the voluminous literature on the sentencing power of th  
legislatures, courts, and parole boards, little has been written concerning the prosecutorial 
role in the sentencing process” (p. 210). Finally, Ulmer, et al. (2007) stated: 
It is well known that more than 90 percent of cases in most 
jurisdictions in the United States are guilty pleas, and a 
large portion of these are plea agreements negotiated with a 
prosecutor. This fact seems to have been forgotten by the 
many studies throughout the literature that frame 
sentencing as the study of judicial discretion. However, 
prosecutors have great influence…We encourage much 
more research on prosecutorial decisions that directly affect 
sentencing outcomes. Too often, studies of sentencing and 
sentencing discretion focus on judges and leave out 
prosecutors, crucial players in the courtroom work groups 
(p. 452). 
 
This chapter reviews the literature on prosecutorial decision making that focuses, 
not on the possible hydraulic displacement of discretion in sentencing guidelines systems, 
but on prosecutorial practices generally. It describes the charging and plea bargaining 
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process in the District of Columbia and reviews prior research on the determinants of 
prosecutor decisions. This research is significant both for its methodological approaches, 
including ways to measure charging severity and charge bargaining, and its subs antive 
conclusions.  
The Charging Function 
The two most important functions of prosecutors are charging and plea 
bargaining. The charging decision has generated the most scholarly interest and is 
commonly viewed as the most important prosecutorial duty (Jacoby, 1980; Walker, 1993; 
Spears and Spohn (1997); Spohn, et al., (2001); Davis, 2007). After the prosecutor is 
notified of the occurrence of a crime or the arrest of a defendant, he or she reviews the 
facts and evidence, evaluates the case, and decides whether to charge the defendant and 
what charges to file (Albonetti, 1987). Prosecutors use a variety of procedures for filing 
charges (Davis, 2007: 23). In the District of Columbia, prosecutions are brought by the 
D.C. Superior Court Division of the Office of the United States Attorney. The charging 
process for felony offenses in D.C. consists of: (1) the presentment of criminal charges; 
(2) the preliminary hearing; and (3) the grand jury indictment. In the presentment stage, 
the prosecutor generally initiates a formal charge with the “complaint,” a written 
statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. After pres ntment, the 
next court date is the preliminary hearing.52  
The purpose of the preliminary hearing is to determine whether there is probable 
cause to believe an offense was committed and that the defendant committed it. Th  
probable cause standard is satisfied if it is more probable than not that the defendant 
                                                
52 In some rare cases, the case is indicted by the grand jury before the preliminary hearing, and the 
preliminary hearing is not held. Also, a case dismissed at the preliminary hearing for lack of probable cause 
may be subsequently presented to the grand jury.  
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committed the crime (Davis, 2007: 26). If the court finds there is probable cause, the case 
is “bound over” for grand jury action. All felonies must be prosecuted by grand jury 
indictment unless the right to an indictment is waived by the defendant. The duty of the 
grand jury is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that a defendant has 
committed a crime and should be brought to trial. If the grand jurors do find probable 
cause, they determine which charges to bring, and those charges are set forth in the 
indictment (Davis 2007: 25). A grand jury indictment may contain charges in addition to 
the ones upon which the defendant was originally arrested or presented.53  
The prosecutor considers numerous factors when determining whether to file 
criminal charges and which charges to file. Organizations such as the American Bar 
Association (ABA) and the National District Attorneys Association (NDAA) provide 
advisory guidelines and standards on factors to consider. They include: (1) the 
prosecutor’s reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact guilty; (2) the extent of he harm 
caused by the offense; (3) the disproportion of the authorized punishment in relation to 
the particular offense or the offender; (4) possible improper motives for a complainant; 
(5) prolonged nonenforcement of a statute, with community acquiescence; (6) the 
reluctance of the victim to testify; (7) cooperation of the accused in the apprehension or 
conviction of others; (8) availability and likelihood of prosecution by another 
                                                
53 The purpose of the grand jury is to serve as a democratic and more thorough check on the prosecutor’s 
decision to charge. Critics argue, however, that grnd jurors rarely have difficulty concluding that there is 
probable cause to believe the defendant committed th  offense, and that the prosecutor has full control of 
the grand jury process, deciding which witnesses to call and which questions to ask (Davis, 2007: 26).
Jacoby (1980) explained:  
A primary criticism of the grand jury system is that the jurors rely too heavily on the 
advice of the prosecutor and can form their opinions ly on the basis of the evidence 
that he provides. The grand jury is often alleged to be a de facto “rubber stamp” for the 
wishes of the prosecutor. Critics cite the statistically low “no bill” rates in many 
American jurisdictions as proof, and some opponents have even called the grand jury an 
administrative tool of the prosecutor, which shields his exercise of discretionary power 
from public scrutiny (p. 103). 
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jurisdiction; and (9) the strength of evidence (Jacoby, 1980: 117). There are, however, no 
binding rules or regulations governing prosecutor charging decisions. Prosecutor  suffer 
no penalty for failure to follow standards of organizations such as the ABA or theNDAA 
(Davis 2007: 30). Critics lament that very few prosecutor offices have manuals with 
guidelines or policies on how to make charging decisions, and offices that do have such 
guidelines or policies rarely enforce them (Davis, 2007: 23).  
When compared to other decisions by criminal justice officials such as the 
decision to arrest, the pretrial release decision, the decision to enter a guilty plea, and the 
decision on sentence severity, there has been relatively little empirical research on the 
charging decision (Albonetti, 1987: 291). Numerous studies from the 1970s and 1980s 
found that prosecutors’ charging decisions are influenced primarily by the strength of the 
evidence against the defendant and the seriousness of the offense (Forst, 2002: 518). 
These studies found that prosecutors decline to prosecute cases when police fail to 
produce adequate evidence (e.g., physical evidence or witnesses) or when the defendants 
are not viewed as serious threats to the community (Forst, 2002: 511). The studies also 
found that prosecutors fail to prosecute in cases based on the victim’s relationship with 
the defendant, particularly in cases of assault and rape. Prosecutors often reject cases, for 
example, where the assailant is known to the victim because the victims are often 
uncooperative (Forst, 2002: 512). Spears and Spohn (1997) summarized the major 
findings of the early studies on prosecutorial charging and screening: 
These studies suggest that prosecutors’ assessments of convictability are 
based primarily on legal factors such as the seriousness of the offense 
(Albonetti 1987; Jacoby et al. 1982; Mather 1979; Miller 1969; M. Myers 
1982; Neubauer 1974; Rauma 1984; Schmidt and Steury 1989), the 
strength of evidence in the case (Albonetti 1987; Feeney, Dill, and Weir 
1983; Jacoby et al. 1982; Miller 1969; Nagel and Hagan 1983), and the 
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defendant's culpability (Albonetti 1987; Mather 1979; Miller 1969; 
Neubauer 1974; Schmidt and Steury 1989; Swiggert and Farrell 1976). 
Prior research on charging also highlights the importance of victim 
characteristics (Albonetti 1987; Amir 1971; Hepperle 1985; Kerstetter 
1990; Miller 1969; Stanko 1988; Williams 1978). These studies suggest 
that prosecutors use stereotypes regarding genuine victims and appropriate 
behavior (Estrich 1987; Frohmann 1991; LaFree 1989) to predict how 
judges and juries will react to victims. Prosecutors attribute credibility to 
victims “who fit society's stereotypes of who is credible: older, white, 
male, employed victims” (Stanko 1988:172). Victims who do not fit this 
image or who “precipitate” (Amir 1971) the attack by their behavior are 
deemed less credible. As Stanko (1988:170) concludes, “[T]he character 
and credibility of the victim is a key factor in determining prosecutorial 
strategies, one at least as important as ‘objective’ evidence about the crime 
or characteristics of the defendant” (p. 502). 
 
Spears and Spohn (1997) examined the effect of victim characteristics and 
strength of evidence on prosecutor charging decisions in sexual assault cases.54 The 
dependent variable was a dichotomous measure of the decision to file charges or not. The 
independent variables included measures of case seriousness, strength of evidence,55 and 
victim characteristics. Based on previous research, Spears and Spohn hypothesized tat 
prosecutors would be more likely to file charges if there was an indication of strong 
evidence, if there were no questions about the victim’s moral character or allegations of 
risk-taking behavior by the victim, if the victim was an adolescent or adult rather than a 
child, if the victim was assaulted by a stranger, or if the victim screamed, physically 
resisted the suspect, or reported the sexual assault within one hour (Spears and Spohn, 
1997: 512). 
                                                
54 The data used for their study consisted of a sample of all complaints of sexual offenses received by the 
Detroit Police Department in 1989. Spears and Spohn selected every second case, for a total of 1,046 cases. 
They included only cases presented to the Wayne County Prosecutor’s Office for a decision to file charges 
(N = 321) (Spears and Spohn, 1997: 508). 
55 The evidence factors were: whether there was a witness to the assault, an injury (other than the rape 
itself) to the victim, physical evidence to corroborate the victim's testimony, and whether the suspect used a 
gun or knife during the assault (Spears and Spohn, 1997: 509). 
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Spears and Spohn (1997) found that the onlysignificant predictors of charging 
were victim characteristics, with prosecutors being much more likely to file charges if the 
victim was an adolescent or an adult rather than a child. Charging also was affected by 
the victim’s moral character and behavior at the time of the incident (Spears and Spohn, 
1997: 502). The fact that strength of evidence did not have the predicted effect, coupled 
with the fact that victim characteristics had significant effects, suggested to the authors 
that prosecutors’ charging decisions in sexual assault cases were motivated by different 
factors than charging decisions in other types of cases. In particular, prosecutor  may 
screen out sexual assault cases unlikely to result in a conviction because of questi ns 
about the victim’s character and credibility (Spears and Spohn, 1997: 519).56 
Spohn, et al. (2001) also examined the prosecutor’s decision of whether or not to 
charge in sexual assault cases.57 They found that charging decisions reflect the 
prosecutor’s assessment of the likelihood of conviction and that this assessment was 
based on “typifications of rape and rape victims,” the victim’s failure to appe r for 
preliminary interviews, the victim’s refusal to cooperate in the prosecution of the case, or 
the victim’s admission that the charges were fabricated. The authors also found that cases 
involving a victim and suspect who were acquainted, related, or intimate partners wer  
more likely than those involving a victim and suspect who were strangers to be 
prosecuted (Spohn, et al., 2001: 206).58 
                                                
56 Spears and Spohn (1997) noted that one limitation was the small sample size of only 321 cases. Second, 
the study examined the charging decision in a single jurisdiction (Detroit, Michigan). Third, in this 
particular jurisdiction most of the sexual assaults involved black suspects and black victims. Finally, this 
study was confined to the screening decision in sexual assault cases and not other types of offenses (Spears 
and Spohn, 1997: 521).  
57 The authors used data on 1997 sexual battery casesleared by arrest in Miami, Florida. They also used 
interviews with a sample of the attorneys who handled these cases. Spohn, et al., 2001: 206. 
58 Spohn, et al. (2001) highlighted the fact that their study focused explicitly on prosecutors’ charging 
decisions in sexual assault cases, which prior resea ch suggest are different than other types of cases. In 
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With the exception of the studies of charging in sexual assault cases, there are 
relatively few recent studies on prosecutor decisions compared to the 1970s and 1980s. 
Forst (2002) lamented that we knew less about the charging decision at the turn of the 
Twentieth Century than in the 1970s and 1980s due to the lack of data on prosecutor 
decision making (p. 525). As Forst (2002) explained, many of the studies of prior decades 
were based on data collected through the Prosecutor’s Management Information Sys em
(PROMIS),59 which was published by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) until it was
discontinued in 1992 (p. 525). 
The Plea Bargaining Function 
It is useful to distinguish between three types of plea bargaining: implicit bargains 
(which always involve sentences); explicit bargains involving sentence bargaining; a d 
explicit bargains involving charge bargaining.60 An implicit bargain refers to those 
situations in which the defendant does not negotiate a specific agreement with the 
prosecutor but believes that if he or she is found guilty at trial, he or she will be punished 
more severely than if he or she had pled guilty. The defendant simply “throws himself on 
the mercy of the court by pleading guilty to the original charge under the expectation of 
                                                                                                                                                 
particular, prior studies revealed that case outcomes are affected by stereotypes about rape and rape 
victims, and that only “real rapes” will be taken seriously. Spohn, et al. (2001) cited Estrich’s (1987) 
description of a “real rape” as “aggravated, jump-from-the-bushes stranger rapes” as opposed to “simple 
cases of unarmed rape by friends, neighbors , and acquaintances.” Spohn, et al. (2001) further stated that 
prior studies of sexual assault case processing decisions, including the decision to charge or not, support 
these assertions. 
59 The PROMIS data system collected local area data from numerous jurisdictions including Manhattan, 
Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., Wayne County (Detroit), Marion County (Indianapolis), and Multnomah 
County (Portland, Ore.). 
60 There are many other types of plea bargaining. A prosecutor may, for example, provide leniency to a 
defendant’s accomplices, withhold damaging information from the court, influence the date for a 
defendant’s trial or sentencing, arrange for a defendant to be sent to a particular correctional institution, 
request that a defendant receive credit for time served while awaiting trial, agree to support a defendant’s 
application for parole, attempt to have detainers from other jurisdictions dismissed, arrange for sentencing 
in a particular court or by a particular judge, provide immunity for uncharged crimes, or remain silent when 
the prosecutor’s recommendation might otherwise be unfavorable (Alschuler, 1979). 
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receiving a more lenient sentence thereby” (Padgett, 1985: 756). In sentence 
recommendation plea bargaining, the prosecutor in exchange for a guilty plea 
recommends a particular disposition to the judge, who then usually imposes the sentence 
recommended (Padgett, 1985: 756). In charge reduction plea bargaining or charge 
bargaining, the prosecutor downgrades or dismisses charges in exchange for a guilty plea 
to the reduced charge(s) (Padgett, 1985: 756).  
According to the D.C. Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, a defendant 
may plead guilty, not guilty, or nolo contendere.61 The prosecutor and defense attorney or 
the defendant may engage in discussions with a view toward reaching an agreement that, 
upon entering of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a charged offense or to a lesseror 
related offense, the prosecutor will do the following: (1) move for dismissal of other
charges; (2) make a non-binding sentencing recommendation or agree not to oppose the 
defendant’s request for a particular sentence or sentencing range; or (3) ag ee that a 
specific sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of the case (such an 
agreement would be binding on the Court once it accepts the agreement). The first type of 
agreement is a charge bargaining agreement. The second and third agreements are form  
of sentence bargaining. The third type of agreement, also known as a Rule 11(e)(1)(c) 
agreement, is virtually nonexistent in the District of Columbia. 
The overwhelming majority of defendants in the District of Columbia enter a plea 
of “not guilty” at the preliminary hearing, and the case is scheduled for trial. Between the 
preliminary hearing and trial, the prosecutor and the defense counsel typically engage in 
plea negotiations and, if the parties reach a plea agreement, the defendant waives his or 
her right to a trial and enters a plea of guilty to one or more charges (District of Columbia 
                                                
61 See D.C. Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedur, Rule 11. 
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Sentencing Commission Annual Report, 2006: 30). Plea bargaining in the District of 
Columbia is generally an informal process. It can occur at any point after the charging 
decision has been made or even before formal charges are brought (Davis, 2007: 45). In 
most cases, prosecutors make the plea bargaining decision early in the process. At some 
point after the defendant is presented with a copy of the charges, the prosecutor will let 
the defendant know whether there is a plea offer and whether the defendant must accept 
the offer by a certain date. The offer often expires by the date of the preliminary hearing. 
If the offer is accepted, the preliminary hearing is waived and a date is set for the plea in 
open court. In many cases, however, defense attorneys may negotiate a continuance of 
the preliminary hearing and an extension of time to accept the offer. Prosecutors are not 
required to offer a plea bargain in every case. He or she does not have to justify the 
decision to offer or decline a plea bargain to the judge, defense attorney, or anyone other 
than possibly the supervising prosecutor in her office (Davis, 2007: 45).  
In the District of Columbia, judges do not participate in any way in plea 
negotiations or in the agreement. With the exception of Rule 11(e)(1)(c) pleas, which are 
extremely rare, there can be no agreement as to what sentence the defendant will receive 
for his or her plea. The plea agreement may be to one count of the charging document or 
to more than one count. In some cases, the defendant may plead guilty to a reduced 
charge included within one of the more serious charges of the indictment. For exampl , in 
an indictment for armed robbery with a gun, the prosecutor will typically charge the 
defendant with possession of a firearm during a crime of violence, carrying a pistol 
without a license, possession of an unregistered firearm and, if the gun was loaded, 
unlawful possession of ammunition (District of Columbia Advisory Commission on 
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Sentencing Annual Report, 1999: 10). Here, the defendant may be permitted to plead 
guilty to a variety of scenarios including unarmed robbery, or to unarmed robbery and 
carrying a pistol without a license. Plea agreements in the District of Columbia “come in 
a wide variety of configurations and may benefit both sides for many different reasons” 
(District of Columbia Advisory Commission on Sentencing Annual Report, 1999: 11). In 
the District of Columbia, “[i]n general, the prosecution bargains for the certainty of 
conviction, and the defendant bargains for the possibility of a reduced sentence” (District 
of Columbia Advisory Commission on Sentencing Annual Report, 1999: 11). 
Davis (2007) provided a detailed example of the plea bargaining process with a 
typical burglary case in the District of Columbia: 
If the defendant is arrested for breaking into a private home and stealing a 
number of items, he may be charged with several offenses. They may 
include first-degree burglary, first-degree theft, and destruction of 
property. If the prosecutor decides to make a plea offer, she has total 
discretion to decide what the offer should be. There are no laws or rules 
that dictate or even guide her decision. A typical plea offer in such a case 
might be a guilty plea to second-degree burglary (a less serious type of 
burglary that carries a lighter penalty than first-degree burglary) in 
exchange for the prosecutor’s agreement to dismiss the other charges. If 
the defendant was not detained after his arrest, the prosecutor also might 
agree not to oppose him staying in the community after his guilty plea, or 
even to support a sentence of probation at the sentencing hearing…A 
different plea offer in the same case might involve a more favorable result 
for the defendant than a plea to second-degree burglary. For example, the 
prosecutor might offer a plea to attempted burglary, which is a 
misdemeanor with a penalty of a year or less in jail. The prosecutor might 
also offer a deal less attractive to the defendant—for example, a plea to the 
first-degree burglary. Any of these offers might be sweetened by the 
prosecutor’s agreement to support the defendant’s release at the time of 
the plea or to support probation or a reduced penalty at the sentencing 
hearing (p. 46).  
 
As with the charging decision, the prosecutor considers numerous factors when 
evaluating a case for plea bargaining. McDonald et al. (1979) wrote that prosecutor  
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focus primarily on “the big three factors”: seriousness of the offense, seriousness of the 
offender, and the strength of the case (p. 161). With regard to the seriousness of the 
offense, prosecutors rarely offer plea bargains favorable to the defendant (such as to 
probationary sentences) in cases of serious crimes (Davis, 2007: 49). As to the 
seriousness of the offender, a first offender is more likely to receive a more generous plea 
offer than someone with a significant prior record (Davis, 2007: 47). All other things 
being equal, the more serious the criminal, the stiffer the terms of the plea bargain 
(McDonald et al., 1979: 156). With respect to the strength of the case, attorneys belive
they are able to estimate the likelihood that if a case went to trial it would result in a 
conviction. A prosecutor’s decision of whether to plea bargain and what terms to offer is
influenced by this calculus (McDonald, 1979: 158).  
Beyond the “big three factors,” there are other elements that contribute to plea 
bargaining decisions. Attributes of the defendant may play a role such as age, sex, race, 
marital status, social class, political or family connections, demeanor, history of 
employment, drug use, alcohol use, psychiatric problems, physical health problems, 
military service, and length of local residence (McDonald et al., 1979: 161). 
Characteristics of the victim may also affect plea bargaining including the victim’s age, 
sex, race, social class, demeanor, prior record of criminal deviant behavior, and 
relationship with the defendant (McDonald et al., 1979: 161). 
The prosecutor must also take into account many practical considerations when 
deciding whether to plea bargain and what terms to offer. For instance, the willingness of 
victims and other witnesses to testify at trial and pre-trial conferences may affect the 
evaluation of a case (McDonald, et al., 1979: 161; Davis, 2007: 47). One of the most 
 
59 
significant practical considerations may be the prosecutor’s caseload. Most have very 
heavy caseloads and must make plea offers in the majority of their cases becau e they 
simply do not have the time and resources to go to trial in all of them (Davis, 2007: 46). 
The prosecutor’s relationship with the defense attorney and the attorney’s reputation for 
honesty, willingness to go to trial, and competence at trial, are also contributig factors 
(McDonald, et al., 1979: 160; Davis, 2007: 47). Another significant factor is the 
defendant’ s willingness to cooperate with the prosecutor by providing informati n that 
will assist in the prosecution of another defendant in exchange for a dismissal or 
reduction of his own charges (Davis, 2007: 52). 
As with the charging decision, the majority of empirical studies on the plea 
bargaining process were conducted during the 1970s and 1980s. While this body of 
research did not focus on prosecutorial decisions within sentencing guidelines systems, 
and while its findings are mixed, it discusses important methodological approaches for 
studying plea bargaining and its determinants. Bernstein, et al. (1977) empirically 
examined charge reductions for a sample of 1,435 criminal defendants.62 The authors 
developed two measures of the favorability of charge reduction. The first was a measure 
of the magnitude of the reduction relative to the absolute reduction possible.63 Th  second 
                                                
62 The study used a sample of defendants arraigned and convicted in a criminal (misdemeanor) court during 
a three-month period in a major metropolitan city in New York State. This court processed upwards of tw -
thirds of all criminal cases including cases prosecut d as felonies. The criminal court can only dispose f 
cases in which the conviction charge is a misdemeanor or violation; to convict a defendant of a felony, the 
case must be waived to Supreme Court. The cases in the sample represented all persons whose most severe 
charge at first court presentation was a second or third degree burglary or related offenses, a first, second, 
or third degree assault, a second or third degree grand larceny, petit larceny, or a first, second or third 
degree robbery. The authors selected only those defen ants prosecuted for charges in one of these four 
crime categories (burglary, assault, larceny, robbery) to limit the variability in crime categories and assess 
how variation among those categories affected the dependent variables (Bernstein, et al., 1977: 372).  
63 This index was constructed by taking the change in severity of charge from prosecution to conviction 
charge as the numerator, and the change in severity of charge from prosecution charge to the lowest 
severity charge possible at conviction as the denomi ator. Severity was coded in increasing severity fom 
1-8 where 1 was a violation or unclassified misdemeanor, 2 was a B misdemeanor, 3 was an A 
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was simply the severity of the charge for which the defendant was convicted (Bernstein, 
et al., 1977: 365). The authors first studied defendants whose cases were disposed of at 
their first court appearance and found that the largest effects were for thetype of crime 
for which the defendant was prosecuted. Defendants prosecuted for assaults were more 
likely to receive a more favorable charge reduction than those prosecuted for burgla y, 
robbery, or larceny.64 Defendants prosecuted for burglary offenses were least likely to 
receive a more favorable reduction. They also found that the age of defendants affected 
the favorability of charge reductions, with older defendants being more likely recipients 
of favorable reduction. The sex and race of the defendants had no significant direct 
effects (Bernstein, et al., 1977: 375). The authors also found that defendants for whom 
                                                                                                                                                 
misdemeanor, 4 was an E felony, 5 was a D felony, 6 was a C felony, 7 was a B felony, and 8 was an A 
felony. The letter codes and felony/misdemeanor/violati n categories were in accordance with the 
specifications of the New York Penal law code. For example, if a defendant’s most serious prosecution 
charge (the charge at his/her first court presentation) was a C felony (e.g., second degree burglary) the 
severity code for that charge was a 6. If that defendant’s most serious charge for which he or she was 
convicted was an A misdemeanor (e.g., possession of burglar's tools) the severity code for that conviction 
charge was a 3. The difference of 3 (6 - 3) between th  prosecution charge and the conviction charge was 
the amount of reduction, i.e., the numerator. The denominator was calculated by taking the difference 
between the severity code of the prosecution charge (using the same example, 6) and the severity code of 
the lowest charge for which the defendant could have been convicted, i.e., a violation, which carries a 
severity code of 1. The difference here (6 - 1) is 5. Thus, for this sample defendant, the amount of reduction 
relative to the amount possible would be 3/5 or .60. The index ranged from 0 for defendants whose 
conviction charge was identical to the charge for which they were prosecuted, to 1 for defendants whose 
reduction was equivalent to the total reduction possible (Bernstein, et al., 1977: 366). 
64 The authors attempted to explain this finding as follows: 
Our conversations with court personnel suggest that one reason for the 
leniency accorded those prosecuted for assaults may be the conception 
that assaults are acts done in the “heat of the moment.” As such, a 
presumption of spontaneity undercuts a presumption of premeditation. 
Since premeditation may be indicative of culpability, persons charged 
with assault and other spontaneous crimes may be mor favorably 
treated by the courts. Additionally, we observed that e overwhelming 
majority of assault cases processed were alleged to have occurred 
between friends and relatives. Since the court under observation serves 
a lower class catchment area, the victims of these as aults are lower-
class persons themselves. Thus, the leniency accorded to assault cases 
may additionally reflect the courts’ adoption of a street-wise definition 
of assaults as routine for the lower class culture, th reby reducing the 




this was a first arrest did least well on the charge reduction outcome, while defendants 
having prior arrests but no convictions did best. This appeared to support the contention 
by Newman (1966) that more experienced defendants may fare better in plea negoti tions 
due to their knowledge of the justice system (Bernstein, et al., 1977: 375).  
Bernstein, et al. (1977) then examined the outcome for defendants whose cases 
were not disposed of at their first court presentation and found that the favorability of the 
charge reduction for these defendants was not affected by the type of offenser the age 
of the defendant (Bernstein, et al., 1977: 375). They did, however, find that minorities 
who pled guilty at this stage received less significant charge reductions. The authors also 
examined variables that reflected organizational constraints to explore how the goals of 
the courts may affect charge reduction decisions. They suggested that the bulk of factors 
having a significant impact on charge alteration can be interpreted in terms of 
“organizational priorities”65 (Bernstein, et al., 1977: 382). In sum, the authors found that 
the favorability of the charge reduction outcome was partly explained by the sta uses of 
the defendant and bureaucratic constraints of the court.  
Curran (1983) examined whether there were differences in treatment by gender
for four outcomes—negotiations, prosecution, conviction, and sentence.66 Curran found 
                                                
65 While the authors did not have direct measures of organizational variables, they examined the effect of 
(a) prosecuting defendants for felony offenses, (b) prosecuting defendants for resisting arrest, and (c) a
defendant's release status pending case disposition. They found that these variables had significant effects, 
which could be accounted for by the court’s need to process as many cases as possible and to minimize the 
court’s expenditure of time and money (Bernstein, et al., 1977: 382). 
66 The negotiation outcome was measured with a dichotom us variable indicating whether there was a 
charge or sentence negotiation. The prosecution outcome was measured with a dichotomous variable 
indicating whether a defendant was prosecuted. Curran (1983) selected a sample of 60 females and 60 
males for each of five years—1965, 1966, 1971, 1975, and 1976. The total number of cases used was 543 
due to missing data (Curran, 1983: 45). 
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that sex was not significantly related to negotiations, prosecution, or conviction.67 
Women were just as likely as men to be offered a plea, to be prosecuted once arrested, 
and to be convicted. At the sentencing level, however, sex did have a significant effect on 
the outcome, with female defendants receiving more lenient dispositions than males 
(Curran: 1983: 52). The findings suggested that the most important determining factors at 
these stages were not offender or offense related, but involved the evidentiary strength of 
the individual cases and organizational factors such as the criminal caseload or 
idiosyncrasies of individual prosecutors and judges (Curran, 1983: 54). 
Bishop and Frazier (1984) studied the relationship between gender and charge 
reduction with a sample of 251 cases drawn from one judicial district in Florida.68 The 
charge reduction outcome was measured using two indices. The first was a simple 
measure of the absolute amount of reduction. It was calculated by subtracting the 
maximum sentence possible for all conviction offenses (in years of incarceration) from 
the maximum sentence possible for all charges listed in the charging instrumen  initially 
                                                
67 Males and females were compared in terms of each outcome, controlling for relevant legal and nonlegal 
variables. The legally relevant variables were seriousness of the criminal act, the total number of counts, 
and prior criminal history. The non-legal variables were the race, age, and occupational status of the 
defendant. 
68 Data were collected in two stages. The first stage included all cases adjudicated during a 12-month 
period. The 229 cases drawn from this stage represent d 90 percent of all the circuit court criminal cses 
processed during that year. (The remaining 10 percent consist of cases in which all charges were dismis ed 
and those in which final adjudication had not taken place by the end of the initial data collection period). 
Because the number of females in the initial sample was too small for meaningful analysis, a second stage 
of data collection was implemented that provided an additional 80 female cases. Specifically, the one-year 
base sample was augmented to include all the female cas s processed over the next two-year period. Since 
they were exploring how women fared as compared to men in charge-reduction decisions, they excluded 
from the sample those cases which were not resolved through guilty pleas, reducing the sample size to 291. 
They further refined the sample by excluding those cases where it was impossible for the defendant to 
negotiate a reduction in the charges. These were cases in which the defendant was initially charged with 
only one count of an offense. The final sample consisted of 250 cases, 178 involving males (71 percent) 
and 72 involving females (29 percent). The data were collected primarily from presentence reports, which 
included relevant charge-reduction information such as the initial charge(s) filed by the prosecutor and the 
final charge(s) to which each defendant pled guilty. Each presentence report also contained information 
regarding a variety of potential control variables ( .g., race, age, prior arrest history, pretrial release status) 
(Bishop and Frazier, 1984: 388). 
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filed by the prosecutor. The sentence maximum for each charge was obtained from the 
Florida penal code (Bishop and Frazier, 1984: 389). 
The second measure was an index of the magnitude of the charge reduction 
received relative to the absolute reduction possible. The index was constructed by taking 
the change in the severity of charges from prosecution to conviction as the numerator, 
and the maximum change possible in the severity of charges as the denominator (Bishop 
and Frazier, 1984: 389). This index was similar to one of the measures employed by 
Bernstein et al. (1977) except that Bernstein et al. (1977) did not code sentences in term  
of years of incarceration, utilizing instead an ordinal classification scheme in which 
several classes of felony and misdemeanor crimes were assigned severity scores ranging 
from 1 to 8. Furthermore, Bernstein et al. (1977) did not consider multiple counts, scoring 
only the severity of the defendant’s most serious charge at initial charging nd at 
conviction (Bishop and Frazier, 1984: 389). Bishop and Frazier (1984) controlled for 
numerous variables including the defendant’s race, age, number of prior arrests and 
convictions, the amount of bond ordered at the initial appearance, the length of time that 
each defendant was held in detention prior to conviction. They found no evidence that 
there was differential treatment by gender in charge reduction. 
Holmes, et al. (1987) took stock of the literature on charge bargaining at that time 
and concluded that “with few exceptions, our knowledge of charge reductions has been 
gleaned from qualitative investigations of plea bargaining or self-reports of those 
involved in plea negotiations” (p. 235). While this literature provided valuable insight, 
Holmes, et al. (1987) wrote, it was unable to establish clear relationships between the 
status attributes and case disposition of defendants. Holmes (1987) noted that the few 
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quantitative studies that existed generally suggested that defendant status variables “have 
less influence than generally assumed, pointing to the greater effects of legally r levant 
variables and the mediating effects they have in the relationships between the status 
attributes and charge reductions” (p. 235).  
In their own study, Holmes, et al. (1987) examined legal, status, and resource 
determinants of charge reductions and the severity of final dispositions in cases of 
burglary and robbery in two jurisdictions. The data for the study were collected from 
prosecutors’ case files in Delaware County, Pennsylvania and Pima County, Arizona. The 
authors operationalized charge reduction as a trichotomous variable, comprising no 
reduction in level of initial indictment charge, reduction to a lesser felony, and reduction 
to a misdemeanor. They believed this measure improved on prior charge reduction 
indices of Hagan (1975) and Curran (1983) by including more information about the 
“actual degree of charge reduction, the most important consideration from the standpoint 
of the defendant” (Holmes, et al., 1987: 240). 
The authors analyzed several dependent variables in sequential order. They first 
examined the antecedents of legal resources (i.e., type of attorney and pretrial rel ase), 
which may have mitigated dispositional severity. These dependent variables were then 
analyzed with respect to their effects on charge reductions. Finally, all of the procedural 
variables were assessed in regard to their impact on the severity of the final dispositions. 
The independent variables included the prior felony conviction record, the number of 
charges filed, the type of most serious charge (robbery, residential burglary, non- 
residential burglary), whether the offense occurred at night, involved a weapon, or 
resulted in physical harm to the victim, whether there was a record of positive eyewitness 
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identification or a confession,69 employment status,70 type of attorney, and pretrial release 
status.71  
The results of the study suggested that the effects of the status characteristics of 
defendants operated indirectly through their influence on access to legal resources. In 
Delaware County, black and unemployed defendants were less likely to be represented by 
private counsel, the lack of which increased the likelihood of pretrial detention and severe 
final disposition. There were also indirect status effects in Pima County where employed 
and older defendants were more likely to obtain bail, which ultimately advantaged them 
at final disposition. Race and ethnicity also had some unexpected effects. In Delaware 
County, blacks received greater charge reductions than whites, and in Pima County 
Mexican defendants received more favorable final dispositions (Holmes, et al., 1987: 
248). Thus, while there was some evidence that social status influenced the acquisition of 
private counsel and pretrial release, which tended to favor defendants at final disposition, 
there was no support for the expectation that charge reductions would be especially 
receptive to status influences (Holmes, et al., 1987: 233). The findings revealed only one 
direct status effect and no indirect influences. Moreover, two of the three statistically 
significant race/ethnicity effects seemed to suggest that minorities were at an advantage 
(Holmes, et al., 1987: 248). 
                                                
69 According to Holmes, et al. (1987), evidential considerations were particularly relevant to charge 
reductions, with the usual hypothesis suggesting that prosecutors are more willing to make concession in 
weak cases (e.g., Rosett and Cressey, 1976; Myers and H gan, 1979). Moreover, such factors were also 
thought to have potential influences in the allocation of legal resources. Judges may, for example, set 
higher bail in cases involving strong evidence of guilt. Finally, such factors might influence final 
disposition severity (Holmes, et al., 1987: 240). 
70 The employment variable may influence allocation of legal resources, charge reductions, and final 
dispositions because it may be seen as an indicator of future criminality (Holmes, et al., 1987: 240). 
71 Research suggested that retention of a private attorney and release on bail generally contributed to more 
favorable dispositions. Furthermore, such variables w re important not only in their own right, but because 




Holmes, et al. (1987) speculated that the general lack of status effects on charge 
reductions may have been due to the bureaucratic nature of the judicial process, where 
decisions by prosecutors and defense attorneys, who are most concerned with efficiently 
disposing of cases, become highly routinized and relatively resistant to extralegal f ctors 
(Holmes, et al., 1987: 248). They also theorized that their findings were a result of the 
inability to control for biases in initial charging decisions.72 If prosecutors overcharged 
initially, they may have ultimately had to accept pleas to lesser charges from black 
defendants with the purpose of obtaining convictions (Holmes, et al., 1987: 249).  
Noting that “the majority of research focusing on plea bargaining was conducted 
in the 1970s and 1980s and has been relatively neglected in the past 25 years,” Ball 
(2006) studied the relationship between offender characteristics and the prosecutor’  
decision to reduce the number of charges (p. 246).73 Ball (2006) hypothesized that race 
and ethnicity, sex, age, and employment status of the offender had an effect on count 
bargaining decisions in only the “borderline serious” cases.74 Ball (2006) predicted that 
for more serious cases, plea bargaining would be used to ensure a conviction for the 
                                                
72 Concerning the effect of race on charge reductions in Delaware County, for example, it is significant to 
note that during the period under study the jurisdiction was reportedly experiencing racial tension and
conflict. The related antagonism between the police and the black community may have thus been 
accompanied by a tendency toward overcharging black offenders. While the police officers file the first 
charges, the authors selected the initial prosecutor harge as the base from which reductions were gauged 
because “they represented the formal charges to which t e defendant must answer and because plea 
negotiations generally occur after these charges have been filed” (Holmes, et al., 1987: 240). 
73 Ball (2006) randomly selected a sample of 2,578 cases from a list of all offenders who were convicted of 
at least one felony in Chicago, Illinois 1993. Those cases where the defendant did not plead guilty were 
eliminated. 
74 Because sentences in Illinois in 1993 were defined  a determinate classification scheme, these groups 
were defined as follows: most serious included Class X offenses, borderline serious included Class 1 
offenses, and least serious included Class 2, Class 3, and Class 4 offenses. These classifications were 
determined based on the potential maximum punishment. For the most serious classification, the defendant 
could likely face 30 years in prison. For the borderlin  serious classification, the defendant could likely 
face 15 years, whereas offenders in the least serious classification could only face a maximum of 7 years 





prosecutor and reduce the severity of the sentence for the defense attorney. For the least 
serious cases, plea bargaining would be used to reduce caseloads for both parties 
regardless of the defendant’s individual characteristics. Finally, in the borderline serious 
cases, there would be more disagreement between the prosecutor and the defense attorney 
regarding the outcome of the case and, thus, there would be more explicit bargaining and 
genuine concessions (Ball, 2006: 246). Plea bargaining decisions would be clearly 
determined by legally relevant factors in the lowest level and highest level of case 
seriousness. It was also hypothesized that plea bargaining decisions would not be clearly 
determined by legally relevant factors and rely more on prosecutorial discretion in he 
medium level of case seriousness. In particular, it was hypothesized that black or 
Hispanic, male, young, and unemployed offenders would be less likely to receive a ount 
reduction in the borderline serious cases than white female older offenders who were 
employed at the time of the crime (Ball, 2006: 256). 
The dependent variable in this study was the likelihood of receiving a count 
reduction. For instance, if a defendant was initially charged with three curr nt offenses 
but was only convicted of one offense, then this defendant received a count reduction. 
Cases with only one original charge were eliminated from the analysis (Ball, 2006: 249). 
Because of low variability, the number of charges filed was recoded into a dichotomous 
measure—2 charges and 3 or more charges (Ball, 2006: 249). Ball (2006) did not find a 
statistically significant relationship between offender characteristics and the likelihood of 
receiving a count reduction. Thus, the hypothesis that offender characteristics affect the 
decision to reduce the number of charges in the borderline serious cases was not 
supported (Ball, 2006: 256).  
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In a recent review of prior empirical studies of charging and charge bargaining, 
Shermer and Johnson (forthcoming) concluded: 
Collectively, prior research on prosecutorial decision-making in state 
courts provides mixed and inconsistent evidence of social disparities in 
punishment. In part, these sundry findings reflect the inherent diversity of 
the samples and jurisdictions examined. Although this research provides a 
number of important insights into the importance of the prosecutor in 
criminal courts, much of it is dated, has been constrained to small sample 
sizes, limited to particular offenses (e.g., burglary, robbery, or sexual 
assault), or conducted in specific locales, often a single city or county 
court. Small sample sizes result in low statistical power to detect 
relationships and the focus on specific crimes and locales reduce 
generalizability and risks localized, idiosyncratic research findings (p. 7). 
 
Shermer and Johnson (forthcoming) examined (1) the influence of extralegal 
offender characteristics in the charge reduction process and (2) the influence that charge 
reductions exert on final sentence outcomes in federal courts (Shermer and Johnson, 
forthcoming: 3). Shermer and Johnson found that male offenders were about .68 times as 
likely as female offenders to receive a charge reduction.75 They found no direct evidence, 
however, of age- or race-graded differences in the likelihood of charge reductions.76  
 With regard to type of offense, Shermer and Johnson found that property crimes 
were more than twice as likely as violent crimes to receive charge reductions, while 
immigration offenses were the least likely to receive charge reductions. Moreover, on 
average, more serious crimes were associated with greater probability of charge 
reductions “in part perhaps because maximum penalties begin much higher for these 
crimes” (p. 20). Finally, criminal history exerted no significant influence on charge 
                                                
75 They operationalized the charge reduction dependent variable as whether the statutory maximum was 
reduced. 
76 More specifically, they found that young, black, and Hispanic offenders were not any less likely to have 
their statutory maximum penalties reduced as part of their plea negotiation. When modeling the joint 




reduction. The authors noted that this “unexpected result” was “consistent with at least 
some prior research that finds the effect of prior offending is limited to the final 
sentencing decision (Holmes et al., 1987)” (p. 20). Shermer and Johnson (2009) 
concluded: “Overall, we find evidence that federal charge reductions are significantly 
influenced by the gender of the offender but not by their age, race, ethnicity, or 
educational and family background” (p. 25).  
Because the above results could not rule out the possibility that important charge 
reduction disparities existed for at least some categories of crime,77 Shermer and Johnson 
reestimated models of charge reduction that were disaggregated by offense type. While 
the authors found that legal predictors such as the severity of the offense and number of 
filing charges exerted consistent influences across offense categories, several 
offender characteristics demonstrated offense-specific effects. For instance, the aggregate 
gender finding discussed above appeared to be driven by violent and drug offenses: For 
violent crimes, male offenders were about one-third as likely to receive a charge 
discount. For drug crimes, they were about one half as likely (p. 25). Shermer and 
Johnson found that other characteristics also varied by offense type. Age, for example, 
exerted a small positive effect only for immigration cases, and race and thnicity emerged 
as strong predictors for weapons offenses, where black and Hispanic offenders were 
about .70 times as likely to have their initial charges reduced (p. 25).  
 Shermer and Johnson concluded that their results offered “relatively little 
support” for the contention that there are disparities associated with prosecutorial charge 
reductions in the federal sentencing context (p. 27). There was no evidence that younger 
                                                
77 Shermer and Jonson (2009) noted that prior research suggested “that racial inequalities in federal 
punishments are greatest for drug crimes (Steffensmier & Demuth, 2000)” and theoretical arguments 
indicated that “charging disparities may be especially pronounced for violent and firearms offenses” (p. 25)  
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offenders were less likely to receive charge reductions. Moreover, the race and ethnicity 
of the offender exerted no direct influences on charge reductions with black and Hispanic 
offenders being no less likely to have their charges reduced than whites (p. 27). While 
males were significantly less likely than females to have their initial charges reduced, the 
authors warned that these effects “may also reflect important gender differences in 
offending and victimization patterns not adequately captured by our measure of off nse 
severity” (p. 28).78 Finally, Shermer and Johnson found that the influence of offender 
characteristics at times varied across offense type. Males were particularly unlikely to be 
given charge reductions for drug and violent crimes and black and Hispanic offenders 
were disadvantaged in charging decisions for weapons offenses (p. 28).  
 Turning to their second research question, Shermer and Johnson investigated the 
influence of charge reductions on final sentence lengths. They found “convincing 
support” for the expectation that charge reductions would be associated with both the 
presumptive sentencing recommendation in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines grid and 
the final sentence length: “Net of other factors, receiving a charge reduction on average 
reduced recommended sentences by 23% and actual sentences by 19%” (p. 29). Once the 
presumptive sentence was accounted for, however, they found that initial charge 
reductions exerted no additional influence on judicial sentencing decisions (p. 29). 
Shermer and Johnson concluded: 
                                                
78 They authors explained: 
Female crime tends to be less severe in its consequences (e.g., less serious victim injury) 
and female offenders are more likely to have unique histories of victimization as well as 
special family circumstances that may serve to mitigate their culpability (Chesney-Lind, 
1997; Daly, 1994; Steffensmeier & Allan, 1996). Unfortunately, we lack detailed data on 
additional measures necessary to investigate these alternative explanations. Future 
research is therefore needed to better explain the und rlying causes of the gender gap in 





Overall, these results indicate that charge reductions significantly reduce 
the length of incarceration for federal offenders because they shift their 
relative placement within the federal sentencing guidelines, but compared 
to offenders within the same guidelines cells, charge reductions are not 
associated with differential punishment (p. 28).79 
 
The Link Between Charging and Plea Bargaining 
Plea bargaining is best understood, not as an isolated decision but as a “process 
that includes a number of decisions” beginning immediately after arrest and th t can lead 
to a number of different outcomes (Walker, 1993: 86). Plea bargaining is “not really a 
decision point at all. It is not a single decision that can be isolated and subjected to formal 
controls. Instead, it involves a series of decisions, over a period of time, by different 
officials” including the police and the prosecutor (Walker, 1993: 86).  
One of the most important decisions affecting the plea bargaining process is the 
charging decision. Plea bargaining opponents object to the practice of “overcharging” 
(McDonald, 1979; Alschuler, 1978). Prosecutors may decline to bring charges, bring only 
charges that they believe they can prove, or overcharge by convincing a grand jury to 
indict a defendant for more and greater charges than they can prove beyond a reason bl  
doubt at the trial stage (Davis, 2007: 23). Overcharging can be defined as the practice of 
charging a defendant with the highest number and degree of charges that can possibly be 
                                                
79 The authors noted that the conclusion that charge reductions affect sentencing but are unaffected by 
offender race is consistent with previous work examining prosecutorial influences in punishment (Hagan, 
1974) and with research examining the hydraulic displacement of discretion to prosecutors (Miethe, 1987; 
Wooldredge & Griffin, 2005). They also offered three important caveats. First, their study only examined 
reduction in charges and was therefore unable to capture potentially important differences in initial charge 
severity or in other prosecutorial decisions of consequence such as the imposition (or avoidance) of 
mandatory minimums. Second, their measure of charge reduction—whether the statutory maximum was 
lowered--provided a conservative estimate of prosecutorial charge bargaining that, while still important, 
failed to capture more subtle types of prosecutorial bargaining. Charge reductions that did not alter 
statutory maxima were unobserved in their analysis a  were other types of plea negotiation such as fact 
bargaining and guidelines stipulations. Finally, the authors were unable to study the effect of some 
potentially important omitted variables including measures of evidentiary strength, inter-organizationl 
relationships among the different court actors, and offender and victim characteristics such as victim injury, 




supported by the available evidence. It involves “tacking on” additional charges that they 
know they cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt or that they can technically prove but 
are inconsistent with the legislative intent or otherwise inappropriate (Davis 2007: 31). 
It is called “overcharging,” not to suggest anything illegal but to convey the notion of 
“overkill” (McDonald, 1979: 39). The charges are higher than anyone expects the 
defendant to be convicted of or punished for given the usual local practice for similarly 
situated offenders. Overcharging allows the prosecutor to reduce charges without really 
giving anything away (McDonald, 1979: 39).  
Hagan (1975) found that offenders with a higher number of charges were more 
likely to experience charge alterations, which “supports a hypothesis that offenders often 
may be systematically ‘over-charged’ in anticipation of ‘rewards’ to be distributed later 
in the bargaining process” (p. 544). Holmes, et al. (1987) pointed out that statistical 
models of charge bargaining may be misspecified by virtue of the inability to control for 
biases affecting initial charging decisions. In one of the jurisdictions of their study, they 
noted that black offenders may have been overcharged initially. If so, prosecutors may 
have ultimately had to accept pleas to lesser charges from black defendants and “what 
would appear to be an advantage at the point of charge negotiations may actually indicate 
efforts to establish charges more amenable to prosecution” (p.249). As discussed earlier, 
Ball (2006) did not find a statistically significant relationship between offender 
characteristics and the likelihood of receiving a charge reduction. Ball (2006) offered 
several warnings, however, including the fact that the study could not consider possible 
prosecutorial overcharging. As Ball (2006) wrote, “Without knowing the real evidence of 
the case, it is unclear as to whether an offender received a true plea bargain or whether 
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the guilty plea was a result of a markup during the initial charging phase…diparities 
may be masked because certain groups of offenders may have received a markup 
reduction as opposed to a true reduction” (p. 257). 
Researchers have found that there is a relationship between the charging policy of 
the prosecutor’s office and charge bargaining. The charging policy affects both the rate of 
charge bargaining and the extent or magnitude of charge reduction. Boland and Forst 
(1985), for instance, analyzed data covering 14 state and local jurisdictions80 and found 
that prosecutors’ offices with more selective charging policies and arrest rejection rates 
were more inclined to take cases to trial. In jurisdictions with a screening a d charging 
policy based on the more stringent trial standard of “guilt beyond a reasonable doubt” 
rather than the minimum legal standard of “probable cause,” the prosecutors were mor  
likely to insist that defendants plead to the top charge or go to trial (Boland and Forst, 
1985: 11). In these jurisdictions, the majority of defendants pled guilty to the top charge 
and did not receive a charge reduction. While some jurisdictions had a criminal case 
processing policy “designed to weed out all but highly convictable arrests before they are 
filed in court, to limit plea bargaining on those that are filed, and to bring cases to trial
routinely whenever the defendant does not plead as charged,” others tended to “accept 
arrests at a higher rate, engage more often in plea negotiation, and obtain more 
incarcerations (especially more short-term jail sentences) per arrest” (p. 12).81 
                                                
80 The data were obtained from the Prosecutor’s Management Information System (PROMIS). 
81 Boland and Forst warned, however, that there may be other forms of concessions such as sentence 
bargaining, or there may be take-it-or leave it plea policies, where charge reductions are not allowed unless 
evidence deteriorates. They wrote, “In many jurisdictions charge reductions represent and unknown 
mixture of evidence weaknesses and concessions. The precise mix is difficult to establish analytically 
because of limitations in measuring the quality of evidence for each charge in each case” (Boland and 




LaFree(1985) studied the relationship between the prosecutorial charging policy 
and charge bargaining in three “high control jurisdictions” (HCJs) and three “low control 
jurisdictions (LCJs). The HCJs-- El Paso, New Orleans, and Seattle--had specific 
guidelines for prosecutorial decision making, specialized screening procedures, and 
internal review of the decisionmaking of assistant prosecutors. In El Paso, for instance, 
the chief prosecutor instituted stringent screening procedures and prohibited any charge 
bargaining once formal charges were filed. He assigned experienced trial attorneys to a 
screening unit and instructed them only to accept “strong, triable cases and to set charges 
so that they accurately reflected the facts of the case and the law” (LFree, 1985: 294).  
In the three LCJs--Pima County (Tucson), Arizona; Norfolk, Virginia; and Delaware 
County, Pennsylvania--the lead prosecutors used minimal felony screening, allowed 
relatively unsupervised discretion by line prosecutors in making charging decisions, and 
allowed assistants to negotiate plea bargains without formal review procedures. 
According to LaFree (1985), the importance of these organizational differences wer  
revealed by the data on the mean number of counts and charge seriousness for defendants 
at arraignment and conviction: 
Defendants were charged with fewer counts and received less charge 
reduction in the jurisdictions that maintained stricter controls over plea 
bargaining (the HCJs) than in the jurisdictions with fewer restrictions on 
plea bargaining (the LCJs). The mean number of arraignment charges for 
the LCJs is over three times greater than the mean for the HCJs. In El 
Paso, the jurisdiction with the most stringent controls on plea bargaining, 
defendants were convicted of nearly as many charges as the number on 
which they were arraigned…Charge Reductions were greater for the LCJs 
than the HCJs. The difference between Arraignment and Conviction 
charges in Norfolk, the jurisdiction with the highest mean Charge 
Reduction, was 13 times greater than the difference between Arraignment 
and Conviction charges in El Paso, the jurisdiction with the lowest mean 
Charge Reduction. Overall, differences between average Arraignment and 
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Conviction charges were three times greater in the LCJs than the HCJs (p. 
294).  
 
The data, LaFree (1985) wrote, supported the argument of plea bargaining critics 
that prosecutors overcharge in order to provide leverage to obtain guilty pleas. LaFree 
(1985) then examined how the outcomes and determinants of guilty pleas and trials 
differed in the high and low control jurisdictions. He concluded that, not only did tighter 
controls on plea bargaining in HCJs appear to reduce the practice of overcharging, but 
prosecutors in these jurisdictions “also appear to have succeeded in tightening the fit 
between case characteristics and sentence severity” (p. 307). While the best predictors of 
sentence severity were similar in the two types of jurisdictions, sentence outcomes in the 
LCJs depended more on factors other than those included in the study. According to 
LaFree (1985), “Given the wide range of independent variables in the analysis and the 
fact that these variables were relatively successful at predicting sentencing outcomes in 
the HCJs, it seems likely that decision making in the LCJs was simply more idi syncratic 
than in the HCJs and thus less dependent on measures of evidence and case seriousness” 
(p. 307). 
 Wright and Miller (2002) argued that prosecutors’ offices should adopt a “hard 
screening” policy that encompasses a “far more structured and reasoned charge selection 
process than is typical in most prosecutors’ offices” (p. 31). Under such a policy, the 
prosecutor's office would make an early and careful assessment of each case and dem nd 
that police provide sufficient information before the initial charge is filed. The prosecutor 
would also file only “appropriate” charges, i.e., those that the office “would generally 
want to result in a criminal conviction and sanction,” that “reflect reasonably accurately 
what actually occurred,” and that the prosecutor “can very likely prove in court” (p.32). 
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The prosecutor’s office would also severely restrict all plea bargaining, particularly 
charge bargaining, which would be made possible by the hard screening process. Finally, 
such a prosecutorial screening policy would include “sufficient training, oversight, and 
other internal enforcement mechanisms to ensure reasonable uniformity in chargi g and 
relatively few changes to charges after they have been filed” (p. 32).  
 While such a policy would likely produce a small increase in the number of trials, 
the more substantial change would be an increase in the number of “open” pleas--
defendants pleading guilty as charged without any prior negotiated agreement with the 
prosecutor (Wright and Miller, 2002: 33). While some form of implicit plea bargaining 
(i.e., sentence bargaining) may occur under such a system, Wright and Miller (2002) 
argued that it would be more attractive than a system where negotiated pleas predominate 
because of the dishonesty and inaccessibility of negotiated plea bargaining.82  
Wright and Miller (2002) analyzed data of the New Orleans District Attorney’s 
Office, which has emphasized early screening of cases and has actively discouraged any 
changes of criminal charges as a result of negotiations after the charges are filed for the 
past three decades. They found that a prosecutor can indeed invest significant resources 
in early evaluation of cases and maintain this practice over the long run. Because there 
was a relatively high level of declination (refusal to prosecute after the police recommend 
                                                
82 Plea bargaining, Wright and Miller (2002) wrote, is dishonest because the “offense of conviction does
not match either the charges the state filed or the eality of the offender’s behavior. A “particularly noxious 
form of dishonesty is overcharging by prosecutors-the filing of charges with the expectation that defendants 
will trade excess charges for a guilty plea. The public in general, and victims in particular, lose faith in a 
system where the primary goal is processing and the secondary goal is justice” (p.33). Defendants and 
defense attorneys also consider bargaining for pleas to be dishonest and develop the “cynical belief that
they have received some undeserved favorable treatment because of a skillful defense lawyer or a sloppy or 
harried prosecutor” (p.33). Defense attorneys in systems driven by bargains “believe that they must 
convince most of their clients-even innocent defendants-to accept lesser punishments to avoid a substantial 
risk of much greater punishment” (p.33). Professors W ight and Miller favor sentencing bargaining over 
charge bargaining because sentence bargaining can be limited by legislatures in changing sentencing 




charges), and a policy discouraging reductions in charges, there were lower levels of 
negotiated pleas, slightly higher rates of trial, and notably higher rates of open guilty 
pleas than in most jurisdictions (Wright and Miller, 2002: 34). Wright and Miller (2002) 
conclude with this recommendation: 
[T]his study calls on prosecutors to appreciate the link between screening 
and negotiated guilty pleas, and to use screening devices with the explicit 
goal of lowering the number of plea bargains…The explicit connection 
between screening and plea bargains should be a regular part of a 
prosecutor’s self- assessment and public explanations for charging and 
trial decisions. The screening/bargaining tradeoff should also become part 
of the public, political dialogue about the justice system, especially at 
election time. The interesting public question should not be the 
“conviction rate,” but rather the “as charged conviction rate.” This rate 
could be expressed as a simple ratio. The higher the ratio of “as charged 
convictions” to “convictions,” the more readily a prosecutor should be 
praised and reelected. A ratio near one-where most convictions are “as 
charged,” whether they result from guilty pleas or trials-is the best sign of 
a healthy, honest, and tough system (p. 35).  
 
Theoretical Perspectives on Prosecutorial Decision-Making 
Uncertainty Avoidance 
Albonetti (1987) introduced the “uncertainty avoidance” perspective to explain 
the prosecutor’s decision whether to charge offenders at the initial stage of felony 
screening. She estimated the net effects on the probability of prosecution of a set
variables including offense-related variables, the evidentiary strength of the case, and the 
defendant-victim relationship. Albonetti hypothesized that case information indicating 
increased uncertainty in obtaining a conviction at trial will decrease the probability of 
prosecution (Albonetti, 1987: 295). Her analysis revealed that the decision of whether to 
prosecute was made with a “generalized preference for avoiding uncertainty,” nd that 
uncertainty emerged from “stereotypical perceptions of cause and effect r lationships 
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between successful case prosecution and containments thereof” (Albonetti, 1987: 311). 
For instance, while uncertainty about successful prosecution was significantly reduced 
with the introduction of certain legally relevant evidence, concerns over witness 
management, victim credibility, and defendant/victim relationship were ext al gal 
sources of uncertainty that exerted a negative effect on the decision to prosecute 
(Albonetti, 1987: 311).  
Albonetti and Hepburn (1996) joined the uncertainty avoidance perspective with 
“causal attribution,” “etiology of bias,” and labeling theories to argue that prosecutors 
make attributions from stereotypes based on ascribed characteristics of defendants to 
reduce uncertainty. They explored the tenets of these theories as they informed an 
uncertainty avoidance perspective on the prosecutors’ decisions to divert felony drug 
defendants from criminal prosecution and into a drug treatment program (Albonetti and 
Hepburn, 1996: 64). According to Albonetti and Hepburn (1996), both the etiology of 
bias perspective and the labeling perspective suggested that males compared to females, 
minority members compared to nonminority members, and older offenders compared to 
younger offenders were more likely to by “typed as deviant, more likely to be perceived 
as possessing a deviant moral character, and more likely to be assessed as having an 
uncertain outcome if diverted from prosecution to treatment” (p 67). Therefore, they 
suggested that these ascribed traits--male, minority membership, and being old r--were 
linked to a low likelihood of rehabilitation and, thus, were expected to reduce 
significantly the likelihood that the prosecutor would defer a defendant from prsecution 
into treatment (Albonetti and Hepburn, 1996: 67). They estimated main effects and 
interaction effects of defendant ascribed status and achieved status on the likelihood of 
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diversion from prosecution to drug treatment, and their findings indicated partial support 
for their hypotheses.  
Focal Concerns Theory 
The “focal concerns theory” is “the leading theoretical perspective used to 
examine discretionary decision-making in sentencing” (Oneill, 2008: 8). This theory was 
first proposed by Steffensmeier, et al. (1998) to frame hypotheses r garding the effects of 
race, gender, and age on judicial sentencing decisions.83 They posited that three “focal 
concerns” influence “judges and other criminal justice actors” in reaching sentencing 
decisions (p. 766). The three focal concerns were “the offender’s blameworthiness and 
the degree of harm caused the victim, protection of the community, and prctical 
implications of sentencing decisions” (p.766). 
According to Steffensmeier, et al. (1998), the first focal concern, 
blameworthiness, is ordinarily associated with the just deserts philosophy of unishment 
where the severity of the sentence increases with the culpability of the defendant and the 
harm caused by the offense. The second factor, protection of the community, typically 
focuses on incapacitation and deterrence. Steffensmeier, et al. (1998) drew on Albonetti’s 
(1991) argument that sentencing is an “arena of bounded rationality where court act rs, 
particularly judges, confront the goal of protecting the public and preventing recidivism 
in the context of high uncertainty about offenders’ future behavior” (p. 766). Under this 
perspective, predictions about offender dangerousness (i.e., the risk of recidivism) are 
                                                
83 Steffensmeier, et al. (1998) analyzed sentencing outcomes in Pennsylvania and found that: (1) young 
black males were sentenced more harshly than any other group, (2) race was most influential in the 
sentencing of younger rather than older males, (3) the influence of age on sentencing was greater among 
males than females, and (4) the main effects of race, gender, and age were more modest compared to the 
very large differences in sentencing outcomes across certain age-race-gender combinations (p. 763). These 
findings, they wrote, demonstrated “the importance of considering the joint effects of race, gender, and ge 
on sentencing, and of using interactive rather thanadditive models” (p. 763). 
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based on “attributions” predicated on factors such as “the nature of the offense (e.g., 
violent or property),” “the offender’s criminal history,” “the facts of the crime such as use 
of a weapon,” and the “characteristics of the offender such as drug dependency, 
education, employment, or family history” ( p. 766). The third focal concern, “practical 
constraints and consequences,” consist of both organizational and individual facets. 
Organizational concerns include maintaining “working relationships among courtroom 
actors,” “ensuring the stable flow of cases,” and “being sensitive to local and state 
correctional crowding and resources” (p.767). Practical consequences at the individual 
level include concerns about the offender’s “ability to do time,” health condition, special 
needs, and the disruption of ties to children and other family members (p.767).  
Because the three focal concerns and their interplay are highly complex, and 
because judges rarely have sufficient information about the case or the defendant, they 
develop a “perceptual shorthand” to make determinations such as who is dangerous and 
who is not. This shorthand is “linked to race, gender, and age attributions” (p.767).84 
Steffensmeier, et al., (1998) concluded that their statistical and qualitative85 findings were 
                                                
84 Steffensmeier, et al., (1998) explained: 
[O]ne might expect that judges, both as citizens and as elected officials, may share in the 
general stereotyping predominant in the community; and that racial (as well as age and 
gender) attributions will intertwine with the focal concerns…to influence judges in 
deciding whether to incarcerate an offender and the length of the incarceration. Our main 
premise is that race, age, and gender will interact to influence sentencing because of 
images or attributions relating these statuses to membership in social groups thought to 
be dangerous and crime prone (see Albonetti, 1991). The attributions may become 
informal norms, routines, and guides as mechanisms to reduce uncertainty in sentencing 
(Farrell and Holmes, 1991) (p. 768). 
85 Steffensmeier, et al., 1998 collected qualitative data on sentencing decisions including interviews with
samples of judges. Their findings reinforced their focal concerns theory of sentencing. The found, for 
instance, that women and older offenders were defined as less dangerous and lesser risks to the community 
compared to younger black males. Also, the blameworthiness of women and older offenders was more 
often mitigated by prospects of being victimized themselves, drug or alcohol problems, or psychological 
disorders (p. 786). They also found that women and older offenders were seen as potentially presenting 
greater costs and problems for the correctional system in terms of health care and child welfare. 
Additionally, women and older offenders were seen as h ving more community ties, more likely to be 
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consistent with their proposed “focal concerns” framework that judges “make attributions 
regarding blameworthiness, dangerousness, recidivism risk, and practical organizational 
consequences” based mostly on legally relevant information such as offense and prior 
record, but also “partly on the basis of attributions based on such defendant 
characteristics as race, gender, or age as they relate to the focal concerns of sentencing” 
(p.788).  
A handful of scholars have applied the focal concerns perspective to prosecutorial 
decision-making. Spohn and Holleran (2001), for example, used the perspective to 
analyze charging decisions. They noted that the focal concerns that guide prosecutors’ 
charging decisions are similar, but not identical to those guiding judicial sentencing 
decisions. While prosecutors consider the seriousness of the offense, the degree of ha m 
to the victim, and the culpability of the suspect when filing charges, they take into 
account a different set of “practical constraints and consequences” than judges.Though 
prosecutors are also concerned about maintaining relationships with other members of th  
courtroom workgroup, they focus on the likelihood of conviction rather than the social 
costs of punishment. They must predict how the victim, the suspect, and the incident will 
be viewed and evaluated by the judge and jurors at later phases of the criminal justice 
process (Spohn and Holleran, 2001: 208). Because these predictions are uncertain, 
prosecutors also develop a “perceptual shorthand” that incorporates stereotyp s f real 
crimes and credible victims. Consequently, they consider, not only the legally relevant 
factors, but also the “background, character, and behavior of the victim, the relationship 
                                                                                                                                                 
supporting a family, and more likely to have steady employment. Young black males, conversely, were 




between the suspect and the victim, and the willingness of the victim to cooperate as the 
case moves forward” (Spohn and Holleran, 2001: 208). 
Ulmer, et al. (2007) proposed that the focal concerns theory be used as a 
“heuristic framework to integrate and organize the propositions from various other 
theories that are compatible in principle with focal concerns but that are perhaps 
incomplete explanations of punishment decision-making on their own” (p. 431). They 
used the focal concerns perspective to guide their examination of prosecutorial decisions 
to apply mandatory minimum penalties because it was “congruent with and builds on the 
themes of uncertainty reduction and causal attribution in Albonetti’s work and because it 
can integrate themes of organizational efficiency and racial threat as well (p. 431). 
Ulmer, et al. (2007) reviewed Albonetti’s (1987) uncertainty avoidance/causal 
attribution theory and argued that “attributions of offender character based on his or her 
behavior, history and social statuses, and situational assessments of practical constraints 
or consequences” affect the interpretation of defendants in terms of the focal concerns (p. 
432). They then discussed two practical constraints—organizational efficiency and 
conviction certainty. Courtroom actors, particularly prosecutors, value processing cases 
efficiently. Convictions are viewed as a measure of prosecutorial effectiveness, and guilty 
pleas are a method for increasing the conviction rate (p. 433). Ulmer, et al. (2007) found 
that prosecutors often value getting a relatively certain conviction over seeing eligible 
offenders receive mandatory penalties. They often trade severity fo  certainty of 
punishment, a scenario consistent with Albonetti’s (1987) uncertainty avoidance theory 
(p. 433).86 
                                                
86 Numerous other scholars have also argued that certainty of conviction is more important for prosecutors 
than severity of sentence (Padgett, 1985: 762; Rhodes, 1979: 375). 
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Ulmer, et al. (2007) suggested that the focal concerns perspective was also 
compatible with the notion of “racial threat.” They cited a wide range of research 
suggesting that blacks and Hispanics “tend to be objects of crime fear and may be seen as 
particularly threatening” (p. 434). They reviewed research finding that “anti-black 
criminal stereotypes and fear of black crime were associated with support for more 
punitive criminal justice policies” (p. 434). They further noted that t ere is a sizeable 
literature showing that females are often seen as “less blameworthy, less dangerous, and 
more amenable to rehabilitation and often present practical problems for the criminal 
justice system (e.g., if they have children)” (p. 435). Because the preponderance of 
research shows that women are typically sentenced more lenienty than men, they 
expected women to receive mandatory minimums less often than men.87 Ulmer, et al. 
(2007) concluded: 
Our findings suggest that the focal concerns perspective is a useful 
heuristic for prosecutorial decision criteria regarding sentencing outcomes, 
just as prior research shows it to be useful for conceptualizing judicial 
discretion. We argue that legally relevant factors, case processing 
concerns (i.e., rewarding uilty pleas), and social statuses (i.e., gender, 
ethnicity, and age) shape rosecutors’ perceptions of blameworthiness and 
community protection and thus their decisions to apply mandatories. In 
addition, the social contexts surrounding courts (e.g., violent crime rates, 
percentage Black) might shape prosecutors’ perceptions of both 
community protection and practical constraints (e.g., political 
ramifications of seeking or not seeking mandatories for certain offenders) 
(p. 452). 
 
While noting that the majority of research had provided at least partial support for 
focal concerns theory, Hartley et al. (2007) discussed some of its major theoretical and 
methodological shortcomings. First, “because the focal concerns theory lacks serious 
                                                
87 They noted that Miethe (1987) found that males were charged with more severe offenses and received 
less favorable sentence bargains from prosecutors than women. Furthermore, Alozie and Johnston (2000) 
found that female drug arrestees were more likely to be diverted by prosecutors into alternative programs 
and that race and ethnicity interacted with gender in such decisions (Ulmer, et al. 2007: 435). 
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theoretical development by criminologists, there is not an explicit thesis or an established 
set of propositions that support this theoretical framework” (p. 62). Rather, researchers 
follow “a set of established concepts which only offer suggestions as to the variables 
which can measure particular concepts” (p. 62). Second, the concepts of the perspective 
are still “relatively unexplored” and “contain interrelated variables” (p. 62). Hartley, et al. 
(2007) cited the example of criminal history, which can be used as an indicator of both 
the blameworthiness and community protection concepts. If one measure such as criminal 
history can be used as an indicator for two concepts, then it is part cularly important to 
know the precise relationship between the two concepts, which has not bee  sufficiently 
explained by the theory.  
A third shortcoming is that the majority of research testing he focal concerns 
theory uses secondary data from the Pennsylvania Sentencing Commission, which limits 
the generalizability of results and the number of variables that can be included in analytic 
models. The focal concerns concepts, therefore, have not been fully operationalized in 
prior research. The concept of practical constraints and consequences has been an 
especially “untapped feature” of this theoretical perspective (p. 62). The primary 
variables used to measure it has been whether or not the defendant ple guilty, the court’s 
number of cases, and the size of the court. This lack of measurement “leaves an empirical 
hole” in the perspective (p. 62). In short, Hartley, et al. (2007) wrote: 
The current research suggests that the focal concerns theory is not a theory 
at all. It has no set of testable propositions; most hypotheses that have 
been derived from this work have been extended over time. The primary 
concepts of this perspective are also underdeveloped. Different concepts 
can actually contain the same variables. Because of this, and the fact that 
focal concerns theorists do not allude to how these concepts fit together, 
except in a “complex interaction,” aspiring focal concerns empiricists are 
left to their own devices in testing extended analytic models. At this point, 
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the “focal concerns theory” is no such thing; it is merely a perspective. 
Criticism aside, the focal concerns perspective does appear to be a very 
logical and effective way in which to test sentencing outcomes (p.73).  
 
Court Community Perspective 
While quantitative research on prosecutorial decision-making is often grounded in 
perspectives such as “perceptual shorthand,” “uncertainty avoidance,” and “focal 
concerns,” a second type of research is ethnographic research of “court communities,” 
which focuses more on the dynamics of case processing rather than actual case out omes 
(Woolredge and Thistlewaite, 2004: 419). Ulmer (1997) reviewed the studies carried out 
by Eisenstein and Jacob (1977), Nardulli et al. (1988), Eisenstein et al. (1988), and 
Flemming et al. (1992), who proposed the court community framework. According to 
Ulmer (1997), there are four notable features of the perspective, the first of which is “the 
metaphor of courts as communities based on local legal culture, members’ shared 
workplace, and interdependencies between key sponsoring agencies (prosecutor’s office, 
bench, defense bar)” (Ulmer, 1997: 13). 
The second aspect of the court community framework highlighted by Ulmer 
(1997) is “an emphasis on interorganizational relations between sponsoring age cies, not 
only in terms of formal bases of authority but also the informal processes by which 
agencies and their representatives exert influence in courtroom workgroup strategies and 
case outcomes” (Ulmer, 1997: 13). The third element is the “detailed ttention to the 
guilty plea and sentencing process as the core organizational activities of courts” (Ulmer, 
1997: 13). The final aspect is the attention to “going rates,” which are “informal norms 
concerning routine charges, plea agreement terms, and sentences (Ulmer, 1997: 13). 
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Woolredge and Thistlewaite (2004) reviewed the court community literature and 
described the “going rates” aspect more specifically: 
Studies of court communities describe organizational and political 
influences on how attorneys and judges (“courtroom workgroups”) 
process large-volume cases within particular jurisdictions (Eisenstein and 
Jacob, 1977; Nardulli et al., 1988; Sudnow, 1965). These cases must be 
moved quickly through the courts to moderate caseloads, and attorneys in 
some jurisdictions therefore informally establish “going rates” (Eisenstein 
and Jacob, 1977) to accompany guilty pleas (see also Flemming et al., 
1992; Emerson, 1983; Nardulli et al., 1988; Ulmer, 1997). These involve 
charge and or sentence recommendations that are often less severe than 
those formally recommended by law. Defendants may therefore plead 
guilty rather than take their chances at trial, saving the state both time and 
money. Very little negotiation actually takes place in these circumstance, 
which also saves valuable time, because the charges and sentences 
accompanying guilty pleas are most often understood (referred to by 
Nardulli et al., 1988, as “consensus mode” guilty pleas) (Woolredge and 
Thistlewaite, 2004: 423). 
 
The Effect of Sentencing Guidelines on Prosecutor Decisions 
Having reviewed the major theoretical perspectives governing prosecutorial 
decision-making in general, this section discusses theories focu ing specifically on the 
effect of structured sentencing reforms on prosecutorial practices. Despite the theoretical 
and practical importance of the hydraulic displacement thesis, “relatively little theory has 
been advanced that can provide specific hypotheses about the likely impact of changes to 
sentencing laws” (Engen and Steen, 2000: 1363). As discussed earlier, Miethe (1987) 
argued that, even if sentencing guidelines or similar reforms exhibit some backward 
transference of discretion to prosecutors, it is not necessarily true that prosecutors will 
use this greater discretion.  
McCoy (1984) speculated that hydraulic displacement may not occur if each 
actor, including judges, “still retains some measure of discretionary power” (p. 256). 
Miethe (1987) offered several reasons why the implementation of sentencing guidelines 
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may not affect prosecutorial practices. First, he theorized that social control mechanisms 
may limit the abuses of prosecutorial discretion in charging and plea barg ining practices. 
For instance, there may be informal policies concerning charging and plea bargaining 
practices that may diminish the likelihood of major adjustments in plea bargaining 
practices after imposition of sentencing guidelines (Miethe, 1987: 174). Second, because 
prosecutors may perceive the development of sentencing guidelines as an initial step in 
controlling decisions, they may limit excessive use of their discretion (Miethe, 1987: 
174). Third, prosecutors’ use of discretion may be constrained by working elationships 
with others in the court community (Miethe, 1987: 157). Membership in the courtroom 
“workgroup” and shared norms about the appropriate penalties for particul r crimes may 
“minimize individual interests and thwart efforts by prosecutors  exercise their greater 
discretionary power” (Miethe, 1987: 174).  
Finally, most structured sentencing schemes retain some judicial sentencing 
discretion in the form of wide sentence ranges and adequate reasons for departures 
(Miethe, 1987: 174). With respect to this point, Frase (1999) similarly noted, in a 
“properly balanced guidelines system” with “reasonable sentence sev rity levels,” in 
which courts retain substantial sentencing discretion due to broad guidelines ranges, 
limited appellate scrutiny, and/or flexible departure powers, it i “rare that prosecutorial 
decisions will produce sentences which judges strongly disapprove, yet are powerless to 
prevent” (p. 69). In such systems, there is generally an absence of widesprea complaints, 
which is a sign that a major changes in prosecutorial practices have not occurred after the 
guidelines (p. 69). As discussed earlier, the voluntary nature of guidelines and the 
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descriptive, rather than normative approach, should also minimize the possibility of a 
hydraulic displacement (Miethe, 1987: 157). 
Tonry and Coffee (1987) speculated about the possible effect of the Minnesota 
Sentencing Guidelines on prosecutorial behavior. They cautioned against the sweeping 
statement that sentencing guidelines increase prosecutorial power to cause guilty pleas 
and discussed other prosecutorial important goals:  
Implicit in critiques of enhanced prosecutorial influence under guidelines 
is the thesis that the prosecutor will use the guidelines to maximize the 
pressure on each individual defendant to plead guilty. This may be an 
oversimplification, however. Other ends—including saving time and 
achieving better allocation of prosecutorial resources—are also pursued by 
the prosecutor and facilitated by the introduction of guidelines. 
Presumptive guidelines serve these goals by simplifying the negotiation 
process. In so doing, they enable the prosecutor to conserve his investment 
of resources in minor cases and thereby enable him to focus more 
intensively on the major cases involving more serious crimes (Tonry and 
Coffee, 1987: 152).  
 
Tonry and Coffee (1987) also warned about the possibility that the aggregate 
pressure that the prosecutor and judge can exert on the defendant to plead guilty may 
actually be reduced by sentencing guidelines even though the prosecutor has gained 
increased control. They illustrate this possibility with an example from the Minnesota 
Sentencing Guidelines. Before those Guidelines took effect, a robbery defendant who 
went to trial risked a sentence as long as 25 years. Under the Guid lines, however, high 
statutory ceilings have far less relevance. Consequently, the effect of any charge 
reduction that the prosecutor can typically offer is greatly reduc. A charge reduction of 
one seriousness level, they write, will seldom reduce the applicable guid line range by 




Complicating matters further, Tonry and Coffee (1987) noted that the “risk
aversion” level of the defendant makes it less clear whether sentencing guidelines 
increase the pressure to plead guilty. They point out that the concern that plea bargaining 
under sentencing guidelines may unduly pressure defendants to plead guilty is “implicitly 
based on the belief that the defendant compares the expected punishment cost of pleading 
guilty with that of going to trial and opts for the lesser expected cost” (p. 147). This, 
however, is not necessarily what the defendant does. There are at least two other 
possibilities. The defendant may be risk-averse and instead focus on the worst possible 
outcome (the maximum sentence), or he may be a “risk preferrer” and focus on the best 
possible outcome (the minimum sentence or acquittal). As Tonry and Coffee (1987) 
wrote, “There are no compelling reasons to believe that defendants are risk-neutral and 
simply compare the two expected outcomes” (p. 147).88 
According to Ulmer (1997), the theoretical perspectives that have been advanced 
to explain why a hydraulic displacement of discretion may or may not occur after the 
introduction of structured sentencing reforms are generally based on the court community 
                                                
88 Tonry and Coffee (1987) explained: 
The prosecutor can obtain greater coercive pressure over the defendant by threatening the 
possibility of a severe sentence than by offering a virtually certain but more modest 
discount off the normal sentence for the crime.  Because presumptive guidelines tend to 
prevent extreme sentences, they should “logically be expected to reduce the pressure on 
the risk-averse defendant to surrender a substantial possibility of acquittal. The trade-off 
has two elements: presumptive sentencing guidelines may lead a defendant who has little 
prospect of acquittal to plead guilty (because they make a discount off the mean sentence 
more certain), but by the same token they protect the risk-averse defendant with a 
reasonable chance of acquittal from his inability to resist prosecutorial pressure in the 
form of a threatened lengthy sentence for failing to plead guilty. So viewed, the charge 
concession arguably becomes only a small bribe that society pays the clearly convictable 
defendant to surrender the nuisance value that his attorney can create on his behalf, but it 
is inadequate to compensate the defendant who has aserious chance of acquittal. Thus, it 
might be argued, guidelines only expedite results; they do not reverse outcomes from the 
state of affairs that would exist in a world without plea bargaining. Attractive and benign 
as such a policy conclusion may seem, we are hesitant to endorse it without considerable 
qualification. Basically, our reservations stem from the ambiguity inherent in the concept 




framework. As Ulmer (1997) wrote, proponents of the court community perspective such 
as Eisenstein et al. (1988) “hold that the influence of any type of s ntencing reform will 
be filtered through the organizational and political contours of local court communities” 
(p. 14). Sentencing reforms do not operate in a vacuum, but must “take place in the real 
world of criminal court communities” (Eisenstein, et al. 1988: 296). Ulmer’s (1997) 
ethnographic and quantitative analysis of three counties in Pennsylvania suggested that 
the “hydraulic displacement” thesis is “not necessarily incorrect, but may be incomplete” 
because current framings of the issue in the literature “place a great deal of emphasis on 
prosecutorial discretion and the importance of charge bargaining, and give little attention 
to ways in which local court contexts provide opportunities, motives, and constraints” for 
the exercise of prosecutorial power (p. 183). In short, the role of sentencing guidelines 
and prosecutorial power in court community power relations will vary depending on the 
organizational context of each court. Ulmer (1997) explained:  
[G]uidelines may benefit prosecutors’ charge bargaining 
leverage and thus sentencing influence, but only where 
local contexts provide the means, motives, and 
opportunities for guidelines to be used in this way… the 
role of guidelines in court community power relations may 
vary depending on the formal and informal organization of 
case processing, the strength of local sentencing norms or 
“going rates,” and the ways in which each sponsoring 
agency (not just prosecutors) is able to use the guidelines to 
their advantage (Ulmer, 1997: 32).  
 
Ulmer (1997) stressed the importance of analyzing the relationship between the 
externally imposed sentencing guidelines norms and local informal norms (going rates) 
and how this relationship varies between court community contexts (p. 33). Ulmer (1997) 
hypothesized that in court communities with greater familiarity and stability—those 
where actors have more extensive shared pasts—there would be stronger local going rates 
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and thus less reliance on sentencing guidelines as a source of sentencing norms. In these 
court communities, informal going rates would supersede sentencing gu delines norms 
(Ulmer, 1997: 33). Conversely, court communities with less extensiv  hared pasts 
among workgroups and less strong going rates would exhibit greater reliance on 
guideline sentencing standards. In such court communities, sentencing guidelines would 
provide a “ready-made system of going rates, reducing uncertainty for counsel in 
predicting judges’ sentences, facilitating unilateral decisions, a d providing explicit tools 
for plea negotiating agendas” (p. 34). Ulmer (1997) concluded that “the nature and 
character of justice and formal social control…depend as much or more on th  processual 
orders of local courts as they do on the policies and laws of larger-scale state actors” (p. 
189). 
Conclusion 
Many years ago, Hagan (1975) wrote that, while the literature surrounding the 
prosecution process was “helpful in isolating potentially important variables,” it did not 
“suggest a set of propositions sufficiently precise to allow a deductive model-testing 
approach to the research problem” (p. 537). This statement is still true today. Theory on 
prosecutor decision-making generally and the hydraulic displacement thesis in particular 
remains underdeveloped. Bushway and Reuter (2008), for example, recently reviewed th  
literature on prosecutor decision making and criticized the lead perspective, focal 
concerns theory, for not operationalizing key concepts or providing a formal model for 
testing (p. 410).89 Existing theories have been most helpful, not for prediction and model 
testing, but simply for interpreting results of empirical research.  
                                                
89 Bushway and Reuter (2008) also argued that economic research could inform criminal justice research 
given that system actors are known and likely to behav  rationally in the “economic sense of consistently 
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Not only are existing theories on prosecutor decision making in need of further 
development, but they can lead to inconsistent predictions about the effect of important 
variables on charging and plea bargaining practices. Woolredge and Thistlewaite (2004) 
reached this conclusion after their review of quantitative studies, which are most often 
grounded in theories predicting harsher treatment for persons of lower status, and 
ethnographic studies of court communities, which leave open the possibility that 
relationships between extralegal characteristics of defendants and case outcomes may 
operate to the advantage or disadvantage of higher status defendants (Woolredge and 
Thistlewaite, 2004: 423). 
As discussed above, quantitative research on prosecutorial decision-making is 
generally based on perspectives such as “perceptual shorthand,” “uncertainty avo dance,” 
and “focal concerns,” which predict harsher dispositions for disadvantaged or lower 
status persons. Under the court community perspective, however, there are arguments 
that lower status defendants may receive more severe or less severe sentencing outcomes. 
As Woolredge and Thistlewaite (2004) explained, Sudnow (1965) argued that 
charge/sentence recommendations that are part of the going rates are more likely to 
accompany the guilty pleas of defendants who fit attorney preconceptions of stere typical 
offenders involved in large-volume crime, such as persons of lower socioeconomic status 
arrested for assaults or burglaries. If, for example, a burglary is committed and a defense 
                                                                                                                                                 
following their objective functions.” They lamented that economic research of criminal justice generally 
and the prosecutor specifically has essentially disappeared. They argued that “pioneering work” by 
economists in the early 1970s on prosecutors could make a significant contribution to understanding 
prosecutorial behavior. The most notable economic research was by Landes (1971), who proposed a 
mathematical model of prosecutor behavior where the prosecutor “attempts to maximize the expected 
number of convictions weighted by the expected sentence given at trial, subject to a budget constraint on 
his resources. Bushway and Reuter (2008) argued that the Landes model should at the very least present 
“an important alternative explanation or competing theory that could serve as a useful stalking horse  




attorney can establish that this offense is just like most other burglaries occurring in more 
crime prone neighborhoods, then the prosecutor may be more willing to reduce the 
charge to petty theft. However, if offense- and offender-related characteristi s do not fit 
preconceived stereotypes, then these charge/sentence recommendations might not be used 
(Woolredge and Thistlewaite, 2004: 422). When faced with atypical defendants, such as 
individuals of higher socioeconomic status, attorneys may “spend more time evaluating 
culpability, future risk, and appropriate outcomes because such evaluations are not 
readily dictated by any preconceptions” (Woolredge and Thistlewaite, 2004: 423). This 
opens the possibility that atypical defendants could experience outcomes that differ 
significantly from informal going rates, but whether these outcomes are more or less 
severe depends on the argument. As Woolredge and Thistlewaite (2004) explained:  
Case outcomes for atypical defendants could be more severe if judges 
maintain higher expectations of these individuals and are less likely to 
tolerate excuses for their behaviors…Atypical defendants could also 
experience more severe outcomes if refusal to negotiate leads to criminal 
investigations uncovering more evidence of culpability, providing the state 
with greater leverage in subsequent negotiations. Reluctance to initially 
accept a plea could also lead to harsher treatment even if these defendants 
subsequently plead guilty. Eisenstein and Jacob (1977) found that, in 
Chicago, prosecutors offered less attractive plea bargains as trial dates 
approached. By contrast, criminal investigations involving atypical 
defendants could lead to less severe outcomes if details about a 
defendant’s background are revealed that either reinforce preconceptions 
that the offense might have been an aberration in the life of an otherwise 
law-abiding citizen, or if uncovered details raise questions about guilt (p. 
423). 
 
Woolredge and Thistlewaite (2004) analyzed disparities in case processing for 
nearly 3,000 males arrested for misdemeanor assaults on intimates in Hamilton County 
(Cincinnati), Ohio. The stages of case processing pertinent to their analysis included the 
charging decision (filed charges versus no filed charges), full prosecution (no 
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subsequently dropped charges), conviction, and sentencing. Their general hypothesis f r 
the main effects of race and socioeconomic status at each stage examined was that
disposition severity among males arrested for intimate assault will vary based 
(separately) on the individual’s race and socioeconomic status, as well as the 
socioeconomic status of his neighborhood (p. 428). Woolredge and Thistlewaite (2004) 
hypothesized significant differences in case dispositions rather than testing directional 
relationships because their review of the literature left open the possibility of alternative 
hypotheses for extralegal disparities in case dispositions for intimate assault (p. 427). 
Woolredge and Thistlewaite’s (2004) findings revealed greater advantages for 
African Americans relative to whites in decisions related to charging, full prosecution 
and the length of incarceration. On the other hand, the significant results for both 
defendant socioeconomic status and neighborhood socioeconomic status were split in 
terms of the directions of their relationships. Lower socioeconomic status at the 
individual level coincided with lower odds of filed charges, yet higher odds of a jail 
sentence. Similarly, lower socioeconomic status at the neighborhood level correspond d 
with lower odds of filed charges and full prosecution, yet higher odds of conviction and a 
jail sentence. The relationships “consistently reflect either a less severe disposition for 
more disadvantaged defendants (formal charges and full prosecution), or a more severe 
disposition for more disadvantaged defendants (jail sentences)” (p.443). The theme that 
emerged was that that earlier case processing decisions generally favored defendants with 
lower socioeconomic status but later decisions generally favored defendants with higher 
socioeconomic status. Importantly, the “most interesting aspect of these trends [was] that 
the first set of findings is consistent with predictions extrapolated from ethnographic 
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studies of court communities, and the second with those based on frameworks more 
common to quantitative studies of case outcomes” (Woolredge and Thistlewaite, 2004: 
443).  
The authors speculated that this may have resulted from the fact that studies of 
court communities focus more heavily on decision making by attorneys, and studies of 
case outcomes focus more heavily on sentencing (decisions by judges). The benefits to 
lower socioeconomic defendants in earlier decision points could have been a 
consequence of the much larger volume of these individuals being arrested by police. 
They could have also reflected a prosecutorial “release valve” for these ypes of 
defendants that compensates for the proactive arrest policy (Woolredge an  Thistlewaite, 
2004: 443).90 
 In sum, Woolredge and Thistlewaite’s (2004) findings indicated that earlier cas  
processing decision points (i.e., charging) resulted in more favorable dispositions for 
suspects of intimate assault who faced greater social and economic disadvantage, which 
was consistent with predictions extrapolated from the literature on large volume cri e 
and court communities. Conversely, later decision points (conviction and sentence) 
generally favored those with higher socioeconomic status, which is consistent with 
predictions grounded in frameworks more common to quantitative research on 
                                                
90 Moreover, decisions to file charges and to not subsequently dismiss them may also have been influenced 
by risk factors not measured in the study, so the pool of fully prosecuted defendants may have consisted of 
a pool of higher risk offenders. It may only have been in the context of processing these higher risk 
defendants that lower socioeconomic status became a disadvantage to defendants, “based on the stereotyp s 
of higher risk offenders that might include their class status and whether they reside in more crime-prone 
neighborhoods” (Woolredge and Thistlewaite, 2004: 443). The authors concluded that, while stereotyping 
may actually benefit defendants who fit the more typical profiles of routine offenders, it is possible that 
such benefits only existed early on in the process due to caseload demands. Once the pool of defendants 
was filtered, both attorneys and judges may have seen the more stereotypical defendants as higher risks
(Woolredge and Thistlewaite, 2004: 443). 
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sentencing.91 In short, the results indicated that “both perspectives have merit for 
understanding extralegal disparities in processing cases of intimate assault, and together 
they offer an explanation for findings that might otherwise seem contradictory across 
stages of case processing” (p. 445). 
Summary and Research Questions  
The 1970s marked the beginning of a sentencing reform movement where many 
states sought to limit judicial discretion and reduce sentencing disparity through 
sentencing guidelines. The District of Columbia implemented sentencing guidelines in 
June 2004 with the goal of moving more sentences toward the center of the historical 
sentencing range. There have been numerous studies finding that sentencing guidelines 
systems in other states have been largely successful in reducing extra-legal sentencing 
disparity, and the D.C. Sentencing Commission evaluations have found that the D.C. 
Sentencing Guidelines have reduced variation that can not be explained by the current 
offense or the offender’s criminal record.  
The majority of research, however, has not examined whether sentencing 
guidelines have displaced discretion and disparity from the judge at the sentencing phase 
                                                
91 As alluded to above, Holmes, et al. (1987) reviewed prior empirical research, which generally did not
find any effect of extralegal variables on prosecutor charge bargaining decisions. They speculated that this 
was due to the “bureaucratic nature” of the judicial process, which “creates relative uniformity at this stage 
of decision making” (p. 248). They explained:  
It has often been argued that the primary concern of both prosecutors and defense 
attorneys is the expedient disposal of cases (e.g., Blumberg, 1967). The result is the 
routinization of dispositions, a procedure dictated by concerns about controlling court 
dockets and maintaining an orderly flow of cases through the system. Prejudicial 
responses to social status may thus become insignifica t in light of the bureaucratic 
imperative to dispose of cases efficiently (Hagan and Bumiller, 1983). Moreover, 
although the acquisition of legal resources was strongly affected by social status, these 
resources did not influence charge reductions. Thisis an especially important finding 
given the effects of legal resources on final dispositi n observed here an in previous 
research. The lack of resource effects on charge reductions reinforces the possibility that 
such decisions were highly routinized and, therefore, relatively impervious to extralegal 




to the prosecutor at the pre-conviction stage. There are a limited number of studies testing 
whether such a displacement has occurred. Miethe and Moore (1985) examined charging 
and plea bargaining practices (including the rate of charge reductions) before and after 
presumptive sentencing guidelines were implemented in Minnesota. They found that 
prosecutorial practices did not change dramatically after the sentencing guidelines and 
that the changes that did occur were related to changes in case attributes rather than 
offender characteristics. Miethe (1987) also examined the Minnesota guidelines and 
found little to no evidence of significant pre-/post-guideline differences in the rate of 
charge reductions, the rate of charge dismissals, or the average severity of the initial 
charge. Furthermore, he found little evidence that extra-legal attributes ecame more 
important predictors of dispositions after the guidelines were implemented. Any 
differences in pre- and post-guidelines models were due to the differential importance 
given to case processing and offense attributes rather than offender characteristics. 
Wooldredge and Griffin (2005) examined whether Ohio’s voluntary sentencing 
guidelines resulted in significant changes in prosecutorial charging and bargaining 
decisions. As discussed above, the first stage of the analysis focused on whether the 
guidelines corresponded with significantly lower odds of being charged with a felony 
where incarceration was presumed. This stage also tested whether the guidelines 
coincided with significant increases in the odds of (1) all charges being dropped after 
indictment (among all indicted suspects), (2) guilty pleas with agreements from 
prosecutors (also among all indicted suspects), (3) some charges being dropped betwe n
indictment and guilty plea (among those who pled guilty via agreements with 
prosecutors), and (4) reductions to lesser charges (also among those who pled guilty via 
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agreements).They did not find that the implementation of guidelines coincided with 
significant changes in any of the outcomes, except that they did correspond with a 
significant increase in rates of charge reductions among defendants who pled guilty.  
The second stage of their analysis looked at changes in the specific effects of case
and defendant characteristics on case dispositions. They found that some changes 
occurred in the specific effects of various defendant characteristics on some of the 
outcomes examined, but that these changes did not uniformly result in harsher 
dispositions for defendants facing greater social and economic disadvantage. Thus, any 
increase in levels of prosecutorial discretion that might have occurred did not result in 
extra-legal disparities in case dispositions.  
In sum, only three studies have specifically examined whether there has been a 
displacement of discretion to prosecutors after the introduction of sentencing 
guidelines.92 The two studies in Minnesota, a presumptive guidelines state, found limited 
evidence of a hydraulic effect, and any displacement that did occur was not related to a 
defendant’s extra-legal characteristics. The study in Ohio, a voluntary guidelines 
jurisdiction, found that the shift to guidelines coincided with an increase in rates of 
charge reductions among defendants who pled guilty, but that these changes did not result 
in harsher dispositions for offenders with greater socioeconomic disadvantage. The 
authors in the Ohio study emphasized, however, that even their limited finding of a 
hydraulic effect was significant due to that state’s voluntary guidelines structure. 
                                                
92 As described above, there have been numerous studie , particularly during the 1970s and 1980s, 
examining the nature and determinants of charging and charge bargaining. There are also several 
theoretical perspectives on prosecutor decision-making. An understanding of this literature is critical for 
this study on prosecutorial behavior, as it addresses issues such as whether to use non-directional 
hypotheses, model specification, and the operationalization of key concepts. It is not directly relevant, 
however, to developing the research questions in this s udy.  
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This study empirically tests whether there was a displacement of discretion and 
disparity from the judge to the prosecutor after the implementation the District of 
Columbia Sentencing Guidelines. It focuses on prosecutor charge bargaining decisions.93 
Specifically, this study addresses the following research questions:  
Among those who plead guilty, is the rate of prosecutor charge bargaining 
different before and after the D.C. Sentencing Guidelines?  
 
Among those who plead guilty, are the determinants of whether defendants 
receive a charge bargain different before and after the D.C. Sentencing 
Guidelines?  
 
Among those who plead guilty, is the magnitude of prosecutor charge bargaining 
different before and after the D.C. Sentencing Guidelines?  
 
Among those who plead guilty, are the determinants of the magnitude of 
prosecutor charge bargaining different before and after the D.C. Sentencing 
Guidelines?  
 
Piehl and Bushway (2007) proposed a different approach for testing the hydraulic 
displacement thesis. While the studies in Minnesota and Ohio focused on changes in the 
rate of plea bargains (“the existence of the bargain”) after sentencing guidelines, Piehl 
and Bushway (2007) developed an estimate of the difference in the sentencing outcome 
that can be attributed to prosecutorial charge bargaining (“the value of the bargain”). 
Their method measures the difference in sentencing outcomes caused by plea bargain and 
emphasizes the amount in months that the sentence length is reduced. They suggested this 
method because it may yield different substantive findings than when using the 
methodology from Minnesota and Ohio studies. This study will be test the hydraulic 
displacement of discretion thesis with Piehl and Bushway’s (2007) methodology. It will 
                                                
93 As discussed further below, this study also attemptd to examine whether there were any changes in the 




compare the average change in expected sentence due to charge bargaining in the pre and 
post-Guidelines periods. The research question to be addressed is:  
Among those who plead guilty, do prosecutor charge bargaining decisions affect 
the sentence to a different degree before and after the D.C. Sentencing 
Guidelines?  
 
The vast majority of studies of the effect of sentencing guidelines on disparity 
reduction have ignored the hydraulic displacement thesis largely because of the lack of 
necessary data. This is a “troubling reality: rules to control discretion may shift the 
discretion so that it is invisible to the researcher” (Piehl and Bushway, 2007: 121). While 
the District of Columbia Sentencing Commission has recognized the possibility of a 
displacement of discretion to prosecutors,94 it has not specifically examined this issue. It 
has not had the necessary data—at least not in a prepared datafile—to analyze whether 
the nature and determinants of prosecutorial decisions changed after the guidelines w re 
introduced. The District of Columbia Superior Court has granted access to data that will 
allow an examination of whether sentencing discretion and disparity has been displace  
from judicial decisions to prosecutorial decisions. 
                                                
94 The Commission wrote that “sentencing guidelines by design limit the discretion and power of judges, 
and many believe that in doing so, guidelines transfer some of that discretion and power to prosecutors – 
giving them too much power” (Advisory Commission on Sentencing Annual Report, 2000: 76). When 
considering whether to recommend abolishing parole for some versus all felonies, the Commission 
determined a unitary system where parole was abolished for all felonies was preferable because “the 
retention of some parole-eligible offenses would also create the potential for a transfer of power to 
prosecutors.” It reasoned that “prosecutors hold the power to select the charge at the indictment and h ve 
leverage in the plea bargaining process. In a bifurcated or trifurcated system, many occasions would arise 
in which the prosecutor could select between one charge that carries parole and another that does not” 




CHAPTER III:  Data and Methods 
Data and Sample Selection 
This study is based on a random sample of single count felony sentences (n=881) 
from the District of Columbia Superior Court.  The sample was selected from 4403 cases 
sentenced in 2003 and 2005.95 This data were taken from the District of Columbia 
Superior Court Information System (CIS), which contains conviction and sentencing 
related information.96 The CIS is more appropriate than the Sentencing Commission’s 
datafile for purposes of this study because it contains information from the periods p ior 
to and after the implementation of the Sentencing Guidelines. 97 The Commission’s 
datafile, on the other hand, only contains information from the period after the 
Guidelines.98  
The research design is a pre- and post-test comparison of two samples of cases. 
The CIS does not allow a clear delineation between pre- and post-Guidelines cases 
because it does not include the date of conviction.99 Given that the Guidelines became 
effective in June 2004, and given that it generally takes approximately eight weeks from 
conviction to sentencing, it was not possible to determine which cases in 2004 were post-
Guidelines cases. All cases sentenced in 2004 were therefore excluded, and only cases 
sentenced in 2003 (the pre-Guidelines sample) and 2005 (the post-Guidelines sample) 
were used. A twenty percent sample was selected, forty percent of which ere Drug Grid 
                                                
95 The majority of convictions in the Superior Court a e for only one count. In 2003 and 2005, only 13.6% 
of felony sentences were for multiple convictions. I  2003, there were 2213 single count cases. In 2005, 
there were 2190 single count cases. 
96 Access to this data was granted through a Memorandum of Understanding with the Superior Court. 
97 After 2005, the CIS was replaced by another data system. 
98 The CIS dataset also contains more demographic, legal, and case-processing variables than the 
Commission’s dataset, which primarily contains variables related to compliance with the Sentencing 
Guidelines.  
99 As stated above, the Sentencing Guidelines apply to convictions on or after June 14, 2004. 
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cases and sixty percent of which were Master Grid cases. Disproportionate stratified 
sampling was done to ensure that there were sufficient non-drug cases, which have far 
more offense types than drug cases. For 2003, 443 cases were selected, 177 of which 
were drug cases and 266 of which were non-drug cases.100 For 2005, 438 cases were 
selected, 175 of which were drug cases and 263 of which were non-drug cases.101  
The second source of data for this study was the Superior Court’s “CourtView” 
system, which tracks individual cases from the prosecutor charging phase to the 
sentencing phase. The CourtView system allows authorized users to examin  individual 
cases by defendant name/identification number or by case docket number. The 
Memorandum of Understanding with the Superior Court grants access to all relevant 
variables in CourtView with the exception of the names of the defendants and the names 
of the sentencing judges.102 While the CIS dataset contains useful conviction and 
sentencing related information, access to CourtView was essential for this study due to its 
focus on prosecutorial decisions. As Ulmer (1997) wrote, “[a]n ideal statistical analysis 
of case processing and sentencing outcomes would include data on original charges (i.e., 
charges at arrest or arraignment stages) as well as conviction charges” (p. 44). For this 
study, the author manually supplemented the random sample of 881 sentenced cases with 
charging, charge bargaining, case processing, and criminal history variables from 
CourtView.  
                                                
100 In 2003, 1066 (48.2%) of the cases in the population were drug cases, while 1147 (51.8%) were non- 
drug cases.  
101 In 2005, 1083 (49.5%) of the cases in the population were drug cases, while 1107 (50.5%) were non- 
drug cases.  





Table 4.1 provides descriptive statistics for the measures in this study. The 
independent variables can be categorized as (1) demographic variables; (2) criminal 
history variables; (3) case processing variables; and (4) charging variables. The 
demographic variables --- age, gender, and race of the offender – are included as 
independent variables in all multivariate analyses. The defendant’s age at sentencing 
(AGE) was created by taking the difference between the year of sentencing (2003 or 
2005) and the defendant year of birth. The defendant’s gender is measured by a 
dichotomous variable (MALE) and coded as 1 for males and 0 for females. The 
defendant’s racial category is captured by a dummy variable (AA) and codeas 1 for 
African Americans and 0 for non-African Americans.  
With regard to criminal history variables, the following information was manually 
collected from CourtView for each case in the sample: (1) the number of prior felony 
arrests in the District of Columbia (PRIORF); and (2) the number of prior misdemeanor 
arrests in the District of Columbia (PRIORM).103 The following additional criminal 
history variables were then created: (1) the number of prior D.C. felony and misdemeanor 
arrests (PRIORA); (2) a dichotomous variable for whether there were any prior D.C. 
felony arrests (ANYFELS); and (3) a dichotomous variable for whether there were any 
prior D.C. felony or misdemeanor arrests (ANYPRIORS). The criminal history variables 
originally collected (PRIOF and PRIORM) were included in all multivariate analyses.104 
                                                
103 Information on traffic related matters was not collected. 
104 While the other three criminal history variables provide helpful information for the descriptive analyses, 




Though there was no information available for prior criminal record from 
jurisdictions other than the District of Columbia, there is no reason to believe that the 
inability to measure prior out-of-state convictions changed after the Guidelines. 
Therefore, a relative comparison between the pre- and post-Guidelines samples should 
not be affected. Nevertheless, to test the accuracy of the criminal history variables 
collected from CourtView, a comparison was made to a subset of cases where the D.C. 
Sentencing Guidelines criminal history scores, which are based on both D.C. and out-of-
state convictions, were available. The Sentencing Commission provided Sentencing 
Guidelines criminal history scores for 316 of the 438 cases sentenced in 2005 (the post-
Guidelines sample).105 A correlation analysis was then performed between the Sentencing 
Guidelines score of adult convictions and this study’s measure of prior D.C. arrests 
collected from Courtview. The highest correlation level (.371) was between the 
Sentencing Guidelines score of adult offenses and the measure of prior D.C. felony and 
misdemeanor arrests (PRIORA). 
While this comparison to the Sentencing Guidelines criminal history measures 
may provide some insight as to the most accurate criminal history variables mong the 
measures collected for this study, it is important to note that the Sentencing Guidelines 
scores frequently do not reflect the true criminal history of the offender. This is due to a 
variety of complex rules for “scoring” prior convictions according to the Sentencing 
Guidelines. For instance, while this study counts the number of prior misdemeanor and 
felony convictions at equal value regardless of their severity, the Sentencing Guidelines 
rules score prior convictions at different levels (e.g., ½ point, 1 point, 2 points, or 3 
                                                
105 The Commission was unable to provide criminal history scores for every case because in the early 




points) depending on their severity.106 The Guidelines also include intricate rules for 
when convictions are too old to be counted and, thus, “lapsed.” There are also rules fr 
when lapsed offenses can be “revived” and scored. In such cases, they are scored at a 
lesser value than non-lapsed convictions, though they are sometimes scored at full value 
depending on the seriousness of the offense. Finally, there are extremely complex rules 
on how to score out-of-state convictions, which by and large result in under representing 
the true out-of-state criminal history in the presentence investigation report and, thus, in 
the Sentencing Commission’s dataset.107 Thus, while the comparison to Sentencing 
Guidelines criminal history scores provides some useful information, one should not 
assume that the scores in the Sentencing Commission’s datafile are an accurte measure 
of prior record. 
While prior convictions or sentences to imprisonment are frequently used as 
measures of prior record to explain sentences imposed by judges, prior arrests may be the 
best measure of criminal history when examining prosecutorial decisions. Welch, et al. 
(1984) assessed the utility of 11 commonly used measures of prior record when 
examining the sentencing outcome.108 They found that these measures were not 
interrelated highly and thus were not interchangeable, that the measures affected sentence 
severity differently, and that the relationships between these measures and sente ce 
                                                
106 For example, more serious felonies such as aggravated assault are generally scored at three points while 
less serious offenses such as theft are scored as one point. 
107 In brief, these rules instruct the presentence report writer to under-represent the out-of-state convictions 
based on a comparison of the statutory elements of the offense from the foreign jurisdiction. The sentencing 
court is then permitted to increase the out-of-state criminal history score based on factual arguments by the 
prosecutor. The prosecutor, however, only raises the arguments in a small fraction of cases when such an 
argument would increase the criminal history category (e.g., A, B, C, D, or E) on the sentencing guidelines 
table. Even in the rare event that such arguments are m de, and the criminal history score is increased to 
reflect the true prior record, that increase in the criminal history score frequently was not reported back to 
the Sentencing Commission in the early years after the Guidelines became effective. 
108 The authors acknowledged that their study was limited because it examined only 2400 cases in one city. 
They wrote: “While this is an adequate number for an overall analysis, it does not allow for a fine 
breakdown by different types of crimes and defendants” (p. 224-225). 
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severity varied for black and white defendants. The strongest predictor of the sentence 
was whether a defendant had ever received a prison sentence of more than 1 year and
whether a defendant had ever received a prison sentence of any length.109  
In his review of the sentencing literature, Mitchell (2005) noted that several 
authors have been highly critical of the adequacy of measures intended to capture 
variation in defendant prior record. While some scholars criticize measures of prior 
record as being crude because they are simple dichotomies distinguishing defendants 
with some record from those without one, others have found that a variety of criminal 
record scores (including both dichotomous and interval-level measures) were equally
effective at predicting sentencing outcome (Mitchell, 2005: 450).  
Wooldredge and Griffin (2005) explored numerous possible measures for 
inclusion in their study of prosecutorial charging and charge bargaining decisions before 
and after sentencing guidelines in Ohio. They concluded that two measures prevailed in 
strength across the outcomes and were included in the full models. The first measure w  
the number of prior prison terms served by a defendant, and the second involved whether 
a defendant had ever been institutionalized as a juvenile.110 Worrall, et al. (2006) 
                                                
109 The measures include in the study were: (1) whether or not the defendant had ever been arrested; (2) 
whether or not the defendant had ever been arrested on a felony charge; (3) whether or not the defendant 
had ever been convicted; (4) whether or not the defndant had ever been convicted on a felony charge; (5) 
the number of times the defendant had been convicted on a felony charge; (6) whether or not the defendant 
had ever been sentenced to a prison term; (7) the number of times the defendant had been sentenced to a 
prison term; (8) whether or not the defendant had ever been sentenced to a prison term of one year or more; 
(9) the number of times the defendant had been sentenced to a prison term of one year or more; (10) a four-
point summary scale of prior record in which the defendant received one point for any prior arrest, any 
prior conviction and any prior term of incarceration; and (11) a four-point (0-3) summary scale of prior 
felony record in which the defendant received one point for any prior arrest on a felony charge, any prior 
conviction on a felony charge, and any prior term of incarceration for one year or more (p. 218-219). 
110 The measures explored were: (1) number of prior fel ny arrests, (2) prior misdemeanor arrests, (3) total
prior arrests, (4) prior felony convictions, (5) prior misdemeanor convictions, (6) total prior convictions, (7) 
prior prison terms less than 2 years, (8) prior prison terms greater than or equal to 2 years, (9) prior jail 
terms less than or equal to 30 days, (10) prior jail terms greater than 30 days, (11) total prior jail terms, (12) 
total prior prison and jail terms, or (13) prior community supervisions. 
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explored the factors that affected prosecutors’ charging decisions in domestic violence 
cases. They defined prior criminal history as whether there was a prior domestic violence 
conviction (Worrall, et al., 2006: 473). According to Weisburd and Britt (2007), while a 
minority of scholars contend that arrests are a less valid measure of offending because 
they come before the court determines guilt or innocence, criminologists “have generally 
assumed that arrest is the most valid measure of frequency of offending” from official
data sources because arrests are much closer in occurrence to the actual criminal behavior 
and are not filtered by the negotiations at later stages of the legal process (p. 24).  
Indeed, there is evidence that prior arrests may be a preferable measure of 
criminal history than prior convictions or prior imprisonment in the context of prosecutor 
decision making. Hagan (1975) and Curran (1983) used the number of prior arrests rather 
than other possible indicators of criminal history in their studies of prosecutorial charge 
bargaining. Kingsnorth, et al. (2002) modeled the prosecutor’s decision at the intake 
phase to “retrack” a domestic violence case as a probation violation in lieu of a criminal 
charge (p.560).111 The prior record variable was measured, not by prior convictions or 
incarcerations, but by prior arrest record, which was “preferred over prior convicti  
because interviews with prosecutors indicate[d] that at this less formal stage of 
processing, arrest record [was] an important concern” (p. 560).  
Spohn, et al. (1987) reached a similar conclusion when they modeled the 
prosecutor’s charging decision and included four items in the prior record score: whether 
                                                
111 The authors utilized a sample of 1427 domestic violence cases supplemented by interviews with 
prosecutors to analyze the phenomenon that arrests not resulting in convictions may nonetheless receive 
substantial punishment through reliance on alternative, less formal, means of imposing sanctions. They 
concluded that the majority of cases disposed by such means originated as new criminal charges, which 
were then rejected or dismissed in favor of resoluti n through use of the prosecutor’s power to initiate 
probation violation hearings, which almost always re ulted in jail or prison sentences.  
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or not the defendant had been arrested in the last five years, the number of previous 
arrests, the number of arrests for crimes against persons, and whether or not the defendant 
ever used an alias (p. 181). They noted that, though the prior arrest record may be an 
imperfect indicator of the seriousness of a defendant’s prior record because of re arch 
finding that prior convictions and incarcerations were better predictors of the judicial 
sentencing decision, “this may not be true for predicting rejection or dismissal of 
charges” by the prosecutor (p. 181). 
The case processing variables in this study are the identification number of th  
sentencing judge (JUDGE), (2) the type of attorney (ATTY); and (3) whether the 
offender was charged by grand jury indictment (INDICT). 112  The judge identifier 
variable may be important if prosecutors and defense attorneys consider the reputation of 
the judge for sentencing leniency or severity before determining whether and how to plea 
bargain. In cases before the D.C. Superior Court, the parties know the identity of the trial 
judge at the time of presentment of charges and thus prior to plea negotiation. For this
study, the identification number of the sentencing judge was used to create a three-
category variable (LIGHT, MODERATE, SEVERE) representing the estimated 
sentencing severity level of the judges. It was created by regressing the sentence length 
variable on the judge identification dummy variables and other variables representing 
crime severity and characteristics of the offenders.113 The judge sentencing severity 
variables were included in all multivariate analyses except for the models predicting 
                                                
112 The first variable was in the CIS dataset, while th  second two variables were manually collected from 
CourtView. 
113 A tobit regression was conducted with sentence length as the dependent variable. Sentences to probation 
were counted as zero months of imprisonment. The ind pendent variables included were the Drug Group or 
Master Group of the conviction offense, the number of prior D.C. misdemeanor arrests, the number of pri r 
D.C. felony arrests, the defendant’s age, gender, and r ce, and the type of attorney. 
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sentence length because the sentence length was used to create the judge sentencing 
severity variables. When the judge sentencing severity variables were included, the 
moderate sentencing category was omitted as it had the largest number of cases.   
The type of attorney variable measures whether the defendant had a publicly 
funded private attorney appointed by the Court under the Criminal Justice Act (CJ),114 
an attorney from the District of Columbia Public Defender Service (PDS), or a privately 
retained attorney. The variable was coded as 1 for CJA, 2 for PDS, and 3 for privately 
retained.115 The public defender organization (PDS) approach as opposed to the 
appointed counsel (CJA) approach is most often justified by four key considerations 
(Jacoby, 1980: 90). First, it is more economical in large jurisdictions. Second, the 
permanent staff of the public defender has more experience and competence in criminal
matters than assigned counsel. Third, public defenders can enter the case procesing at an 
earlier stage. Early investigation by defense counsel is considered “one of the most 
important responsibilities of the defense attorney” (Davis 2007: 58). Finally, public 
defenders have built in support services (Jacoby, 1980: 90).  
Though the assigned counsel system has some advantages such as the fact that the 
court can specifically select more experienced attorneys when necessary, a erious 
problem is the lack of control over the quality of defense representation (Jacoby, 1980: 
93). In D.C. Superior Court cases, private attorneys retained by clients with financial 
resources and PDS attorneys generally have more time and resources to conduct a 
                                                
114 The United States Congress enacted the Criminal Justice Act (18 U.S.C. 3006A), which provides for the
appointment of defense attorneys to represent indige t defendants at no cost. 
115 Two dummy variables (PDS and RETAINED) were then created so that the attorney type variable could 
be included as an independent variable (the referenc  category is CJA). 
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thorough and early investigation and negotiation than CJA attorneys, who are often 
overburdened and underpaid.  
The variable measuring whether a grand jury indictment is filed (INDICT) was 
coded as 1 for when and indictment was filed and 0 for when an indictment was not filed. 
The government’s interest in saving time and avoiding a trial can result in reaching 
favorable bargains before indictment. Many D.C. Superior Court judges grant greater 
sentencing concessions for pleas entered before indictment (District of Columbia Public 
Defender Service, 2005). Still, indictments are filed in virtually all cases due largely to 
the fact that prosecutors are not required to disclose information about the case prior to 
indictment, which hinders the defense attorney’s ability to conduct an investigation and 
negotiate an early plea (Davis, 2007: 28).  
Several charging variables were manually collected from CourtView as ell. The 
number of felony charges initially filed by the prosecutor (NUMFELCH) and the number 
of misdemeanor charges initially filed by the prosecutor (NUMMISCH) were used as 
independent variables as measures of charging severity in all multivariate nalyses. The 
most important data collected for this study were the specific names of the original 
charges initially filed by the prosecutor (OCHARGE1, OCHARGE2, OCHARGE 3, 
etc.). This information was then used to create several new charging and charge 
bargaining variables. For instance, variables were created for the Sentencing Guidelines 
offense severity group accompanying each of the original prosecutor charges 
(PGROUP1, PGROUP2, PGROUP3, etc.). A new variable was then created for the most 
severe offense severity group initially charged by the prosecutor.116 Because this variable 
                                                
116 This variable is similar to the “alleged severity” variable used by Miethe and Moore (1985) and Miethe 
(1987), which was measured on the ten-point Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines scale of conviction 
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included the Sentencing Guidelines severity groups for both drug and non-drug offenses 
(Drug Grid 1 through Drug Grid 3; and Master Grid 1 through Master Grid 9), the drug 
and non drug groups were separated into two new variables named SEV_CHG_D (most 
severe charge group for drug offenses) and SEV_CHG_M (most severe charggroup for 
non-drug offenses). The scales of these two variables were also reversed so that, unlike 
under the Sentencing Guidelines, higher numbers corresponded with more severe 
sentencing ranges.117 These variables were included in the multivariate models predicting 
the rate and extent of charge bargaining. Several variables were also created for the type 
of drug involved (cocaine, heroine, PCP) in drug cases or for whether a drug free zone 
violation was violated.118 These variables were included in the multivariate analyses for 
Drug Grid offenses.  
Dependent Variables 
To examine whether and to what extent charge bargaining occurred, several 
variables were included as dependent variables. First, a dichotomous variable for wh ther 
there was a charge reduction/dismissal was created. 119 This variable (GRPREDUCED) 
was measured by whether there was a reduction in Sentencing Guidelines severity group 
                                                                                                                                                 
severity. The District of Columbia Sentencing Guidelines offense severity groups are used to gauge both 
charging severity and charge bargaining because they provide a more precise measure of sentencing 
consequences than statutory maximum penalties. Moreove , though the Sentencing Guidelines were not in 
existence during 2003 (the pre-Guidelines sample), th y were developed based on average sentences in the 
past and should thus provide a measure of pre-Guidelines as well as post-Guidelines sentencing practice. 
117 These variables are coded as “one” (least serious) through “three” (most serious) for drug offenses and
“one” (least serious) through “nine” (most serious) for non-drug offenses.  For Drug Grid offenses, thiese 
variables are included as independent variables as dummy variables where group “two” (Drug Group 2) is 
the omitted category. For Master Grid offenses, this variable is treated as an  interval level measure.  
118 Distribution of marijuana is a felony unless the defendant has not been previously convicted of 
distributing or possessing with intent to distribute any controlled substances and the amount of marijuana is 
½ pound or less, in which case it is a misdemeanor. See D.C. Official Code § 48- 904.01(a)(2)((B). In the
sample of felony convictions used for this study, all drug distribution cases are for cocaine, heroine, or 
PCP. The drug free zone cases are for committing the offense in protected areas such as near schools.  
119 Because this study uses sentenced cases for only sing e count convictions rather than multiple count 
convictions, consecutive sentences are not possible and, thus, a charge reduction is the functional 
equivalent of a charge dismissal. 
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from the most severe initial prosecutor charge to the final charge of convicti. A 
variable for the number of felony counts dismissed/reduced (FELCTSDISM) was cre ted 
by taking the difference between the number of felony charges initially filed by the 
prosecutor (NUMFELCH) and the number of felony convictions (which will always be 
only one). Finally, to measure, not just the existence of, but the magnitude of the charge 
reduction, a variable (GRPSRED) was created for the number of Sentencing Guidelines 
offense severity groups reduced from the most severe prosecutor original charge to the 
conviction charge.120 In order to examine the effect of charge bargaining on sentence 
length, as suggested by Piehl and Bushway (2007), this study uses the variable 
(SENTENCE) from the CIS dataset, which is a continuous variable measuring months of 
imprisonment with sentences to probation treated as zero months of imprisonment. 
Analytic Methods 
This study examines whether the implementation of the D.C. Sentencing 
Guidelines resulted in significant changes in prosecutorial charge bargaining decisions.121 
Master Grid cases and Drug Grid cases will be analyzed separately. The first stage of the 
analysis will be to examine the descriptive statistics of the pre and post-Guidelines 
samples. Tests of statistical significance will be used to compare the two samples on 
relevant factors to ensure they are statistically equivalent. Next, this study will examine 
whether the Guidelines corresponded with significant differences in charge bargaining as 
measured by whether a charge was reduced, the number of charges dropped, and the 
                                                
120 Wooldredge and Griffin (2005) considered numerous dependent variable measures such as the raw 
number of count reductions and the magnitude of charge reductions, but they found that the results for 
those outcomes were virtually identical to the findings for their dichotomous outcomes (whether there was
a charge reduction), so the dichotomous outcomes were pr sented in order to avoid criticisms related to the 
highly skewed distributions of the ratio scales (p. 304).  
121 This study also attempted to examine whether the Guidelines coincided with changes in the nature and 
determinants of the mode of conviction (plea vs. trial) and charging severity (as measured by the number 
and severity of charges filed). The results of these analyses are discussed below. 
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number of Sentencing Guidelines severity groups reduced between the original 
prosecutor charge and the charge of conviction. Only cases where conviction was by plea 
agreement will be included in the analyses of charge bargaining outcomes. The outcomes 
will also be examined separately on pools of cases including and excluding convictions 
for escape or Bail Reform Act violations.122  
The main effects of the Sentencing Guidelines on the outcomes will be examined 
by estimating period-specific models of each outcome and then comparing them. Because 
applying ordinary least squares regression to these outcomes would violate important 
assumptions (Long, 1997), logistic regression will be used for dichotomous outcomes 
while negative binomial regression will be used for count outcomes.123 This study will 
then examine changes in the specific effects of case and defendant characteristics on the 
outcomes. This procedure will involve testing whether the magnitude of a regression 
coefficient (for a certain predictor) differed significantly between the pre and post-
Guidelines periods. An equality of coefficients test for independent samples will be used 
(Paternoster, et al., 1998).124 Finally, this study will examine how much difference in the 
sentence length can be attributed to the charge bargain. This question will be tested with 
the methodology recommended by Piehl and Bushway (2007), who estimated tobit 
regression models to measure the difference in sentencing outcomes caused by the charge 
bargain. While Piehl and Bushway (2007) measured the charge of conviction and the 
                                                
122 Escape offenses virtually always stem, not from escaping from a secure facility such as a jail, but from 
leaving a halfway house without permission or failing to return to a halfway house when required. 
Violations of the Bail Reform Act involve a violation of the conditions of pre-trial release. For both types 
of convictions, prosecutors generally charge the def ndants with only one count and, therefore, there is no 
possibility of charge bargaining. 
123 The requirements of Poisson regression (equidispersion and independence of observations) were not 
satisfied for the count outcomes. 




most severe indictment charge by the type of crime and whether the offense was a 
misdemeanor or felony, this study includes the conviction charge and initial prosecutor 
charge through a set of dummy variables measuring the Sentencing Guidelines s verity 
group associated with each charge. 
All statistical significance tests for this study will be non-directional with the 
standard five percent significance level. As discussed above, the empirical and theoretical 
research on prosecutorial decisions in sentencing guidelines systems is not sufficiently 
advanced for one-tailed significance tests. Because it is not possible to catg rically 
exclude the possibility of negative or positive findings, a more conservative approach to 




CHAPTER IV.  Descriptive Analyses  
This study uses a random sample of 881 felony convictions.125 The descriptive 
statistics for the variables are displayed in Table 4.1. They are first broken down by pools 
of Master Grid offenses versus Drug Grid offenses, and then by time period examin d 
(pre-Guidelines versus post-Guidelines). With regard to the first demographic variable, 
gender, 88.72% of Master Grid cases involved males before the Guidelines, while 
84.41% of Master Grid cases involved males after the Guidelines.126 Before the 
Guidelines, 86.44% of Drug Grid cases involved males, while 90.86% of Drug Grid cases 
involved males after the Guidelines. 127 As to the defendant’s racial category, 93.98% of 
Master Grid cases before the Guidelines involved African American defendants, while 
93.52% of Master Grid cases involved African American defendants after the 
Guidelines.128 Before the Guidelines, 98.31% of Drug Grid cases involved African 
American defendants, while 96.53% of Drug Grid cases involved African American 
defendants after the Guidelines.129 While data are not available about the racial 
composition of non-African Americans, there is widespread agreement among local 
criminal justice practitioners that the majority of non-African Americans are of Hispanic 
origin. Before the Guidelines, the mean age at sentencing for Master Grid cases was 
                                                
125 While the case is the unit of analysis in this study, 12 defendants appeared twice in the dataset. Seven 
defendants appeared two times in the pre-Guidelines sample, two defendants appeared twice in the post-
Guidelines sample, and three defendants appeared in both the pre- and post-Guidelines samples. 
126 The results of a chi-square test did not indicate a statistically significant relationship between gend r and 
whether the Sentencing Guidelines were in effect (chi-square with one degree of freedom = 2.115, p = 
0.146). 
127 The results of a chi-square test did not indicate a statistically significant relationship between gend r and 
whether the Sentencing Guidelines were in effect (chi-square with one degree of freedom = 1.704, p = 
0.192). 
128 The results of a chi-square test did not indicate a statistically significant relationship between race and 
whether the Sentencing Guidelines were in effect (chi-square with one degree of freedom = 0.047, p = 
0.829). 
129 The results of a chi-square test did not indicate a statistically significant relationship between race and 




32.09(10.03), while the mean age for Master Grid cases after the Guidelines was 32.48 
(10.78).130 Before the Guidelines, the mean age at sentencing for Drug Grid cases was 
34.54(10.81), while the mean age for Drug Grid cases after the Guidelines was 35.39 
(10.80).131 The mean age of the offenders in this sample is relatively high in large part 
because the sample consists only of cases for felony convictions. Moreover, according to 
interviews with local practitioners, offenders charged and convicted with felony offenses 
in D.C. Superior Court frequently have an extensive criminal record, while offenders 
with less or no criminal history are often charged and convicted of misdemeanor 
offenses. 
With regard to criminal history variables, the mean number of prior D.C. felony 
arrests for Master Grid cases before the Guidelines was 3.07 (3.69), while the m an 
number of prior D.C. felony arrests for Master Grid cases after the Guidelines was 2.71 
(3.50).132 For Drug Grid cases, the mean number of prior D.C. felony arrests before the 
Guidelines was 2.53 (2.62), while the mean number of prior D.C. felony arrests for Drug 
Grid cases after the Guidelines was 2.85 (2.95).133 The mean number of prior D.C. 
misdemeanor arrests for Master Grid cases before the Guidelines was 3.51 (5.10), while 
the mean number of prior D.C. misdemeanor arrests for Master Grid cases after the 
Guidelines was 3.20 (4.21).134 The mean number of prior D.C. misdemeanor arrests for 
                                                
130 An independent-samples t-test was conducted, and no sig ificant difference was found in scores for 
before and after the Guidelines (t(519)=-.429, p=.668). 
131 An independent-samples t-test was conducted, and no statistically significant difference was found in 
scores for before and after the Guidelines (t(349)=-.736, p=.462). 
132 An independent-samples t-test was conducted, and no sig ificant difference was found in scores for 
before and after the Guidelines (t(509)=1.146, p=.253). 
133 An independent-samples t-test was conducted, and no statistically significant difference was found in 
scores for before and after the Guidelines (t(348)=-1.062, p=.289). 
134 An independent-samples t-test was conducted, and no sig ificant difference was found in scores for 
before and after the Guidelines (t(509)=.738, p=.461). 
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Drug Grid cases before the Guidelines was 3.02 (3.99), while the mean number of prior 
D.C. misdemeanor arrests for Drug Grid cases after the Guidelines was 2.86 (3.08).135  
The mean number of prior D.C. misdemeanor and felony arrests for Master Grid 
cases before the Guidelines was 6.58 (7.71), while the mean number of prior D.C. 
misdemeanor and felony arrests for Master Grid cases after the Guidelines was 5.91 
(6.10).136 The mean number of prior D.C. misdemeanor and felony arrests for Drug Grid 
cases before the Guidelines was 5.55 (5.62), while the mean number of prior D.C. 
misdemeanor and felony arrests for Drug Grid cases after the Guidelines was 5.71 
(5.05).137  
Before the Guidelines, 70.99% of Master Grid cases involved defendants with 
prior D.C. felony arrests, while 68.80% of Master Grid cases involved defendants with 
prior D.C. felony arrests after the Guidelines.138 Before the Guidelines, 73.86% of Drug 
Grid cases involved defendants with prior D.C. felony arrests, while 77.01% of Drug 
Grid cases involved defendants with prior D.C. felony arrests after the Guidelines.139 
Before the Guidelines, 81.30% of Master Grid cases involved defendants with prior D.C. 
felony or misdemeanor arrests, while 80.88% of Master Grid cases involved defen ants 
                                                
135 An independent-samples t-test was conducted, and no sig ificant difference was found in scores for 
before and after the Guidelines (t(348)=.422, p=.674). 
136 An independent-samples t-test was conducted, and no sig ificant difference was found in scores for 
before and after the Guidelines (t(509)=1.054, p=.292). 
137 An independent-samples t-test was conducted, and no statistically significant difference was found in 
scores for before and after the Guidelines (t(348)=-.273, p=.785). 
138 The results of a chi-square test did not indicate a statistically significant relationship between whether 
there were prior D.C. felony arrests and whether th Sentencing Guidelines were in effect (chi-square with 
one degree of freedom = 0.292, p = 0.589). 
139 The results of a chi-square test did not indicate a statistically significant relationship between whether 
there were prior D.C. felony arrests and whether th Sentencing Guidelines were in effect (chi-square with 
one degree of freedom = 0.468, p = 0.494). 
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with prior D.C. felony or misdemeanor arrests after the Guidelines.140 Before the 
Guidelines, 84.66% of Drug Grid cases involved defendants with prior D.C. felony or 
misdemeanor arrests, while 88.51% of Drug Grid cases involved defendants with prior 
D.C. felony or misdemeanor arrests after the Guidelines.141  
Turning to the case processing variables, prior to the Sentencing Guidelines, 
82.95% of Master Grid cases involved defendants with court-appointed attorneys under 
the Criminal Justice Act (CJA), 12.40% had Public Defender Service (PDS) attorneys, 
and 4.65% had privately retained attorneys. After the Guidelines, 69.44% of Master Grid 
cases involved defendants with CJA attorneys, 23.02% had PDS attorneys, and 7.54% 
had privately retained attorneys. The results of a chi-square indicated there was a 
statistically significant difference in attorney type among time periods (chi-square with 
two degrees of freedom = 12.933, p = 0.002) among Master Grid cases.142 Among Drug 
Grid cases, 86.63% of cases prior to the Guidelines involved defendants with court-
appointed attorneys under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA), 6.98% had Public Defender 
Service (PDS) attorneys, and 6.40% had privately retained attorneys. After the 
Guidelines, 89.66% of Drug Grid cases involved defendants with CJA attorneys, 6.32% 
had PDS attorneys, and 4.02% had privately retained attorneys.143 According to 
interviews with local criminal justice practitioners, the majority of defendants are 
                                                
140 The results of a chi-square test did not indicate a statistically significant relationship between whether 
there were prior D.C. felony or misdemeanor arrests and whether the Sentencing Guidelines were in effect 
(chi-square with one degree of freedom = 0.015, p = 0.903). 
141 The results of a chi-square test did not indicate a statistically significant relationship between whether 
there were prior D.C. felony or misdemeanor arrests and whether the Sentencing Guidelines were in effect 
(chi-square with one degree of freedom = 1.112, p = 0.291). 
142 It is unclear why there was a difference in attorney type between the two time periods. Conversations 
with defense attorneys revealed that PDS attorneys g nerally handle a higher proportion of more serious 
offenses. However, the distribution of crime types did not change before and after the Guidelines.   
143 The results of a chi-square test did not indicate a statistically significant difference in attorney type 
among time periods (chi-square with two degrees of freedom = 1.0815, p = 0.582). 
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represented by CJA attorneys, particularly in more routine cases, while PDS attorneys 
frequently handle more serious cases. 
Before the Guidelines, 94.66% of Master Grid cases were charged by grand ju y 
indictment, while 87.64% of Master Grid cases were charged by indictment aft r the 
Guidelines. The results of a chi-square test indicated there was a statistically ignificant 
difference (chi-square with one degree of freedom = 7.955, p = 0.005). This difference 
may indicate that prosecutors and defense attorneys were able to negotiate plea 
agreements quicker and easier after the Sentencing Guidelines. Among Drug Grid cases, 
before the Guidelines, 91.53% of cases were charged by grand jury indictment, while 
90.29% of cases were charged by indictment after the Guidelines.144 This absence of a 
statistically significant difference is not surprising because, based on conversations with 
criminal justice practitioners, Drug Grid offenders are on a “fast track” where indictments 
have always been filed sooner after arrest than in Master Grid cases. This i  due largely 
to the fact that Drug Grid cases are often very similar to each other and addressed in a 
routine manner by prosecutors and defense attorneys. 
As discussed above, several variables were also created for the type of drug 
involved (cocaine, heroine, PCP) in drug cases or for whether there was a drug free zone 
violation. A set of dummy variables was also created for the type of non-drug offense. 
The offense types were: weapons, sexual offenses, theft/fraud/forgery, extotion/threats, 
assault, inchoate offenses, escape/violation of bail conditions, homicide, cruelty to 
children, kidnapping, carjacking, robbery, burglary, destruction of property/arson, 
unlawful use of an automobile, and obstruction of justice. A specific description of these 
                                                
144 The results of a chi-square test did not indicate a statistically significant difference (chi-square with one 
degree of freedom = .164, p = 0.686).  
 
120 
offense types is attached at Appendix D. A statistically significant difference was not 
found for drug type or offense type between the pre and post-Guidelines periods. 
Turning to the outcome variables, this study attempted to analyze whether 
conviction was by plea or trial. For Master Grid cases, 96.24 percent of convictis were 
by plea agreement before the Guidelines, while 92.78 percent of the Master Grid cases 
after the Guidelines were for convictions by plea agreement.145 Among Drug Grid cases, 
93.79 percent of the cases were for convictions by plea agreement before the Guidelines, 
and 96.57 percent of the cases were for convictions by plea agreement after the 
Guidelines.146  
With regard to the charging severity variables, the mean number of prosecutor 
original felony charges for Master Grid offenses before the Guidelines was 2.03 (1.67), 
while the mean number of prosecutor original felony charges for Master Grid offenses 
after the Guidelines was 2.54 (3.82). An independent-samples t-test was conducted, and a 
statistically significant difference between the two time periods was found (t(620.49)=-
1.97, p=.0496). As to Drug Grid offenses, the mean number of prosecutor original felony 
charges before the Guidelines was 2.38 (1.00), while the mean number of prosecutor 
original felony charges for Drug Grid offenses after the Guidelines was 2.24 (.81).147 The 
mean number of prosecutor original misdemeanor charges for Master Grid offenses 
before the Guidelines was .45 (.98), and the mean number of prosecutor original 
                                                
145 The results of a chi-square test did not indicate a statistically significant difference between the pr and 
post-Guidelines periods (chi-square with one degree of freedom= 3.064, p = 0.08). 
146 The results of a chi-square test did not indicate a statistically significant difference between the pr and 
post-Guidelines periods (chi-square with one degree of freedom= 1.486, p = 0.223). 




misdemeanor charges after the Guidelines was .59 (1.17).148 The mean number of 
prosecutor original misdemeanor charges for Drug Grid offenses before the Guidelines 
was .25 (.56), while the mean number of prosecutor original misdemeanor charges for 
Drug Grid offenses after the Guidelines was .31 (.69).149 
The mean of the most serious severity group charged by the prosecutor150 for 
Master Grid offenses before the Guidelines was 2.79 (2.04), while the mean of the most 
serious group charged by the prosecutor for Master Grid offenses after the Guidelines 
was 3.02 (2.31).151 A frequency distribution of the most serious group charged by the 
prosecutor for Master Grid offenses also revealed no statistically significant differences. 
With regard to Drug Grid offenses, virtually all observations for most serious charge 
group fell into group two.152  
The first charge bargaining variable is whether there was a reduction in 
Sentencing Guidelines severity group from the most severe initial prosecutor charge to 
the final charge of conviction. Before the Guidelines, the group was reduced from 
prosecutor to conviction in 28.95 percent of Master Grid cases. After the Guidelines, the 
group was reduced from prosecutor to conviction in 31.56 percent of the Master Grid 
                                                
148 An independent-samples t-test was conducted, and no sig ificant difference was found in scores for 
before and after the Guidelines (t(518)=-1.54, p=.124). 
149 An independent-samples t-test was conducted, and no sig ificant difference was found in scores for 
before and after the Guidelines ((350)=-8.99, p=.370). 
150 As discussed above, unlike under the D.C. Sentencing Guidelines, this variable measures charging 
severity so that lower numbers indicate a less severe charging category and higher numbers indicate a more 
severe charging category. 
151 A Mann-Whitney two-sample rank-sum test was done and did not reveal a significant difference 
between groups (z=-.787; p value of .431). 
152 Prior to the Guidelines, 175 of 177 observations fell in group two. After the Guidelines, 170 of 175 
observations fell into group two. Given that there were only three categories, and that most observations 
fell in one category, a chi-square test was also performed. It did not indicate a statistically significant 




cases.153 For Drug Grid offenses, the group was reduced from prosecutor to conviction in 
53.00 percent before the Guidelines. After the Guidelines, the group was reduced from 
prosecutor to conviction in 68.00 percent of the Drug Grid cases. The results of a chi-
square test indicated a statistically significant relationship between h ther there was a 
reduction in Sentencing Guidelines severity group for Drug Grid offenses and whether 
the Sentencing Guidelines were in effect (chi-square with one degree of freedom = 8.168, 
p = .004). Based on conversations with criminal justice practitioners in the District of 
Columbia, this statistically significant difference may be the result of the fact that the 
statute for attempts to commit a drug offense was placed in the least severe S ntencing 
Guidelines Group (Drug Group 3).  
The mean number of felony charges dismissed/reduced before the Guidelines for 
Master Grid cases was 1.03 (1.67), while the mean number of felony charges 
dismissed/reduced after the Guidelines for Master Grid cases was 1.54 (3.83). An 
independent-samples t-test was conducted, and a statistically significant difference was 
found in scores for before and after the Guidelines (t(518)=-1.97, p=.0496). Thus, while 
the number of felony charges for Master Grid offenses increased after the Guidelines, the 
number of felony charges dismissed increased as well. The mean number of felony 
charges dismissed/reduced before the Guidelines for Drug Grid cases was 1.38 (1.00), 
and the mean number of felony charges dismissed/reduced after the Guidelines for Drug 
Grid cases was 1.24 (.81).154 Finally, the mean number of Sentencing Guidelines groups 
reduced from prosecutor original charge to conviction charge for Master Grid cases
                                                
153 The results of a chi-square test did not indicate a statistically significant relationship between whether 
there was a reduction in Sentencing Guidelines severity group and whether the Sentencing Guidelines were 
in effect (chi-square with one degree of freedom = .428, p = .513). 
154 An independent-samples t-test was conducted, and no sig ificant difference was found in scores for 
before and after the Guidelines (t(350)=1.486, p=.138). 
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before the Guidelines was .58 (1.08), while the mean number of groups reduced for 
Master Grid offenses after the Guidelines was .74 (1.34).155  
The final outcome variable is the sentence length, which measures sentences to 
probation as zero months of imprisonment. The mean final sentence for Master Grid 
cases before the Guidelines was 26.91 (45.56), while the mean final sentence after th  
Guidelines was 23.16 (40.42).156 With regard to Drug Grid cases, the mean final sentence 
before the Guidelines was 15.98 (19.94), while the mean final sentence after the 
Guidelines was 12.09 (12.09). An independent-samples t-test was conducted, and a 
statistically significant difference was found (t(343)=2.199, p=.029). 
In sum, the descriptive statistics did not reveal any statistically significant 
differences in the demographic profile or prior criminal record of the offenders in the pre-
Guidelines and post-Guidelines samples. The statistical tests did reveal a difference in the 
type of attorney between the two samples among Master Grid offenses, with CJA 
attorneys being far less common and PDS attorneys being far more common after the 
Sentencing Guidelines. Additionally, among Master Grid cases, the rate of indictment by 
grand jury was lower in the post-Guidelines period, which may suggest that plea bargains 
were negotiated more quickly after the Guidelines.  
With regard to the outcome variables, there was no statistically significant 
difference among time periods in the rate of conviction by plea agreement. Th re was a 
potentially important difference in charging severity with the mean number of prosecutor 
original felony charges for Master Grid offenses increasing after the Guidelines. This 
                                                
155 An independent-samples t-test was conducted, and no sig ificant difference was found in scores for 
before and after the Guidelines (t(519)=-1.509, p=.132). 
156 An independent-samples t-test was conducted, and no sig ificant difference was found in scores for 
before and after the Guidelines (t(514)=.993, p=.321). 
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may indicate that there was prosecutorial overcharging once the Guidelines we t into 
effect.  As to the charge bargaining measures, the significance tests revealed that for 
Master Grid cases the mean number of felony charges dismissed/reduced increased after 
the Guidelines. Thus, while the charging level for Master Grid offenses was more severe 
after the Guidelines, there was some evidence that the extent of charge bargaining for 
Master Grid increased as well. For Drug Grid offenses, while the level of charging 
severity did not increase, the rate of charge bargaining (as measured by how often the 
severity group was reduced from the prosecutor original charge to the conviction charge) 
increased after the Guidelines. The significance tests also revealed that the final sentence 




Table 4.1:  Nominal scale percentages and metric scale means (with standard 
deviations) for pre-Guidelines and post-Guidelines samples (N=881) 
 
Measures Missing Master Grid Drug Grid 
  Pre- Post- Pre- Post- 
Demographic Variables      








      
Male (0,1) 0 88.72 84.41 86.44 90.86 
      
African American (0,1) 18 93.98 93.52 98.31 96.53 
      
Criminal History Variables      










      








      










      
Whether prior DC felony 
arrests (0,1) 
19 70.99 68.80 73.86 77.01 
      
Whether prior DC felony or 
misdemeanor arrests (0,1) 
18 81.30 80.88 84.66 88.51 
      
Case Processing Variables      
Indicted (0,1) 8 94.66* 87.64* 91.53 90.29 
      
Attorney type 25     
CJA (1)  82.95∗ 69.44∗ 86.63 89.66 
PDS (2)  12.40∗ 23.02∗ 6.98 6.32 
Retained (3)  4.65∗ 7.54∗ 6.40 4.02 
      
                                                








Measures Missing Master Grid Drug Grid 
  Pre- Post- Pre- Post- 
Type of Drug Offense 0     
Cocaine (0,1)  --- --- 70.06 69.71 
Heroin(0,1)  --- --- 23.16 25.71 
PCP(0,1)  --- --- 2.26 1.14 
DFZ(0,1)  --- --- 4.00 3.43 
      
Type of Master Grid 
Offense 
0     
Arson  0 .38 --- --- 
Assault  15.04 14.45 --- --- 
Burglary  2.26 4.56 --- --- 
Carjacking  .38 .38 --- --- 
Cruelty to Children  .38 0 --- --- 
Destruction Property/Unlawful 
Entry 
 0 .76 --- --- 
Escape, Bail Reform Act  34.96 31.56 --- --- 
Extortion  0 0 --- --- 
Homicide  3.01 4.94 --- --- 
Inchoate  6.40 6.84 --- --- 
Kidnapping  .75 .38 --- --- 
Obstruction  0 0 --- --- 
Robbery  5.26 3.42 --- --- 
Sex offense  2.63 2.67 --- --- 
Theft, Fraud, Forgery  1.13 1.52 --- --- 
Unlawful Use of Automobile  13.53 10.65   
Weapon  13.16 16.35 --- --- 
      
Outcomes      
Conviction by plea 
agreement (0,1) 
0 96.24 92.78 93.79 96.57 
      
Number of prosecutor 









      
Number of prosecutor 
original misdemeanor 
charges 








      
Most severe group charged 
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Measures Missing Master Grid Drug Grid 
  Pre- Post- Pre- Post- 
      
Most severe group charged 
by prosecutor for Master and 
Drug Grid offenses 
8     
One (Master 9; Drug 3)  34.73 33.20 0 .57 
Two (Master 8; Drug 2)  29.00 28.19 98.87 97.14 
Three (Master 7; Drug 1)  4.20 3.47 1.13 2.29 
Four (Master 6)  10.69 10.81 --- --- 
Five (Master 5)  10.31 10.04 --- --- 
Six (Master 4)  2.29 2.32 --- --- 
Seven (Master 3)  5.73 5.41 --- --- 
Eight (Master 2)  1.91 2.32 --- --- 
Nine (Master 1)  1.15 4.25 --- --- 
      
Group reduced from 
prosecutor to conviction 
(0,1) 
0 28.95 31.56 53.00∗ 68.00∗ 
      










      
Number of groups reduced 
from most serious prosecutor 






      








      









CHAPTER V.  Results of Multivariate Analysis 
While this study attempted to analyze several other prosecutorial outcomes such 
as mode of conviction157 and charging severity,158 the focus was on charge bargaining 
practices before and after the District of Columbia Sentencing Guidelines. Th  
multivariate models displayed in Tables 5.1 through 5.8 provide information regarding 
possible main effects of the Sentencing Guidelines on prosecutorial charge bargaining 
outcomes. They also provide information on possible interaction effects, or how the 
Sentencing Guidelines conditioned the effects of certain factors on prosecutorial 
decisions. With regard to the main effects, comparisons of the constants in the pre-
Guidelines and post-Guidelines models in Tables 5.1 through 5.8 did not reveal any 
statistically significant effects of the Sentencing Guidelines on prosecutorial outcomes. 
The interaction effects were examined by testing the differences in slope coefficients for 
the independent variables across the pre and post-Guidelines samples. The general 
conclusion was that, while there were some differences in slope coefficients for certain 
outcomes, there were far fewer significant interaction effects relativ  to nonsignificant 
effects.  
                                                
157 Logistic regression analyses predicting the mode of conviction were performed for Master Grid and 
Drug Grid cases.  Among Master Grid cases, the analyses, which included variables measuring charging 
severity, prior criminal history, demographic characteristics, and case processing attributes, did not reveal 
any main or interaction effects of the Sentencing Guidelines. It should be noted that the explained 
variability of the models were low (.12 in the Pre-Guidelines model and .13 in the post-Guidelines model).  
Among Drug Grid cases, many of most important variables were excluded from the analyses in the post-
Guidelines model due to perfect prediction of the outc me, which led to a large reduction in the number of 
observations and affected the ability to draw strong conclusions without reducing the number of predictor 
variables in the models. 
158 Negative binomial regression analyses predicting the number of felony and misdemeanor charges filed 
by the prosecutor were performed for Master and Drug Grid cases. Because the majority of the available 
independent variables occurred later in time than te charging decision, however, only five variables 
(measuring prior criminal history and demographic characteristics) were included in these models, and 
there were very low levels of explained variability (from .01 to .11).  
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 Tables 5.1 through 5.3 present the results of logistic regression models predicting 
whether the Sentencing Guidelines severity group was reduced from the prosecutor filing 
stage to the conviction stage. The models predicting this outcome for Master Grid cases 
include variables measuring the most severe Sentencing Guidelines severity group 
charged by the prosecutor, the number of prosecutor charges filed, the number of prior 
D.C. arrests, offender demographic characteristics, case processing factors su h as type 
of attorney and whether an indictment was filed, and the sentencing severity category of 
the judge. The difference of coefficients tests for models predicting whether the severity 
group was reduced for Master Grid cases did not reveal any statistically s gnificant 
interaction effects (Tables 5.1-5.2).  
The models predicting whether the severity group was reduced for Drug Grid 
cases included the same variables as those for Master Grid cases in addition to variables 
measuring the type of drug offense. The models for Drug Grid cases did reveal a 
statistically significant difference (p<.05) in the effect of the number of misdemeanor 
charges initially filed by the prosecutor. Prior to the Guidelines, there was a 
nonsignificant negative relationship (-.69) between the number of misdemeanor charges 
filed and whether the severity group was reduced. After the Guidelines, there was a 
nonsignificant positive relationship (.72) between the number of misdemeanor charges 
filed and whether the severity group was reduced (Table 5.3). This interaction effect may 
suggest that after the Sentencing Guidelines the number of misdemeanor charges filed 




 The second type of charge bargaining outcome examined was the number of 
felony charges that were dismissed or reduced by the prosecutor. The negative binomial 
regression models predicting this outcome (Tables 5.4 through 5.6) include the same 
variables as the charge bargaining models discussed above in Tables 5.1 through 5.3. 
While the majority of the difference of coefficients tests continued to have nonsignificant 
results, there were several notable interaction effects. For Master Grid cases, there were 
three statistically significant interaction effects (Table 5.4). First, there was a statistically 
significant difference (p<.01) in the effect of the most severe Sentencing Guidelines 
group charged on the number of felony charges dismissed or reduced. Prior to the 
Guidelines, there was a statistically significant (p<.01) positive relationship (.11) between 
these two factors. After the Guidelines, there was a statistically significant (p<.001) 
stronger positive relationship (.24) between these two factors. This finding suggests that 
prosecutors may have filed more serious charges in Master Grid cases after the 
Guidelines in order to increase the number of charges dismissed and expedite the charge 
bargaining process.  
Second, there was statistically significant difference (p<.01) in the effect of Being 
African American. Before the Guidelines, there was a nonsignificant negativ  
relationship (-.40) between being African American and the number of charges dismi sed 
or reduced. After the Guidelines, there was a nonsignificant positive relationship (.39) 
between being African American and the number of charges dismissed or reduced (Tabl  
5.4). Thus, before the Guidelines, being African American led to less charges dismissed, 
while after the Guidelines, being African American led to more charges being dismissed. 
While this may suggest that prosecutors treated African Americans more lenient y after 
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the Guidelines to expedite processing of these more typical offenders, this finding should 
be interpreted with caution because, as discussed below, there may be unmeasured 
variables correlated with being African American that account for this type of treatment.  
Third, the effect of the judge sentencing severity level on the number of felony 
charges dismissed changed after the Guidelines (p<.05). Prior to the Guidelines, ther  
was a nonsignificant positive effect (.18) between having a judge in the least severe
sentencing category (as opposed to the moderate category) and the number of charges 
dismissed or reduced. After the Guidelines, there was a statistically significant (p<.05) 
negative relationship (-.58) (Table 5.4). This may be because prior to the Guidelines, 
defense attorneys and prosecutors estimated how a judge might sentence based largely on 
reputation. When judges with reputations for imposing light sentences were assigned to 
cases, prosecutors may have had less bargaining leverage because they could not argue 
that a severe sentence would be imposed at trial. After the Guidelines, however, 
prosecutors could have enjoyed increased leverage to induce guilty pleas quickly because 
of their greater ability to predict the punishment based on the Sentencing Guidelines 
ranges. 
 For the models predicting the number of felony charges dismissed or reduced for 
Master Grid cases except for those for escape or Bail Reform Act viola ions (Table 5.5), 
a statistically significant difference (p<.01) was still found in the effect of the most severe 
Sentencing Guidelines severity group charged. Before the Guidelines, the most severe 
group charged had a nonsignificant negative effect (-.02) on the number of felony charges 
dismissed, while it had a statistically significant (p<.001) positive effect (.13) after the 
Guidelines (Table 5.5). Second, there was still a difference (p<.05) in the effect of being 
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African American, which had a nonsignificant negative effect (-.31) on the number of 
charges dismissed before the Guidelines and a nonsignificant positive effect (.33) after 
the Guidelines (Table 5.5).  
Finally, a new difference emerged for the effect of the number of prosecutor 
original felony charges (p<.001). There was a statistically significant (p<.001) positive 
effect (.30) before the Guidelines and a statistically significant (p<.001) smaller positive 
effect (.10) after the Guidelines (Table 5.5). While the number of felony charges filed led 
to more felony charges being dismissed in both Guidelines periods, the stronger positive
effect before the Guidelines was surprising and inconsistent with the findings above 
suggesting that increased charging severity led to increased charge bargaining after the 
Guidelines were in effect.  
 With regard to models predicting the number of charges dismissed or reduced for 
Drug Grid offenses, there were two statistically significant differences among pre and 
post-Guidelines periods (Table 5.6). First, there was a difference (p<.01) in the effect of 
being charged with the most severe charge group (compared to Drug Group 2). Before 
the Guidelines, there was a nonsignificant negative effect (-.76). After the Guid lines, 
there was nonsignificant weaker negative effect (-.28). This finding is consiste t with the 
argument that Sentencing Guidelines may assist prosecutors in facilitating charge 
bargaining through charging decisions. Second, there was a difference (p<.05) in the 
effect of being African American. There was a nonsignificant negative relationship (-.20) 
between being African American and the number of charges dismissed before the 
Guidelines, and a nonsignificant positive relationship (.02) after the Guidelines (Table 
5.6). Again, while this finding is consistent with the argument that more typical 
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defendants may actually be treated less severely by prosecutors in order to expedite their 
processing and focus more on less routine cases, and Sentencing Guidelines may 
facilitate such treatment, this finding, as discussed below, should be interpreted with 
caution due to possible unmeasured variables.  
Contrary to the findings of models predicting the number of charges dismissed or 
reduced by prosecutors, there were no statistically significant interaction effects found in 
the negative binomial regression models predicting the number of severity groups 
reduced for Master Grid cases (Tables 5.7 and 5.8). The next set of tables contain the 
results of the tobit regression approach recommended by Piehl and Bushway (2007) to 
measure the effect of the charge bargain on the ultimate sentence. Table 5.13 presents the 
final results, which are the predicted sentence lengths based on the offense of conviction 
and then on the most severe prosecutor charge. For Master Grid offenses, there was v ry 
little change between the pre and post-Guidelines periods in the predicted sentences as a 
result of the charge bargain. Prior to the Guidelines, Master Grid offenders rec ived a 
1.21 percent reduction in their sentence as a result of the charge bargain. After the 
Guidelines, offenders received a 2.28 percent reduction in sentence as a result ofthe 
charge bargain. For Drug Grid cases, offenders received a 1.25 reduction in sentence 
before the Guidelines as a result of the charge bargain. After the Guidelines, Drug Grid 
offenders received a .08 percent reduction in sentence. Thus, these findings do not 
suggest a dramatic difference in reduction in sentence due to charge bargaining after the 
Guidelines.  
In sum, the most important finding from the multivariate analyses was that there 
were far more null effects than statistically significant effects, which supports the 
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argument that there was not a significant displacement of discretion and disparity to the 
prosecutor. While there were several statistically significant interac ion effects, they 
seemed to suggest, not a transfer of disparity to the prosecutor, but a change in the plea 
bargaining process.  There were several findings indicating that prosecutors increased 
their charging severity level after the Guidelines to increase the efficiency of the charge 
bargaining process. For instance, there was one statistically significant difference in the 
models predicting whether the Sentencing Guidelines group was reduced from the 
original prosecutor charge to the final conviction charge. Specifically, for DrugG id 
cases, there was a difference in the effect of the number of misdemeanor chrges initially 
filed by the prosecutor. Prior to the Guidelines, there was a negative relationship between 
the number of misdemeanor charges filed and whether the severity group was reduced. 
After the Guidelines, there was a positive relationship between these two facors, which 
may suggest that prosecutors increased their number of charges after the Guidelines to 
induce guilty pleas more quickly (Table 5.3).  
The results of the models predicting the number of felony charges dismissed or 
reduced for the most part also demonstrated more severe charging was associated with 
more charge bargaining after the Guidelines. For Master Grid cases, regardless of 
whether escape/BRA cases were included, the effect of the most severe group charged on 
the number of charges dismissed was stronger after the Guidelines. Indeed, there was a 
negative effect before the Guidelines and a positive effect after the Guidelines (Table 5.4-
5.5). For Drug Grid cases, there was a difference in the effect of being charged with the 
most severe charge group with a strong negative effect before the Guidelines and a 
weaker negative effect after the Guidelines (Table 5.6). These findings, in combination 
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with the descriptive statistics showing more severe charging and more chargebargaining 
after the Guidelines (Table 4.1), seem to suggest that prosecutors relied on chargi g 
severity as a mechanism to facilitate plea agreements. There was one findi g, however, 
that contradicted this conclusion. In the model predicting the number of charges 
dismissed for Master Grid cases (excluding escape/BRA cases), there was a difference in 
the effect of the number of prosecutor original felony charges with a stronger positive 
effect before the Guidelines than after the Guidelines (Table 5.5). Still, the majority of 
the findings suggested a stronger effect of charging severity on charge bargaining after 
the Sentencing Guidelines went into effect.  
There were also notable findings with regard to the effect of the offender’s race 
on the number of charges dismissed or reduced. For Master Grid cases, regardless of 
whether escape/BRA cases were included, there was a negative relationship between 
being African American and the number of charges dismissed before the Guidelines and 
a positive relationship after the Guidelines (Table 5.4-5.5). This may suggest that 
prosecutors used the Sentencing Guidelines as a tool to accelerate case pro e sing for the 
most typical or routine offenders so that they could, as Wooldredge and Thistlewaite 
(2004) wrote, “spend more time evaluating culpability, future risk, and appropriate 
outcomes” (p. 423) for less typical defendants. This finding should be interpreted 
cautiously, however, because the race variable may be standing in for uncontrolled o  
unmeasured variables that make cases with African American defendants more typical.  
Despite findings suggesting a greater effect of charging variables on charge 
bargaining after the Sentencing Guidelines went into effect, there was no evidence that 
these changes affected the ultimate sentencing outcomes. In other words, while there was 
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some evidence that the determinants and rate of charge bargaining (“the exis ence of the 
bargain”) changed after the Guidelines, there was no evidence that the effect of th  
charge bargain on the sentence (“the value of the bargain”) changed. The tobit regression 
approaches proposed by Piehl and Bushway (2007) did not suggest a dramatic difference 






Table 5.1:  Logistic regression models predicting whether the severity group was 
reduced from prosecutor filing stage to conviction stage for Master Grid cases   
 
 Pre-guidelines Post-guidelines Z-test 
 
 b1 (se1) b2 (se2) b1 - b2 
Constant -1.98 1.61 -1.60 1.75  
Most severe severity 
group charged for non-
drug offenses 
1.29*** .18 1.46*** .21  
Number of prosecutor 
original misdemeanor 
charges 
.41 .22 .01 .22  
Number of prosecutor 
original felony charges 
-.18 .16 -.15* .06  
Prior DC felony arrests -.00 .07 -.24 .14  
Prior DC misdemeanor 
arrests 
.02 .05 .05 .10  
Age .01 .03 -.01 .03  
Male -.84 .71 -.75 .84  
African American -.93 .90 .94 1.16  
Indicted -.78 .78 -1.94** .73  
Whether PDS attorney -.45 .68 .18 .63  
Whether retained attorney -1.48 1.09 -.61 1.09  
Least severe sentencing 
judge category 
.22 .61 -.10 .70  
Most severe sentencing 
judge category 
.72 .52 -.13 .74  
      
N 246  216   
Pseudo R2 .51  .60   
*  p< .05 
**  p < .01 
*** p < .001 






Table 5.2:  Logistic regression models predicting whether the severity group was 
reduced from prosecutor filing stage to conviction stage for Master Grid cases 
(excluding escape cases) 
 
 Pre-guidelines Post-guidelines Z-test 
 
 b1 (se1) b2 (se2) b1 - b2 
Constant -.99 1.71 -1.25 1.89  
Most severe severity 
group charged for non-
drug offenses 
1.07*** .18 1.39*** .24  
Number of prosecutor 
original misdemeanor 
charges 
.28 .21 -.11 .21  
Number of prosecutor 
original felony charges 
-.14 .14 -.15* .06  
Prior DC felony arrests -.02 .07 -.30* .15  
Prior DC misdemeanor 
arrests 
.05 .07 .08 .11  
Age .02 .03 .00 .03  
Male -1.30 .85 -1.16 1.01  
African American -.86 .88 .78 1.22  
Indicted .80 .81 -1.92* .75  
Whether PDS attorney -.37 .67 .03 .65  
Whether retained attorney -1.20 1.00 -.68 1.10  
Least severe sentencing 
judge category 
.10 .61 .13 .73  
Most severe sentencing 
judge category 
.61 .52 -.01 .74  
      
N 158  144   
Pseudo R2 .38  .53   
*  p< .05 
**  p < .01 
*** p < .001 







Table 5.3:  Logistic regression models predicting whether the severity group was 
reduced from prosecutor filing stage to conviction stage for Drug Grid cases 
 
 Pre-guidelines Post-guidelines Z-test 
 
 b1 (se1) b2 (se2) b1 - b2 
Constant -4.32* 2.01 -1.83 2.71  
Most severe charge group 
drugs three 
-6.52** 1.93 --- ---  
Number of prosecutor 
original misdemeanor 
charges 
-.69 .37 .72 .55 -1.41* 
Number of prosecutor 
original felony charges 
1.57*** .33 2.38** .49  
Prior DC felony arrests -.11 .09 -.00 .09  
Prior DC misdemeanor 
arrests 
.02 .05 -.03 .08  
Age .03 .02 -.02 .03  
Male 1.06 .57 .40 .76  
African American -.46 1.51 -1.64 2.15  
Indicted .35 .68 .35 .75  
Whether PDS attorney -.84 .80 -2.05* .86  
Whether retained attorney -1.01 1.25 -2.34* 1.05  
Least severe sentencing 
judge category 
-.44 .65 -.65 .58  
Most severe sentencing 
judge category 
1.24* .50 1.10 1.55  
Whether drug conviction 
involved heroin 
-1.34* .54 .76 .64  
Whether drug conviction 
involved pcp 
-.84 1.68 -1.56 1.68  
      
N 160  157   
Pseudo R2 .28  .34   
*  p< .05 
**  p < .01 
*** p < .001 






Table 5.4:  Negative binomial regression models predicting the number of felony 
charges dismissed from prosecutor charging phase to conviction for Master Grid 
cases 
 
 Pre-guidelines Post-guidelines Z-test 
 
 b1 (se1) b2 (se2) b1 - b2 
Constant -.58 .60 -.93 .56  
Number of prosecutor 
original misdemeanor 
charges 
.05 .07 .03 .06  
Number of prosecutor 
original felony charges 
.35*** .06 .12*** .02  
Most severe severity 
group charged for non-
drug offenses 
.11** .04 .24*** .04 -.13** 
Prior DC felony charges .01 .03 -.03 .03  
Prior DC misdemeanor 
charges 
-.02 .02 .00 .03  
Age -.00 .01 -.00 .01  
Male -.16 .24 .00 .22  
African American -.40 .27 .39 .35 -.80* 
Indicted -.20 .33 -.22 .22  
Whether PDS attorney -.08 .22 .11 .18  
Whether retained attorney .23 .30 -.10 .33  
Least severe sentencing 
judge category 
.18 .22 -.58* .24 .76* 
Most severe sentencing 
judge category 
-.11 .18 -.02 .20  
      
N 246  216   
Pseudo R2 .31  .28   
*  p< .05 
**  p < .01 
*** p < .001 







Table 5.5:  Negative binomial regression models predicting the number of felony 
charges dismissed from prosecutor charging phase to conviction for Master Grid 
cases (excluding escape cases) 
 
 Pre-guidelines Post-guidelines Z-test 
 
 b1 (se1) b2 (se2) b1 - b2 
Constant .11 .55 -.29 .47  
Number of prosecutor 
original misdemeanor 
charges 
-.01 .05 -.02 .05  
Number of prosecutor 
original felony charges 
.30*** .03 .10*** .01 .20*** 
Most severe severity 
group charged for non-
drug offenses 
-.02 .04 .13*** .03 -.15** 
Prior DC felony charges .01 .02 .00 .04  
Prior DC misdemeanor 
charges 
-.01 .03 -.02 .03  
Age .00 .01 .01 .01  
Male -.40 .24 -.34 .20  
African American -.31 .26 .33 .29 -.64* 
Indicted -.08 .32 -.02 .18  
Whether PDS attorney .14 .19 -.06 .16  
Whether retained attorney .25 .27 -.17 .29  
Least severe sentencing 
judge category 
.01 .21 -.41 .21  
Most severe sentencing 
judge category 
-.10 .17 -.07 .17  
      
N 158  144   
Pseudo R2 .30  .27   
*  p< .05 
**  p < .01 
*** p < .001 






Table 5.6:  Negative binomial regression models predicting the number of felony 











 b1 (se1) b2 (se2) b1 - b2 
Constant -1.08 .64 -1.41* .61  
Number of prosecutor 
original misdemeanor 
charges 
-.03 .11 .03 .15  
Number of prosecutor 
original felony charges 
.62*** .07 .70*** .09  
Most severe charge group 
drugs one 
--- --- .06 1.09  
Most severe charge group 
- drugs three 
-.76 .39 -.28 .53 -.48** 
Prior DC felony charges .00 .03 -.01 .03  
Prior DC misdemeanor 
charges 
.00 .02 -.01 .03  
Age .00 .01 -.00 .01  
Male -.02 .24 -.04 .29  
African American -.20 .52 .02 .43 -.22* 
Indicted -.09 .23 -.03 .26  
Whether PDS attorney .05 .27 -.07 .31  
Whether retained attorney -.31 .34 -.07 .37  
Least severe sentencing 
judge category 
-.07 .22 -.03 .18  
Most severe sentencing 
judge category 
-.02 .15 .08 .26  
Whether drug conviction 
involved heroin 
-.08 .18 .06 .18  
Whether drug conviction 
involved pcp 
.13 .52 .09 .75  
Whether drug conviction 
involved drug free zone 
.12 .51 .14 .60  
      
N 163  165   
Pseudo R2 .22  .18   
*  p< .05 
**  p < .01 
*** p < .001 




Table 5.7:  Negative binomial regression models predicting the number of severity 
groups reduced from prosecutor charging phase to conviction for Master Grid cases 
 
 Pre-guidelines Post-guidelines Z-test 
 
 b1 (se1) b2 (se2) b1 - b2 
Constant -2.22** .79 -2.12** .71  
Number of prosecutor 
original misdemeanor 
charges 
.18 .11 .05 .07  
Number of prosecutor 
original felony charges 
-.01 .06 -.03 .02  
Most severe severity 
group charged for non-
drug offenses 
.57*** .07 .52*** .06  
Prior DC felony charges -.09 .05 -.05 .05  
Prior DC misdemeanor 
charges 
.03 .03 -.00 .04  
Age .02 .01 .01 .01  
Male .07 .35 .58 .31  
African American -.46 .39 .21 .43  
Indicted -.20 .47 -.65** .24  
Whether PDS attorney -.20 .29 -.34 .23  
Whether retained attorney -.21 .38 -.13 .36  
Least severe sentencing 
judge category 
-.02 .37 -.34 .29  
Most severe sentencing 
judge category 
.06 .25 -.21 .24  
      
N 246  216   
Pseudo R2 .28  .30   
*  p< .05 
**  p < .01 
*** p < .001 






Table 5.8:  Negative binomial regression models predicting the number of severity 
groups reduced from prosecutor charging phase to conviction for Master Grid cases 
(excluding escape cases) 
 
 Pre-guidelines Post-guidelines Z-test 
 
 b1 (se1) b2 (se2) b1 - b2 
Constant -1.59* .66 -1.77** .67  
Number of prosecutor 
original misdemeanor 
charges 
.10 .09 -.00 .07  
Number of prosecutor 
original felony charges 
-.01 .05 -.02 .01  
Most severe severity 
group charged for non 
drug offenses 
.44*** .06 .43*** .05  
Prior DC felony charges -.09* .04 -.04 .05  
Prior DC misdemeanor 
charges 
.06 .03 -.01 .04  
Age .01 .01 .01 .01  
Male -.10 .31 .44 .29  
African American -.38 .33 .32 .41  
Indicted -.11 .43 -.57** .21  
Whether PDS attorney -.09 .25 -.37 .21  
Whether retained attorney -.06 .32 -.12 .33  
Least severe sentencing 
judge category 
-.22 .34 -.39 .27  
Most severe sentencing 
judge category 
.06 .21 -.20 .21  
      
N 158  144   
Pseudo R2 .21  .24   
*  p< .05 
**  p < .01 
*** p < .001 




Table 5.9:  Tobit Regressions of Ln(sentence length) based on Conviction Charge 
for Master Grid Offenses 
 
 Pre-guidelines  Post-guidelines   
 b1 (se1)  b2 (se2)   
Constant 3.15*** .55  2.26*** .44   
Prior DC felony charges .03 .02  .03 .02   
Prior DC misdemeanor 
charges 
.00 .02  .02 .02   
Age -.00 .01  .00 .01   
Male .24 .23  .26 .22   
African American .02 .29  -.28 .27   
Indicted -.64 .36  -.09 .22   
Whether PDS attorney .02 .21  .03 .19   
Whether retained 
attorney 
-.83* .38  -.40 .32   
Whether convicted 
group “one” 
-.21 .17  -.35 .18   
Whether convicted 
group “three” 
-.73 .49  .66 .35   
Whether convicted 
group “four” 
.49* .22  .91*** .23   
Whether convicted 
group “five” 
1.61*** .36  1.54*** .36   
Whether convicted 
group “six” 
1.45* .57  2.24*** .50   
Whether convicted 
group “seven” 
2.53*** .44  2.60*** .36   
Whether convicted 
group “eight” 
3.10** .95  3.37*** .91   
N 185   173    
*  p< .05 
**  p < .01 
*** p < .001 






Table 5.10:  Tobit Regressions of Ln(sentence length) based on Most Severe 
Prosecutor Charge for Master Grid Offenses 
 
 Pre-guidelines  Post-guidelines   
 b1 (se1)  b2 (se2)   
Constant 3.08*** .59  1.45** .48   
Prior DC felony charges .06* .02  .05* .02   
Prior DC misdemeanor 
charges 
.00 .02  .02 .02   
Age -.01 .01  .00 .01   
Male .22 .25  .18 .23   
African American .19 .31  -.37 .28   
Indicted -.84* .39  .51* .24   
Whether PDS attorney .07 .23  .14 .20   
Whether retained 
attorney 
-.89 .41  -.37 .33   
Whether charged  group 
“two” 
.24 .02  .29 .20   
Whether charged group 
“three” 
-.56.43 .43  1.20** .39   
Whether charged group 
“four” 
.34 .25  1.10*** .29   
Whether charged group 
“five” 
.88** .28  .97** .28   
Whether charged group 
“six” 
1.66** .61  1.33* .56   
Whether charged group 
“seven” 
1.42*** .32  1.74*** .32 
 
  
Whether charged group 
“eight” 
1.77** .53  2.16*** .55   
Whether charged group 
“nine” 
3.01*** .72  2.86*** .36   
N 185   173    
*  p< .05 
**  p < .01 
*** p < .001 




Table 5.11:  Tobit Regressions of Ln(sentence length) based on Conviction Charge 
for Drug Grid Offenses 
 
 Pre-guidelines  Post-guidelines   
 b1 (se1)  b2 (se2)   
Constant 3.28*** .86  1.20 .64   
Prior DC felony charges .07 .04  .06* .03   
Prior DC misdemeanor 
charges 
.00 .02  .01 .03   
Age .00 .01  .01 .01   
Male .24 .32  .72** .26   
African American -.93 .60  -.10 .43   
Indicted -.49 .35  .09 .30   
Whether PDS attorney -.13 .36  -.02 .31   
Whether retained 
attorney 
-.01 .45  -.67 .42   
Whether convicted drug 
one 
1.82 1.01  -- --   
Whether convicted drug 
two 
.42* .20  .51** .17   
N 117   118    
*  p< .05 
**  p < .01 
*** p < .001 







Table 5.12:  Tobit Regressions of Ln(sentence length) based on Most Severe 
Prosecutor Charge for Drug Grid Offenses 
 
 Pre-guidelines  Post-guidelines   
 b1 (se1)  b2 (se2)   
Constant 3.64*** .86  1.25 .66   
Prior DC felony charges .08 .04  .07* .03   
Prior DC misdemeanor 
charges 
.01 .02  .01 .03   
Age -.00 .01  .01 .01   
Male .05 .31  .68* .26   
African American -.86 .61  -.05 .44   
Indicted -.57 .36  .13 .31   
Whether PDS attorney -.13 .37  .11 .31   
Whether retained 
attorney 
.20 .44  -.43 .43   
Whether charged  group 
“one” 
-- --  -.98 .84   
Whether charged group 
“three” 
1.41 .73  -.26 .43   
N 117   118    
*  p< .05 
**  p < .01 
*** p < .001 















Predictions based on coefficient 
estimates pre-Guidelines 
    
Predicted sentence using 
conviction charge 
17.19  12.64  
Predicted sentence using 
prosecutor charge  
17.40  12.80  




 -.16  
(-1.25%) 
 
Predictions based on coefficient 
estimates from post-Guidelines 
    
Predicted sentence using 
conviction charge 
13.31  11.94  
Predicted sentence using 
prosecutor charge  
13.62  11.95  














CHAPTER VI.  Discussion and Conclusion 
Summary and Discussion of Key Findings 
This study contained three stages of analysis. The first stage examined whether 
the District of Columbia Sentencing Guidelines had any main effects on prosecutorial 
charge bargaining outcomes. The analyses revealed that there were no statistically 
significant main effects. The second phase examined whether there were any interaction 
effects of the Sentencing Guidelines on charge bargaining. There were very fw 
statistically significant differences over time in the effect of lega  and extra-legal factors 
on the prosecutorial outcomes. The final stage examined whether the effect of charge 
bargaining on the ultimate sentence changed after the Sentencing Guidelines, and the 
analyses revealed very little change. The most important conclusion of this study, 
therefore, is that there were far more null findings that significant findings. These results 
are consistent with the results of Miethe (1987) and Wooldredge and Griffin (2005), 
which found very limited evidence of a hydraulic displacement of discretion to 
prosecutors.  
While the majority of the findings did not reveal significant differences in the 
nature, determinants, and effect of prosecutorial decisions after the implementation of the 
Sentencing Guidelines, there was some evidence of a change in charging and charge 
bargaining practices that may have affected the plea bargaining process.  Though the 
multivariate analyses did not reveal any main effects of the Sentencing Guidelines on 
prosecutorial outcomes, the descriptive statistics suggested that prosecutors increased the 
level of charging severity and charge bargaining after the Sentencing Guidelines went 
into effect. The most consistent findings of the multivariate analyses related to the effect 
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of charging variables on charge bargaining outcomes. As discussed earlier, one of the 
most important decisions affecting the plea bargaining process is the charging decision 
(McDonald, 1979; Alschuler, 1978). Hagan (1975) found that offenders with a higher 
number of charges were more likely to experience charge alterations, which “supports a 
hypothesis that offenders often may be systematically ‘over-charged’ in anticip tion of 
‘rewards’ to be distributed later in the bargaining process” (p. 544).  
The analyses in this study found that, with one exception, there was a stronger 
positive relationship between the level of charging severity and the level of charge 
bargaining after the Sentencing Guidelines went into effect. Before implementing the 
Sentencing Guidelines, the D.C. Advisory Commission on Sentencing speculated that, 
“in general, the prosecution bargains for the certainty of conviction, and the defendant 
bargains for the possibility of a reduced sentence” (1999 Report: 11). Tonry and Coffee 
(1987) wrote that it is an oversimplification to say that sentencing guidelines increase 
prosecutorial power only to cause guilty pleas, but that other ends such as saving time 
and achieving better allocation of prosecutorial resources are also pursued by th  
prosecutor and facilitated by the introduction of sentencing guidelines. Sentencing 
guidelines, they believed, can simplify the negotiation process and enable the prosecutor 
to conserve resources for more major cases involving serious crimes (p. 152). 
After the introduction of the D.C. Sentencing Guidelines, prosecutors seemed to 
change their charging and charge bargaining practices to make the plea negotition 
process easier. According to interviews with criminal justice practitioners in the District 
of Columbia, prosecutors after the Guidelines relied heavily on the Sentencing Guidelines 
ranges when offering plea bargains. Indeed, the standard plea agreements in the post-
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Guidelines era have generally required that the parties not argue for departur  above or 
below the Guidelines range. There is anecdotal evidence that guilty pleas became easier 
to negotiate under the Guidelines because both the prosecution and the defense had a 
clearer picture of the likely sentencing range in typical cases, particul ly for offenses 
with extremely wide statutory sentencing ranges. The finding that the rate of charging by 
indictment decreased after the Guidelines (Table 4.1) also supports the argument that 
prosecutors sought to reach plea agreements more efficiently after the Guidelines. As 
discussed above, the government’s interest in saving time and avoiding a trial can esult 
in reaching bargains without filing indictment (District of Columbia Public Defender 
Service, 2005).  
There was also an interesting finding regarding the effect of the offender’s race on 
prosecutorial outcomes. The analyses revealed a negative relationship between being 
African American and the number of charges dismissed before the Guidelines and a 
positive relationship after the Guidelines. The finding of more favorable treatment after 
the Sentencing Guidelines is consistent with prior research finding a lack of status effects 
on charge reductions that may be due to the “bureaucratic nature of the judicial pro ess,” 
where decisions by prosecutors and defense attorneys, who are concerned with efficiently 
disposing of cases, become “highly routinized and relatively resistant to extralegal 
factors” (Holmes, et al., 1987: 248). Thus, after the Sentencing Guidelines wet into 
effect, it appears that prosecutors may have used them as a tool to expedite typical cases 
in a routinized manner in order to save resources. Again, it is important to note that the 
race variable may be standing in for other unmeasured or uncontrolled factors that make 




Limitations and Future Research 
 Though this study fills a gap in the literature because it is one of the few studies 
examining the hydraulic displacement of discretion thesis, and it is the first study to apply 
Piehl and Bushway’s (2007) methodology to assess, not just the rate, but the value of the 
charge bargain, it does have limitations. One major shortcoming is that it only examines a 
period of one year after the Sentencing Guidelines went into effect. Data limitations 
prevent the examination of cases after 2005, which means this study will not be able to 
account for a possible lag effect of the Guidelines as court actors become more failiar
with the nuances of the new system (Wooldredge and Griffin, 2005: 308). An additional 
limitation is the small sample sizes, which may affect the ability to detect s atistically 
significant relationships. Future studies should include large samples if data are vailable 
to increase the level statistical power.159  
 This study is also limited in that it can only be generalizable to other urban 
jurisdictions with similar caseloads and offender demographic characteristi s. 
Furthermore, because this study uses a sample of convicted felons, it can not consider 
cases where defendants are convicted only of misdemeanors. Moreover, this study 
examines only prosecutorial decisions associated with charge bargaining. 
Due to lack of data, it does not consider other forms of prosecutorial discretion such as 
sentence bargaining, fact bargaining, or bargaining over whether to recommend release 
from pretrial detention. 
                                                
159 Statistical power provides an estimate of how often one would fail to find a statistically significant effect 
when one exists. Statistical power is defined as “1-type II error,” or one minus the probability of accepting 
the null hypothesis when it is false (Weisburd, et al., 1993). 
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This study is also limited because the CIS dataset and CourtView have a limited
number of variables. They do not include factors such as the offender’s pretrial status, 
employment status, income, marital status, degree of harm inflicted, education, 
drug/alcohol dependence, and whether a weapon was used in the crime. However, while 
model misspecification may result in biased estimates of the outcome and biase
estimates of the effects of specific independent variables, there is no reason to believe 
that measurement error is different in the pre and post-Guidelines periods and, therefore, 
a relative comparison between the two samples is still possible.  
Another limitation is that, because the data are limited to cases resulting in 
conviction, this study was unable to examine prosecutorial discretion regarding other 
decisions such as the decision of whether to charge and which charges to file. This study 
focuses on charge bargaining, which is one component in the sequence of decision 
making by criminal justice actors. It revealed the importance of charging on charge 
bargaining, and future research should examine the effect of sentencing guidelines on 
charging outcomes. Interviews with local criminal justice practitioners revealed that 
prosecutors often increase the number and severity of charges between the arrest stage 
and the charging phase. Future research should analyze police arrest charges to det rmine 
whether prosecutor charging decisions changed after the Sentencing Guidelines. As 
discussed above, plea bargaining is best understood, not as an isolated decision but as a 
“process that includes a number of decisions” beginning immediately after arrest and th t 
can lead to a number of different outcomes (Walker, 1993: 86). Plea bargaining is “not 
really a decision point at all. It is not a single decision that can be isolated and subjected 
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to formal controls. Instead, it involves a series of decisions, over a period of time, by 
different officials” including the police and the prosecutor (Walker, 1993: 86). 
 
Conclusion  
The majority of the findings of this study did not reveal significant differences in 
the nature and determinants of prosecutorial decisions after the implementation of the 
District of Columbia Sentencing Guidelines. Moreover, this study found that the effect of 
the charge bargain on the ultimate sentence did not change significantly after the 
Guidelines. Thus, the Sentencing Guidelines did not appear to result in a significant 
displacement of discretion and disparity to the prosecutor stage. This finding should be 
encouraging to policy makers who did not intend for the Sentencing Guidelines to affect 
prosecutorial practices.   
There were some changes in the charge bargaining process, however, that may be 
of interest to policy makers. Several findings of this study revealed, for instance, that 
charging practices changed after the Guidelines to facilitate charge b aining. According 
to interviews with criminal justice practitioners in the District of Columbia, the 
Guidelines have made the plea negotiation process easier for both the prosecutor and the 
defense attorney by increasing the predictability of the sentencing exposure for each 
charge. While this is considered a virtue by many, some defense attorneys criticize the 
Sentencing Guidelines for eliminating the judge’s ability to take into accunt 
extraordinary circumstances. Prosecutors generally require in plea agreements that 
defense attorneys not argue for downward departure, and judges virtually never depart 
from the Guidelines. The impression of some defense attorneys and defendants is that 
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prosecutors control the sentencing process under the Sentencing Guidelines. Policy 
makers may therefore wish to periodically review the Guidelines to determine whether 
the Guidelines ranges and departure rules strike the right balance between uniformity and 
judicial flexibility. The most important finding of this study, however, is thate 
Guidelines did not appear to result in a substantial displacement of discretion to 





MASTER  GRID 
 
 Criminal History Score 
Ranking Group 
Most Common Offenses 
0 to ½ 
A 
¾ to 1¾ 
B 
2 to 3¾ 
C 





1st degree murder w/armed 
1st degree murder 
360 - 720 360 - 720 360 - 720 360 - 720 360 + 
Group 2 
2nd degree murder w/armed 
2nd degree murder 
1st degree sex abuse 
1st degree sex abuse w/armed 
144 - 288 156 - 300 168 - 312 180 - 324 192 + 
Group 3 
Voluntary manslaughter w/armed 
1st degree child sex abuse 
Carjacking while armed 
Assault with intent to kill w/armed 
Armed burglary I 
90 - 180 102 - 192 114 - 204 126 - 216 138 + 
Group 4 
Aggravated assault w/armed 
Voluntary manslaughter 
48 - 120 60 - 132 72 - 144 84 - 156 96 + 
Group 5 
Possession of firearm /CV 
Armed robbery 
Burglary I 
Obstruction of justice 
Assault with intent to kill 





2nd degree child sex abuse 
Assault with intent to rob 
18 - 60 24 - 66 30 - 72 36 - 78 42 + 
Group 7 
Burglary II 
3rd degree sex abuse 
Negligent homicide 
Assault w/I to commit mayhem 
Attempt 2nd degree sex abuse 






1st degree theft 








1 - 12 3 - 16 5 - 20 7 - 24 9 + 
*Criminal History Points for prior convictions in these groups. 
White/unshaded boxes – prison only.  
Dark shaded boxes – prison or short split permissible.  






 Criminal History Score 
 Ranking Group 
Most common offenses 
0 to ½ 
A 
¾ to 1¾ 
B 
2 to 3¾ 
C 











12-30 16-36 20-42 24-48 28+ 
Group 3 
Attempt Distribution 
Attempt PWID 6-18 10-24 14-30 18-36 22+ 
*Criminal History Points for prior convictions in these groups. 
White/unshaded boxes – prison only. 
Dark shaded boxes – prison or short split permissible. 







(Most Common offenses by Groups) 
 
1 
Murder 1º w/a 
Murder 1 
Murder of a law enforcement officer 1º 
2 
Murder 2º w/a 
Murder 2º 
Child sexual abuse 1º w/a 
Sexual abuse 1ºw/a 
Sexual abuse 1º 
3 
AWIK w/a 
Burglary 1º w/a 
Carjacking w/a 
Child sexual abuse 1º 
Kidnapping w/a 
Voluntary manslaughter w/a 
4 Aggravated assault w/a Voluntary manslaughter 
5 
Armed robbery 
AWI commit any offense w/a 




Involuntary Manslaughter w/a 
Involuntary Manslaughter 
Kidnapping 
Malicious disfigurement w/a 
Mayhem w/a 
Obstruction of justice 
PFCOV  
Child sexual abuse 2º w/a 
Sexual abuse 2º w/a 
Sexual abuse 2º 
AWI commit 1º child sexual abuse w/a 
AWI commit 2º child sexual abuse w/a 
AWI commit 1º sexual abuse w/a 
AWI commit 2º sexual abuse w/a 
Child sexual abuse, attempt 1º  w/a 
Child sexual abuse, attempt 2º w/a 
Sexual abuse,  attempt 1º w/a 




APO w/ dangerous weapon 
ADW 
AWI commit robbery 
Attempt robbery w/a 
Burglary 2º w/a 




AWI commit 1º child sexual abuse 
AWI commit 2º child sexual abuse 
AWI commit 1º sexual abuse 
AWI commit 2º sexual abuse 
Child sexual abuse, attempt 1º 
Child sexual abuse 2º 
Sexual abuse, attempt 1º 
7 




Sexual abuse, attempt 2º 
Sexual abuse of a patient 1º 
Sexual abuse of a ward 1º 
Sexual abuse 3º 
8 
APO 
AWI commit any offense 




Cruelty to children 2º 
DP (f) 
Extortion 







Trafficking in stolen property 
UUV 
Child sexual abuse, attempt 2º 
Enticing a child 
Sexual abuse of a patient, attempt 1º 
Sexual abuse of a ward, attempt 1º 
Sexual abuse, attempt 3º 
Sexual abuse 4º  
Sexual abuse of a patient 2º 
Sexual abuse of a ward 2º 
9 
Bad check 
Bail reform act (BRA) 
Blackmail 
Crack house, maintaining 








Impersonating a public official 
Obtaining narcotics by fraud 
Pandering 
PPW -- second + offense 
RSP 
UE (vending machine) 
Uttering 
Enticing a child. attempt 
Sexual abuse, attempt 4º 
Sexual abuse of a patient, attempt 2º 







Possession of prohibited weapon 
Unlawful possession of pistol 
Carrying a pistol w/o license 
Attempt carrying pistol w/o license 
Poss firearm during dang. crime/violence 
Unregistered firearm 
Unlawful possession of ammunition 
 
2 Sexual Offenses 
 
Sexual solicitation 
Solicitation for lewd purposes 
Sexual solicitation 3rd 
Sex abuse 
Attempt 2nd degree child sex abuse 
Sodomy on minor 
1st degree sex abuse 
2nd degree sex abuse 
3rd degree sex abuse 
4th degree sex abuse 
1st degree child sex abuse 
2nd degree child sex abuse 
Enticing a child 
2nd degree sex abuse/ward 
2nd degree sex abuse/patient 
Attempt 1st degree sex abuse 
Sexual performance using minor 
1st degree sex abuse w/armed 
Attempt 1st degree child sex abuse 
Induce female into prostitution 
Rape w/armed 
Incest 








Taking property w/o right 
1st degree theft 
1st Degree Fraud 




Receiving stolen goods 
Theft DC property 









Threats bodily harm 






Armed assault with intent 
Mayhem while armed 
Assault w/i to kill 
Assault on correctional officer 
Assault with intent 
Assault w/i to rape w/armed 
Assault w/i to rob w/ armed 
Assault w/i to kill w/armed 
Assault w/i to commit sodomy while armed 
Attempt aggravated assault 
Assault w/i to rob 
Assault w/i to commit 1st degree sex abuse 
Assault w/i any offense 
Assault w/i to commit mayhem 
APO 














Accessory after fact 
Attempt armed robbery 
 
 
7 Escape/BRA/Contempt/Prison Breach 
 
Bail Reform Act violation 
Contempt (violation of conditions of release) 





Attempt PWID marijuana 
Attempt PWID heroin 
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Attempt PWID cocaine 
Attempt PWID PCP 
Attempt PWID dilaudid 
Attempt dist heroin 
Attempt dist cocaine 
Attempt dist preludin 
Attempt dist marijuana 
Attempt dist PCP 
Attempt dist dilaudid 
Violating drug free zone 





















Murder I while armed 
2nd degree murder w/armed 
Involuntary manslaughter 
Manslaughter while armed 
Manslaughter 
2nd degree murder 
 
10 Cruelty to Children 
2nd degree cruelty to children 














Robbery of senior citizen 







Armed burglary I 











Bribery of witness 








Attemp petit larceny 
Attempt UUA 
Attempted crime not listed 
Bad check 
CDW 
Cruelty to animals 
Sale possession narcotics 
Exempt narcotics 
UNA records 
Obtain narcotics by fraud 
Dangerous drugs 
DDA inventories 





Larceny - shoplifting 
Negligent homicide 
Permanent game table setup 




Possession implement crime 
Buying stolen property 
Indecent exposure 


















possession drug parphenalia 





Possession of drug parphenalia w/in to use 
2nd Degree attempt theft 
Attempt to take property w/o right 
Attempt possession heroin 
Attempt possession cocaine 
Attempt possession marijuana 
Attempt possession PCP 
Attempt possession dilaudid 
Picket 100 feet of health care facility 
Maintaining a crack house 
Destroying property/domestic 
Violation of civil protection 
Violation of civil protection 
PDP with intent to sell 
Unlawful possession of heroin 
Unlawful possession of cocaine 
Unlawful possession of preludin 
Procuring 
Violation of work release 
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